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This is an excerpt from a book by Tam Hunt. Although his solution is panpsychism, the critique of idealism is on point.
Her are some extended quotes:
First, I want to establish where I agree with these thinkers: I agree that the world we know, each of us in our heads here and now, is entirely created in our minds, presumably by our brains and the various senses that feed into our brains. So in that sense, yes, our human reality is for each of us all in our minds. But recognizing the ability of our minds and brains to create an entire world for each of us, based on an external objective reality, is a very different statement than saying that there is no external objective reality.
The modern scientific view is that there is a world out there that forms the basis for the creation of subjective individual worlds by beings with minds. This position is known as scientific realism and I find it a pretty compelling view.
The scientific realist uses this kind of agreement — what is known as “intersubjective” agreement — to reasonably infer that there is in fact a real world out there, independent of any particular human consciousness, that we know through our senses. Our minds create our subjective impressions for each of us: the colors, the sounds, every detail of what we actually witness in our minds. We know this with good confidence from countless studies on how the brain produces the features of our world. But we reasonably infer that there is something out there, what we call an external objective world, that is the basis for our internal representations in our minds.
So the world we know is — we reasonably infer — a representation of an independently existing reality. By independently existing, we mean that it exists independently of you or I. How else would we agree on so much about what’s out there if there wasn’t some objective (i.e. independent of our individual minds) basis for the worlds in our minds?
Idealism can’t answer this basic question very well at all. Classic idealism, formulated by Bishop Berkeley in a number of works in the 18th Century, answered the question by suggesting that the external world is in fact the mind of God. And since we all exist in the mind of God, we agree on these features of the world around us. The world around us is the mind of God.
BK's approach is hardly different from Bishop Berkeley. He substitutes a mind-at-large for mind of God. The problem is that the need to hypothesize a mind-at-large to make the theory work destroys any argument from parsimony. It also requires belief in something for which there is no evidence and which is as far-fetched as a world of matter.
Well, if you've been paying attention at all, BK has gone to great lengths in books, papers, blog posts, and interviews to make a comprehensive case for why he has delineated his take from Berkelely's take, explicating why and how he significantly diverges from it. Not sure BK is even aware of Lanza's version, but I suspect he would also argue that it's lacking. Nor can BK's version be easily lumped in with Vedanta or Buddhist versions, whatever tangential comparables there may be. And while there is some common ground to be found with Hoffman, there are also some hard to reconcile differences—i.e. Hoffman doesn't limit conscious agency to metabolizing lifeforms. So given that Tam Hunt makes no mention of BK's work, and may well not have delved into it at all, which no doubt BK would argue is distinct from the versions that TH is critiquing, if he were to thoroughly investigate it, and they were to actually have a nuanced discussion about it, for all we know he might be more amenable to it. Now, of course, we will await the case to be made that TH should just bypass BK's version, and all of those other versions he refers to, and go directly to Steiner's version, if he wants to understand what idealism truly is.
Here out of instinct or grace we seek
soulmates in these galleries of hieroglyph and glass,
where mutual longings and sufferings of love
are laid bare in transfigured exhibition of our hearts,
we who crave deep secrets and mysteries,
as elusive as the avatars of our dreams.
Soul_of_Shu wrote: ↑Mon Dec 20, 2021 5:40 pm
Well, if you've been paying attention at all, BK has gone to great lengths in books, papers, blog posts, and interviews to make a comprehensive case for why he has delineated his take from Berkelely's take, explicating why and how he significantly diverges from it. Not sure BK is even aware of Lanza's version, but I suspect he would also argue that it's lacking. Nor can BK's version be easily lumped in with Vedanta or Buddhist versions, whatever tangential comparables there may be. And while there is some common ground to be found with Hoffman, there are also some hard to reconcile differences—i.e. Hoffman doesn't limit conscious agency to metabolizing lifeforms. So given that Tam Hunt makes no mention of BK's work, and may well not have delved into it at all, which no doubt BK would argue is distinct from the versions that TH is critiquing, if he were to thoroughly investigate it, and they were to actually have a nuanced discussion about it, for all we know he might be more amenable to it. Now, of course, we will await the case to be made that TH should just bypass BK's version, and all of those other versions he refers to, and go directly to Steiner's version, if he wants to understand what idealism truly is.
Agree that Tam should have addressed BK's version.
However, you say BK is different from Berkeley, I don't see how it is significantly different since it still requires a mind-at-large which, although different from God, is still something for which there is no evidence nor any certain sure way to obtain evidence.
This topic was created somewhat as a response to Czinczar's post but I didn't want to take that topic off-topic so I created this.
Idealists make a good point, which Tam and I agree with, that all we know of the world is in our consciousness. The problem becomes in trying to extend that observation to any broader understanding of the world. A critique of materialism does not by itself become an argument for idealism. The core problem, which Tam identifies, is explaining "intersubjective" agreement.
Jim Cross wrote: ↑Mon Dec 20, 2021 6:15 pm
Agree that Tam should have addressed BK's version.
