A separate topic...

[ScottRoberts]

TriloByte said in the Cleric/Eugene thread

I would agree. I think that was what Scott Roberts was doing, integrating BK idealism, non-dualism and Steinerian Science in one philosophy. I don’t know if he is still working in that regard. Sadly he doesn’t write in this forum as much as he did before.

My intent in the Tetralemmic Polarity essay was not to integrate any existing philosophies (though it might serve to do such integration). Rather it was just to provide a logical tool to get one past the perennial oppositions: one/many, time/timelessness, being/becoming, and so on. It does, I grant, suggest an ontological claim, namely that there is no formlessness, there are no forms, there is only the polarity. But latterly I'm thinking this is too abstract to bother defending as an ontology, though I still hold to its value as a logical tool.

I should mention that I've discovered a logical error in the essay. To correct it, I've done a strike-through on the sentence:

Note that there can only be one formlessness, since if there were two, there must be that which distinguishes one from the other, which means they would have form. [See Addendum]

and the Addendum says:

I have crossed out the line saying "there can only be one formlessness" since, though it may hold logically for some absolute formlessness, experientially one must consider the possibility of "relative formlessness". That is, while one might experience a mystical "formlessness" state, there is no telling if one is not simply focused on some world of forms that one is unable to experience. To make an analogy, suppose one sees a blank piece of paper, but is unaware that it contains words written in invisible ink.

[Eugene I.]

My understanding was that the "formlessness" is not a "mystical" state of the absence of forms, but formless/existential aspects of every form. So, formlessness is present regardless whether any forms are present or not. Every form has these following formless aspects: beingness (every form exists) and awareness (every form is consciously experienced, in idealistic ontology at least). Any form is never separate from these two aspects and cannot exist and be experienced without them. Also, the formless aspects have some peculiar properties: they do not change in time and in their extent (there cannot be more or less existence or more or less experiencing, there is just existence and experiencing, the same all the time), and they never change from one form to another (i.e. every form exists and is experienced in the same way). The formless aspects unify all forms into oneness because they are the same for all forms, basically, all forms are "glued" together in oneness in the formless aspects, without losing a variety in their manifestation. This is not an abstract intellectualization, one can experientially directly see in their 1-st person conscious experience that all forms are united into the oneness of the "space" of beingness-awareness. Some nondualists claim that these properties of formless aspects make them in some way ontologically more fundamental than forms, but I would not subscribe to such far-reaching claim.

[AshvinP]

I should mention that I've discovered a logical error in the essay. To correct it, I've done a strike-through on the sentence:

Note that there can only be one formlessness, since if there were two, there must be that which distinguishes one from the other, which means they would have form. [See Addendum]

and the Addendum says:

I have crossed out the line saying "there can only be one formlessness" since, though it may hold logically for some absolute formlessness, experientially one must consider the possibility of "relative formlessness". That is, while one might experience a mystical "formlessness" state, there is no telling if one is not simply focused on some world of forms that one is unable to experience. To make an analogy, suppose one sees a blank piece of paper, but is unaware that it contains words written in invisible ink.

Here is a slightly elaborated version of Cleric's image to illustrate what Scott is pointing to in his addendum:







Each colored bar represents a higher stage of our own cognition, where what was previously known only indirectly as "formlessness" now appears as meaningful form of spiritual activity. There is still the essential polar relation of Spirit-Soul (formlessness-form) through which this eternal involutionary-evolutionary process unfolds, but our own cognition is always in the middle.

[TriloByte]

TriloByte said in the Cleric/Eugene thread

I would agree. I think that was what Scott Roberts was doing, integrating BK idealism, non-dualism and Steinerian Science in one philosophy. I don’t know if he is still working in that regard. Sadly he doesn’t write in this forum as much as he did before.

My intent in the Tetralemmic Polarity essay was not to integrate any existing philosophies (though it might serve to do such integration). Rather it was just to provide a logical tool to get one past the perennial oppositions: one/many, time/timelessness, being/becoming, and so on. It does, I grant, suggest an ontological claim, namely that there is no formlessness, there are no forms, there is only the polarity. But latterly I'm thinking this is too abstract to bother defending as an ontology, though I still hold to its value as a logical tool.

I should mention that I've discovered a logical error in the essay. To correct it, I've done a strike-through on the sentence:

Note that there can only be one formlessness, since if there were two, there must be that which distinguishes one from the other, which means they would have form. [See Addendum]

and the Addendum says:

I have crossed out the line saying "there can only be one formlessness" since, though it may hold logically for some absolute formlessness, experientially one must consider the possibility of "relative formlessness". That is, while one might experience a mystical "formlessness" state, there is no telling if one is not simply focused on some world of forms that one is unable to experience. To make an analogy, suppose one sees a blank piece of paper, but is unaware that it contains words written in invisible ink.

