Bernardo's Shared World Problem

[Starbuck]

Thanks again for pertinent comments.

The theories of dissociation (which are only analogies anyway to DID) need to come into play because Bernardo has concluded there is a mind-at-large. But there is no observational or scientific evidence for a mind-at-large. Zero, zip, nada. It is only a hypothesis argued on the basis of parsimony which in itself is in the eye of the beholder.

Parsimony itself likely has no place in this argument because it involves picking the apparently simplest explanation from other more complicated explanations. There is, however, always the possibility that the simplest explanation can be proven wrong as more evidence accumulates. But the mind-at-large cannot be disproven. No amount of evidence can prove or disprove it because it is a self-contained, circular argument. Nothing has been presented that would falsify it.

Can we really talk of prove/disprove when it comes to validity of any ultimate ontology? They are all circular because they are comprehensive, Which one you plump for is probably best accounted for by character type as much as reasoned debate.

My advice to someone like you is spend a few months living AS IF analytic idealism were true, I'd recomend someone like Rupert Spira's exercises and lectures.

At least at the end of that you can throw your hands up and in good faith say you've explored it to its limits and found it wanting. The alternative is that it will nag away at you, possibly because a remote part of you believes it may be true.

"Can we really talk of prove/disprove when it comes to validity of any ultimate ontology?"

That's why the argument for parsimony fails. Is there any evidence that might arise in the future which would disapprove it? For parsimony to be an effective argument, it needs to have possibility of being disproven.

What would convince you it is wrong?

I don't think you or other on this forum really realize where I am coming from if you think I haven't explored these ideas thoroughly.

I dont know your background. But something draws you to this forum looking for answers.

Nothing would convince me that any ontology was wrong, there is no such thing as intellectual closure. Just sliding margins of certainty. Bernardo says the intellect is the bouncer of the heart. The only useful question is what is it defending?

[Jim Cross]

Can we really talk of prove/disprove when it comes to validity of any ultimate ontology? They are all circular because they are comprehensive, Which one you plump for is probably best accounted for by character type as much as reasoned debate.

My advice to someone like you is spend a few months living AS IF analytic idealism were true, I'd recomend someone like Rupert Spira's exercises and lectures.

At least at the end of that you can throw your hands up and in good faith say you've explored it to its limits and found it wanting. The alternative is that it will nag away at you, possibly because a remote part of you believes it may be true.

"Can we really talk of prove/disprove when it comes to validity of any ultimate ontology?"

That's why the argument for parsimony fails. Is there any evidence that might arise in the future which would disapprove it? For parsimony to be an effective argument, it needs to have possibility of being disproven.

What would convince you it is wrong?

I don't think you or other on this forum really realize where I am coming from if you think I haven't explored these ideas thoroughly.

I dont know your background. But something draws you to this forum looking for answers.

Nothing would convince me that any ontology was wrong, there is no such thing as intellectual closure. Just sliding margins of certainty. Bernardo says the intellect is the bouncer of the heart. The only useful question is what is it defending?

What draws you to the forum since you already have the answers?

[Starbuck]

As Ben Iscatus said recently, when you find a mythology that resonates its like appreciating a piece of art. You contemplate and tweak and it gives you space for reverence and meaning - thats why I suggested a sub forum for Bernardo where we can do that. I dont really go for the butting of heads in other parts of the forum, where people defend and impose wildly different worldviews.

[Jim Cross]

As Ben Iscatus said recently, when you find a mythology that resonates its like appreciating a piece of art. You contemplate and tweak and it gives you space for reverence and meaning - thats why I suggested a sub forum for Bernardo where we can do that. I dont really go for the butting of heads in other parts of the forum, where people defend and impose wildly different worldviews.

Thanks for keeping your comments mostly tied around BK's view. Did you actually read BK's paper that is the subject of this post?

My own views are ever-changing and there were many years when I would have been attracted to BK's views. Views like his no longer resonate with me. Reducing the world to mind (or matter) doesn't in the end provide answers. There aren't any answers.

"Before Enlightenment chop wood, carry water. After enlightenment chop wood, carry water".

[Soul_of_Shu]

"Before Enlightenment chop wood, carry water. After enlightenment chop wood, carry water".

Yeah but, what gets enlightened?!

Btw, frankly I'm hurt that my long pertinent comment that took a good half hour to compose didn't get a response ... I guess whatever it is that gets enlightened and transcends such petty hurt feelings, is still a work in progress on this end

[Jim Cross]

"Before Enlightenment chop wood, carry water. After enlightenment chop wood, carry water".