However, you say BK is different from Berkeley, I don't see how it is significantly different since it still requires a mind-at-large which, although different from God, is still something for which there is no evidence nor any certain sure way to obtain evidence.
Regardless of my opinion, it's BK who has made the comprehensive case for how and why he diverges from Berkeley, and why a plausible epistemological case can be made for transpersonal Mind. If you've either ignored his case, or have indeed thoroughly delved into it, but reject it as unconvincing, then just re-capitulating BK's case here, in hope that it will somehow be made more convincing than he has already made it, seems another exercise in futility.
Jim wrote: The core problem, which Tam identifies, is explaining "intersubjective" agreement.
Again, if you've been paying attention, BK has made his case in explaining how he addresses this critique, which in his estimation is a sound case. Whether or not TH would buy into it, would require that he first investigate it. In the case of our discussion, I can only repeat what I just wrote above as it applied to the Berkeley comparison: if you are either ignoring or not buying how BK has already addressed this critique, why would you buy some re-packaging of it here?
Here out of instinct or grace we seek
soulmates in these galleries of hieroglyph and glass,
where mutual longings and sufferings of love
are laid bare in transfigured exhibition of our hearts,
we who crave deep secrets and mysteries,
as elusive as the avatars of our dreams.
Jim Cross wrote: ↑Mon Dec 20, 2021 6:15 pm
Agree that Tam should have addressed BK's version.
However, you say BK is different from Berkeley, I don't see how it is significantly different since it still requires a mind-at-large which, although different from God, is still something for which there is no evidence nor any certain sure way to obtain evidence.
Regardless of my opinion, it's BK who has made the comprehensive case for how and why he diverges from Berkeley, and why a plausible epistemological case can be made for transpersonal Mind. If you've either ignored his case, or have indeed thoroughly delved into it, but reject it as unconvincing, then just re-capitulating BK's case here, in hope that it will somehow be made more convincing than he has already made it, seems another exercise in futility.
Jim wrote: The core problem, which Tam identifies, is explaining "intersubjective" agreement.
Again, if you've been paying attention, BK has made his case in explaining how he addresses this critique, which in his estimation is a sound case. Whether or not TH would buy into it, would require that he first investigate it. In the case of our discussion, I can only repeat what I just wrote above as it applied to the Berkeley comparison: if you are either ignoring or not buying how BK has already addressed this critique, why would you buy some re-packaging of it here?
It might be helpful if you would offer a summation of BK's argument. But keep in mind, this is not all about BK, otherwise I would have posted this in the BK forum.
I think "intersubjective" agreement goes well beyond Tam's exposition of it and his example of the photograph.
It is not just that we agree on a description of the world but also that we agree on how the world works.
If we toss a tennis ball off the roof of high building, it will fall in a parabolic arc to road or street below. For everybody who does it it will work that way. No matter how many times we do it it works that way. The ball never flies into space or comes back to us like a boomerang. Any of those things I can imagine in my mind but only one thing happens in the external world. It might do any or all of those things in a dream but that is what distinguishes dreaming as mental.
So the external world doesn't even have the most basic characteristics of something mental. In contrast to the mental, it works the same way every time. It doesn't work differently for you and me. It doesn't work differently one time from another time.
Okay. I went back and looked parts of The Idea of the World.
In 8.7 (Chapter 8 part 7) he discusses the shared world objection.
The problem with his argument is that BK works backward from the mind-at-large to explain why the world appears the same or similar to all of us. But the mind-at-large is what he needs to prove, not the perception of a shared world. The problem is providing independent evidence of a mind-at-large. The fact that the world appears similar to all of us can be explained a number of ways and, if we want to use parsimony as an argument, the simplest explanation is the external world really is different from the mental since it has consistencies and regularities not found in the mental.
So the external world doesn't even have the most basic characteristics of something mental. In contrast to the mental, it works the same way every time.
Jim, what I'm about to say I feel sure you already know, but you just love stirring the pot, you rascal. Never mind.
BK has semi-facetiously referred to MAL as like a crocodile - you can work out exactly how far you need to be from it to avoid being pursued. MAL is instinctive, and recently, BK also used the word 'spontaneous' (as a synonym), by which he means reacts without thinking. He sees the laws of physics as akin to reflex actions arising out of natural, archetypal templates.
Our brains (as images of our minds) show our evolutionary history with reptilian elements (instinct), mammalian elements (feeling) and human elements (reasoning). So evolution has given MAL's bounded alters more nuanced thinking than MAL had unbounded.
I don't expect you to believe any of this or worship Sobek the crocodile god - but I think it's close to how Analytic Idealism sees it.
So the external world doesn't even have the most basic characteristics of something mental. In contrast to the mental, it works the same way every time.
Jim, what I'm about to say I feel sure you already know, but you just love stirring the pot, you rascal. Never mind.