Scott, thank you for your clarification.

[TriloByte]

My understanding was that the "formlessness" is not a "mystical" state of the absence of forms, but formless/existential aspects of every form. So, formlessness is present regardless whether any forms are present or not. Every form has these following formless aspects: beingness (every form exists) and awareness (every form is consciously experienced, in idealistic ontology at least). Any form is never separate from these two aspects and cannot exist and be experienced without them. Also, the formless aspects have some peculiar properties: they do not change in time and in their extent (there cannot be more or less existence or more or less experiencing, there is just existence and experiencing, the same all the time), and they never change from one form to another (i.e. every form exists and is experienced in the same way). The formless aspects unify all forms into oneness because they are the same for all forms, basically, all forms are "glued" together in oneness in the formless aspects, without losing a variety in their manifestation.

I believe that all you say here is consistent with what Scott says above.

This is not an abstract intellectualization, one can experientially directly see in their 1-st person conscious experience that all forms are united into the oneness of the "space" of beingness-awareness. Some nondualists claim that these properties of formless aspects make them in some way ontologically more fundamental than forms, but I would not subscribe to such far-reaching claim.

Eugene, I’m not sure if it was you who said in another thread that since one person remember an experience of emptiness, then his/her memory was present while having that experience. Could it be that this memory-form is one of those invisible ink-forms Scott is referring to?

[TriloByte]

I should mention that I've discovered a logical error in the essay. To correct it, I've done a strike-through on the sentence:

Note that there can only be one formlessness, since if there were two, there must be that which distinguishes one from the other, which means they would have form. [See Addendum]

and the Addendum says:

I have crossed out the line saying "there can only be one formlessness" since, though it may hold logically for some absolute formlessness, experientially one must consider the possibility of "relative formlessness". That is, while one might experience a mystical "formlessness" state, there is no telling if one is not simply focused on some world of forms that one is unable to experience. To make an analogy, suppose one sees a blank piece of paper, but is unaware that it contains words written in invisible ink.

Here is a slightly elaborated version of Cleric's image to illustrate what Scott is pointing to in his addendum:







Each colored bar represents a higher stage of our own cognition, where what was previously known only indirectly as "formlessness" now appears as meaningful form of spiritual activity. There is still the essential polar relation of Spirit-Soul (formlessness-form) through which this eternal involutionary-evolutionary process unfolds, but our own cognition is always in the middle.

Thank you Ashvin for all your explanations. I have a lot to think about them.

[Eugene I.]

Eugene, I’m not sure if it was you who said in another thread that since one person remember an experience of emptiness, then his/her memory was present while having that experience. Could it be that this memory-form is one of those invisible ink-forms Scott is referring to?

Yes, that's what I was also saying. But my point is that there is a terminological confusion here. "Formless" or "emptiness" can be understood in two ways: one is absence of forms, like dreamless sleep of deep meditative formless state (and we can argue if that is indeed the state of total absence of forms or only "invisible-ink" kind of state, but it's actually irrelevant). The other meaning of "formless" is formless aspects of every form. To experience the latter, the state of absence of forms in not needed, it only requires experiential recognition of the formless aspects. I think actually calling it "formless" is confusing, the reason for such name is to point that it is invariant to any form and not a form itself. I think calling it "existential aspects" would be more appropriate (John Vervaeke calls them "adverbial aspects").

There is still a practical link between the two, because it is usually easier to recognize the formless aspects in the state of the absence of forms (or to call it more precisely, the state of the minimal presence of forms), because in such state the attention is not focused on forms and becomes more open and it becomes easier for it to notice the formless aspects. But once the formless aspects are recognized, there is not much usefulness in continuing such practice, and in some traditions it is even considered counter-productive.

[ScottRoberts]

My understanding was that the "formlessness" is not a "mystical" state of the absence of forms, but formless/existential aspects of every form.

Yes, but I am just saying that when a mystic says he 'experiences formlessness' that formlessness may be relative. Also -- getting picky here -- there is no formless aspect of a form. There is a formless aspect of an ideational act, and a form aspect of an ideational act (though I note that I made the same mistake in my OP.)