Yeah but, what gets enlightened?!

Btw, frankly I'm hurt that my long pertinent comment that took a good half hour to compose didn't get a response ... I guess whatever it is that gets enlightened and transcends such petty hurt feelings, is still a work in progress on this end

Which comment was that? It might be one I mostly agreed with.

Nothing gets enlightened. That's why it is same after as before.

[Soul_of_Shu]

Which comment was that? It might be one I mostly agreed with.

The 1st comment I made in this thread, which is the only other comment I made here until today.

Nothing gets enlightened. That's why it is same after as before.

So hurt feelings before and after ... Good to know

[Jim Cross]

Whether going with BK's version of idealism, or going with materialism, both share the premise that the phenomenal appearance of objectified percepts are representational of a shared underlying, behaviourally consistent, corresponding realm of the so-called 'thing-in-itself.' Under materialism that is a shared realm of universal, nonlocal vacuum state fluctuations—even as that could in theory be reducible to some other state. Under BK's idealism, that is a shared realm of universal, nonlocal ideations of irreducible Mind. In both cases, the representational phenomenal percepts are prone to misperception when filtered through any given psychological 'screen'—i.e. a subject that has an intense phobia regarding snakes could be prone to mistaking a garden hose for a snake. Or, in both cases, an evolutionary predisposition toward being wary of snakes could account for that mistaken perception. As well, in both cases, a dream of an encounter with a snake, and an encounter with a snake within the consensus construct, clearly have different potential ramifications for the phenomenal, representational percept of this consensus corporeal form. However, while both premises are based upon there being some shared underlying realm, the core difference between these premises is that under materialism there is still no account for how to get from vacuum state fluctuations existing independent of consciousness, to some supposedly brain-generated (that too being reducible to said fluctuations) conscious experience of objectified, representational, phenomenal percepts, however real or dreamlike they may be; while under BK's idealism there's the problem of how to get from a sole Mind to many inter-subjective loci of minds experiencing objectified, phenomenal percepts that are representative of universal ideations of Mind. I suppose, these problems notwithstanding, it comes down to which starting premise one derives the most deeply resonant meaning from, in terms of how each jibes with one's core experience. Then again, it could be neither, as Indeed Ashvin and/or Cleric might now remind us.

If this is the comment, some paragraphs would help.

However, while both premises are based upon there being some shared underlying realm, the core difference between these premises is that under materialism there is still no account for how to get from vacuum state fluctuations existing independent of consciousness, to some supposedly brain-generated (that too being reducible to said fluctuations) conscious experience of objectified, representational, phenomenal percepts, however real or dreamlike they may be; while under BK's idealism there's the problem of how to get from a sole Mind to many inter-subjective loci of minds experiencing objectified, phenomenal percepts that are representative of universal ideations of Mind.

Yeah, but suppose vacuum state fluctuations are excitations of consciousness. That would be a different matter all together.

Or maybe it is simply that consciousness is impossible. How can the Mind ever really stand outside itself to be aware of anything?

[Soul_of_Shu]

If this is the comment, some paragraphs would help.

On that I can agree, but the daemon gets into stream-of-consciousness mode and one forgets about paragraphs.

Yeah, but suppose vacuum state fluctuations are excitations of consciousness. That would be a different matter all together.

I'm taking that as pun intended ... When isn't it matter anymore?

[Jim Cross]

If this is the comment, some paragraphs would help.

On that I can agree, but the daemon gets into stream-of-consciousness mode and one forgets about paragraphs.

Yeah, but suppose vacuum state fluctuations are excitations of consciousness. That would be a different matter all together.

I'm taking that as pun intended ... When isn't it matter anymore?

Maybe it never was matter (whatever that means).

But back briefly to the differences between our shared world/reality and our apparent private alter consciousness. Even dogs can see the difference between what can be imagined in consciousness to happen and what can actually happen.

A pair of researchers at the Medical University of Vienna and University of Vienna has found that dogs notice when objects in the world do not conform to the laws of physics. In their paper published in the journal Biology Letters, Christoph Völter and Ludwig Huber describe experiments they conducted with pet dogs looking at objects depicted on a computer screen.

https://phys.org/news/2021-12-dogs-anim ... ysics.html

So I would say that, at best, Bernardo's account is incomplete if not wrong. Either our alter consciousness has greater freedom than the mind-at-large to imagine alterative realities or, as a different way to look at it, the mind-at-large is more constrained that our individual alter consciousness.