Is this a good answer to the question "why am I me and not someone else?", and the possibility of infinite creation

[Eugene I.]

You are right about the here-ness though, I don't know a good answer to that. My only argument is that many people speak about these same thoughts / experiences, and how would this be possible without a "here-ness" from their POV? I can imagine a universe where everything is causally ordered and therefore it doesn't matter which being I subjectively look out of, everything will take place the same. But if other beings can also report on their similar experiences, including ego loss and transcendence, how do they do that? Robots could be operational, but how could they report on experiences requiring consciousness? I think Berkeley was right in that regard: the minimum that is required is that I and God exist. I to experience the world, and God to move around all the other beings. Only I, without anything to constitute the consistency of the outside world, no transdencent I, nothing just my momentary experience, just doesn't make sense.

You are right. As I said before, the problem of "here-ness" only does not exist in solipsism. Even in Berkley's scheme there are two "here"s - God's and mine, so the same problem still exists (why the experience "here" is my experience and not God's experience?).

There is another weird version of solipsistic idealism where there exists only one "here-now" that "travels" through multiple subjective perspectives of the fractal in reincarnational manner. For example, God would setup the fractal of the world to be experienced and then travel through the experiences of all characters with the same single "here-now". So it would look like a multi-alter world, but in fact there is only one "here-now" in it, so it is essentially a solipsism.

[Hedge90]

I think it is possible because she is a human being like me, with thoughts and perceptions. And because I recognise my own nature in her, I am able to empathise. But that doesn't mean the boundary is not there. I still experience her as an object, and I dont experience her thoughts, unless she shares them.

[Hedge90]

You are right about the here-ness though, I don't know a good answer to that. My only argument is that many people speak about these same thoughts / experiences, and how would this be possible without a "here-ness" from their POV? I can imagine a universe where everything is causally ordered and therefore it doesn't matter which being I subjectively look out of, everything will take place the same. But if other beings can also report on their similar experiences, including ego loss and transcendence, how do they do that? Robots could be operational, but how could they report on experiences requiring consciousness? I think Berkeley was right in that regard: the minimum that is required is that I and God exist. I to experience the world, and God to move around all the other beings. Only I, without anything to constitute the consistency of the outside world, no transdencent I, nothing just my momentary experience, just doesn't make sense.

You are right. As I said before, the problem of "here-ness" only does not exist in solipsism. Even in Berkley's scheme there are two "here"s - God's and mine, so the same problem still exists (why the experience "here" is my experience and not God's experience?).

There is another weird version of solipsistic idealism where there exists only one "here-now" that "travels" through multiple subjective perspectives of the fractal in reincarnational manner. For example, God would setup the fractal of the world to be experienced and then travel through the experiences of all characters with the same single "here-now". So it would look like a multi-alter world, but in fact there is only one "here-now" in it, so it is essentially a solipsism.

Yeah I came up with this weird version as a possible explanation too. But it doesnt answer the question why am I me, at this time, any better than my initial post. The only difference is that in this case there is a sequence of the experiences of the I, going through the various perspectives, while in my version it happens simultaneously, but still to the same I. I dont think it makes much of a difference.

[Eugene I.]

Yeah I came up with this weird version as a possible explanation too. But it doesnt answer the question why am I me, at this time, any better than my initial post. The only difference is that in this case there is a sequence of the experiences of the I, going through the various perspectives, while in my version it happens simultaneously, but still to the same I. I dont think it makes much of a difference.

Why? Let's say (in such scheme of things) I-God after finishing the Hedge's life decides to go through the "life" Lucy's experiences. This choice may be made for no particular reason, but at least there is a causal explanation for this. No?

[Hedge90]

How is the choice made?

[Eugene I.]

How is the choice made?

Well, imagine you come out from your Hedge's life stream after the end of the life, remember that you are God going through multiple life streams, and then think "hmm.. who I'm I gonna be next, may be Lucy?", and then you make that choice. Anything wrong with that?

[tjssailor]

Re: Is this a good answer to the question "why am I me and not someone else?", and the possibility of infinite creation
Post by Hedge90 » Tue Dec 28, 2021 11:07 am

I think it is possible because she is a human being like me, with thoughts and perceptions. And because I recognise my own nature in her, I am able to empathise. But that doesn't mean the boundary is not there. I still experience her as an object, and I dont experience her thoughts, unless she shares them.

You are not a human being. She is not a human being. You are Consciousness. She is the same Consciousness. That is where empathy comes from. Whatever you do you do to yourself.

The data of the NDE shows that at the transition time the sense of separateness disappears and then all experiences are accessible.

[Hedge90]

Yes. If I keep a capacity to choose between things, then I'll have a preference for either Lucy or someone else, because I know which experiences are pleasurable and which are not. If we follow this line of thought, then why wouldn't I only live the life in the entire fractal that is the "best" (has the maximum pleasure) over and over again? (I'd like to note in that case I can pretty much preclude solipsism on the grounds that my life is very far from the maximum amount of pleasure).
If, on the other hand, I do not have any kind of preference, then once again the question: how is the choice made? Whenever a choice is made by an actor, it is made based on input considering those choices. Even when you seemingly choose randomly, there are innumerable circumstances resulting in that choice. But what if there are really NO factors to consider at all, because the core "I" knows not the difference between good and bad, pain and pleasure? Then a truly random choice would need to be made.. but what is truly random? Is it even possible?

[Cleric K]

Yes. If I keep a capacity to choose between things, then I'll have a preference for either Lucy or someone else, because I know which experiences are pleasurable and which are not. If we follow this line of thought, then why wouldn't I only live the life in the entire fractal that is the "best" (has the maximum pleasure) over and over again? (I'd like to note in that case I can pretty much preclude solipsism on the grounds that my life is very far from the maximum amount of pleasure).
If, on the other hand, I do not have any kind of preference, then once again the question: how is the choice made? Whenever a choice is made by an actor, it is made based on input considering those choices. Even when you seemingly choose randomly, there are innumerable circumstances resulting in that choice. But what if there are really NO factors to consider at all, because the core "I" knows not the difference between good and bad, pain and pleasure? Then a truly random choice would need to be made.. but what is truly random? Is it even possible?

That's why the concept of Karma exists. When we look back in memory, our current state of beings has grown out of all our previous activity. Similarly, our future states will grow out from what we now do in our thinking, feeling, willing and its interference with the environment. Everything we do shapes the seeds from which our future states grow.

[Soul_of_Shu]

I've run accross this question in the analyticidealism subreddit, and engaged in a conversation. In the end, instead of theoretical descriptions, I provided a simile ...

For the fun of it, let's toss in another limited analogy here: Let's imagine some irreducible, immanent conscious agency as non-local operating system (as paradoxical as that may be) that conceives an Omni-browser, which via an ever-updating/evolving ideated pattern, a Cosmos is experienced. Using that browser, an unlimited number of tabs are open, each one a discrete configuration of patterned ideation, as a unique experiential POV, even as they all share the same OS. Now insofar as the conscious agency never actually closes any tabs, it is holding all those POVs simultaneously, as a Sole being experiencing a multiplicity, in theory an infinitude, of soul beings. This then may also involve tabs within tabs. Notwithstanding the question of each tab having a sovereign will of its own, in this scenario is the conscious agency not always experiencing an integrally valid POV, that however transitory cannot be regarded as illusory?