But my main concern at this point is to question my use of the word 'formlessness' at all. Really, all I can say after the argument against horn (2) of the tetralemma (arguing that form alone cannot produce awareness of form) is that in addition to form there is "something more". Now it is easy enough to say that that "more" must be 'formless', but should we? Doing so seems to lead to reifying formlessness, which I see as getting overly abstract.

So, formlessness is present regardless whether any forms are present or not. Every form has these following formless aspects: beingness (every form exists) and awareness (every form is consciously experienced, in idealistic ontology at least). Any form is never separate from these two aspects and cannot exist and be experienced without them.

I see these statements as just tautological, not as having ontological significance. What exists exists, and what is experienced is experienced. To then go on...

Also, the formless aspects have some peculiar properties: they do not change in time and in their extent (there cannot be more or less existence or more or less experiencing, there is just existence and experiencing, the same all the time), and they never change from one form to another (i.e. every form exists and is experienced in the same way).

...is as I see it to reify, or at least pursue, an abstraction.

The formless aspects unify all forms into oneness because they are the same for all forms, basically, all forms are "glued" together in oneness in the formless aspects, without losing a variety in their manifestation. This is not an abstract intellectualization, one can experientially directly see in their 1-st person conscious experience that all forms are united into the oneness of the "space" of beingness-awareness.

But if one introduces relative formlessness into the disussion, the gluing can be ascribed to that, rather than some absolute formlessness. Now one might be tempted to say the hierarchy of relative formlessnesses must top out with absolute formlessness, but why bother? The pragmatist in me says we shouldn't bother, and instead concern ourselves on whatever relative formlessness is our immediate environment.

Some nondualists claim that these properties of formless aspects make them in some way ontologically more fundamental than forms, but I would not subscribe to such far-reaching claim.

Yes, and that was, and continues to be, one of my concerns in writing the essay.

I should note that much of your thinking here was my thinking when I wrote the essay but -- I won't say I've moved on, it's more a stepping back -- I just now think that such thinking is not useful. I would write it differently now. In some ways, I think the most important thing to take from the essay is that tetralemmic polarity is not understandable. Which is just another way of saying that our current intellect is limited. Maybe when we move up a level of Meaning (h/t Ashvin) one can cognize it. Or leave it behind.

[Eugene I.]

Yes, but I am just saying that when a mystic says he 'experiences formlessness' that formlessness may be relative.

Yes, good point

Also -- getting picky here -- there is no formless aspect of a form. There is a formless aspect of an ideational act, and a form aspect of an ideational act (though I note that I made the same mistake in my OP.)

Right, that's a good way to put it.

But my main concern at this point is to question my use of the word 'formlessness' at all. Really, all I can say after the argument against horn (2) of the tetralemma (arguing that form alone cannot produce awareness of form) is that in addition to form there is "something more". Now it is easy enough to say that that "more" must be 'formless', but should we? Doing so seems to lead to reifying formlessness, which I see as getting overly abstract.

Right, that's also what I was trying to say one pose above.

I see these statements as just tautological, not as having ontological significance. What exists exists, and what is experienced is experienced. To then go on...

Logically it is a tautology, but these statements are simply the pointers to a direct experience of the unity of all forms in their existential aspects.

Good to find some common ground, thanks!

[AshvinP]

Thank you Ashvin for all your explanations. I have a lot to think about them.

No problem. I should caution, these images should not be reified into reflecting something more about the Reality than the limited clarifying purpose for which they are intended. Just as the word "formlesness" can be reified into an absolute unchanging condition of Reality, so can various aspects of an image. That is why so little added detail is generally used in these images. It's a real danger of idolatry that the intellect can slip into without really knowing it, and entire edifices of thought are built up around one or two subconscious reifications. It becomes more and more difficult to rectify the longer it remains outside of conscious awareness informed by Thinking.

The main point here is that the "relative formlessness" Scott mentions should be internalized to our concrete experience, which is the main reason Scott is modifying the language. We should really try to understand there is only relative perpsective within a unfied Mind. Many academics talk about "relational" nature of Reality, but it remains so abstracted from experience, they do not perceive the lack of relational perspective in their own thinking and thought-systems. It is meaningless to speak of absolute properties of Reality, because that already implicates the view from nowhere.

So if we want to truly relate these concepts to 1st-person perspective, the only possible perspective, we can naturally look at our own experience of the world content. What is it that "glues" our fragmented perceptions together into coherent wholes of experience? That is obviously the meaning which is discerned by our Thinking. Any adding of other concepts to Thinking activity which perceives the meaningful glue is unnecessary. Reality isn't posing us trick questions here. It's really only as complicated as we make it.