BK has semi-facetiously referred to MAL as like a crocodile - you can work out exactly how far you need to be from it to avoid being pursued. MAL is instinctive, and recently, BK also used the word 'spontaneous' (as a synonym), by which he means reacts without thinking. He sees the laws of physics as akin to reflex actions arising out of natural, archetypal templates.
Our brains (as images of our minds) show our evolutionary history with reptilian elements (instinct), mammalian elements (feeling) and human elements (reasoning). So evolution has given MAL's bounded alters more nuanced thinking than MAL had unbounded.
I don't expect you to believe any of this or worship Sobek the crocodile god - but I think it's close to how Analytic Idealism sees it.
Ben,
You are dwelling on BK too but at least you are not quoting Steiner.
A crocodile's jaws, like an alligator's, has very little opening strength which is how wrestlers can handle them.
BK's explanation for a shared world is circular. It requires a mind-at-large but can't derive the mind-at-large independently from the shared world. His explanation too has very little opening power.
Okay. I went back and looked parts of The Idea of the World.
In 8.7 (Chapter 8 part 7) he discusses the shared world objection.
The problem with his argument is that BK works backward from the mind-at-large to explain why the world appears the same or similar to all of us. But the mind-at-large is what he needs to prove, not the perception of a shared world. The problem is providing independent evidence of a mind-at-large. The fact that the world appears similar to all of us can be explained a number of ways and, if we want to use parsimony as an argument, the simplest explanation is the external world really is different from the mental since it has consistencies and regularities not found in the mental.
It seems for the most part you're in agreement with TH's critique of idealism, and in giving some further elaboration on it, and in the absence of any engagement from BK, you want others here to argue against that critique, in some way that improves upon what BK has already offered. I suspect the Steineresque take would concur with your specific critique. I grant the benefit of the doubt that perhaps it's not an exercise in futility, for anyone who wants to give it a try, to offer you a version of idealism that better addresses these perceived failings of idealism. As for where I'm at, I've no need of rhetorical persuasion, or proof of the kind that you find lacking, to buttress what is a living experience of the primacy of consciousness independent of this corporeal expression. The conceptual models just offer some mutual framework, however provisional, within which I can communicate in a meaningful way with others who likewise have that living experience. However, for those for whom that apparently isn't an option, and are inclined toward needing and offering some definitive, objective empirical case, by all means go for it.
Here out of instinct or grace we seek
soulmates in these galleries of hieroglyph and glass,
where mutual longings and sufferings of love
are laid bare in transfigured exhibition of our hearts,
we who crave deep secrets and mysteries,
as elusive as the avatars of our dreams.
Soul_of_Shu wrote: ↑Mon Dec 20, 2021 5:40 pm
Well, if you've been paying attention at all, BK has gone to great lengths in books, papers, blog posts, and interviews to make a comprehensive case for why he has delineated his take from Berkelely's take, explicating why and how he significantly diverges from it. Not sure BK is even aware of Lanza's version, but I suspect he would also argue that it's lacking. Nor can BK's version be easily lumped in with Vedanta or Buddhist versions, whatever tangential comparables there may be. And while there is some common ground to be found with Hoffman, there are also some hard to reconcile differences—i.e. Hoffman doesn't limit conscious agency to metabolizing lifeforms. So given that Tam Hunt makes no mention of BK's work, and may well not have delved into it at all, which no doubt BK would argue is distinct from the versions that TH is critiquing, if he were to thoroughly investigate it, and they were to actually have a nuanced discussion about it, for all we know he might be more amenable to it. Now, of course, we will await the case to be made that TH should just bypass BK's version, and all of those other versions he refers to, and go directly to Steiner's version, if he wants to understand what idealism truly is.
Agree that Tam should have addressed BK's version.
However, you say BK is different from Berkeley, I don't see how it is significantly different since it still requires a mind-at-large which, although different from God, is still something for which there is no evidence nor any certain sure way to obtain evidence.
This topic was created somewhat as a response to Czinczar's post but I didn't want to take that topic off-topic so I created this.
Idealists make a good point, which Tam and I agree with, that all we know of the world is in our consciousness. The problem becomes in trying to extend that observation to any broader understanding of the world. A critique of materialism does not by itself become an argument for idealism. The core problem, which Tam identifies, is explaining "intersubjective" agreement.
Do you see the blatant dualism being employed in the very first sentence? Tam writes, "First, I want to establish where I agree with these thinkers: I agree that the world we know, each of us in our heads here and now, is entirely created in our minds, presumably by our brains and the various senses that feed into our brains." So she is not only importing dualism into her argument but into the arguments of "these [idealist] thinkers" as well.
Perhaps you agree with subject-object dualism. But the point is, do you see why assuming a metaphysical position at the very outset of a philosophical or scientific inquiry makes the rest of the reasoning worthless? And, if you or anyone else did not spot this dualism until after I pointed it out here, they should really ask themselves how often they fail to spot metaphysical assumptions when evaluating philosophical or scientific arguments.
"Most people would sooner regard themselves as a piece of lava in the moon than as an 'I'"
