Bernardo's talk with Lance Butler

[Ben Iscatus]

This interview mostly covered known ground, but (new, I think, from BK) was mention of daemons being akin to tulpas (semi-autonomous thought forms) at the 57 minute mark and then again at the 1hour 11 minute mark, where a distinction was made between an imagined pink elephant as pure appearance with no agency, as opposed to a genuine daemon/tulpa arising out of MAL's archetypal thought patterns. Daemons are said to be semi-autonomous because they are still linked to MAL, whereas our executive ego, being wholly dissociated, is a fully autonomous daemon.

[Ben Iscatus]

There is also a good new talk with Gregg Heuriques (friend of John Vervaeke). At the 1 hour mark or thereabouts, Gregg outlined his theory about how metacognition in humans evolved through social interaction ( Justification Systems Theory) which impressed BK enough to say he'd like to publish on the Essentia site.

At I hour 33m, Bernardo openly invited criticism of analytic idealism by debate.

[AshvinP]

At I hour 33m, Bernardo openly invited criticism of analytic idealism by debate.

The question remains, how can BK accept an invitation that is never aware of? How can his attention be brought to an evolutionary idealism which certainly does not defend physicalism, which critiques analytic idealism, and which shows precisely why both are products of dualsim, naive realism, and the necessary abstraction of thinking which results?

[Ben Iscatus]

The question remains, how can BK accept an invitation that is never aware of? How can his attention be brought to an evolutionary idealism which certainly does not defend physicalism, which critiques analytic idealism, and which shows precisely why both are products of dualism, naive realism, and the necessary abstraction of thinking which results?

It seems that you need at least one (preferably two) of the following:
a) a PhD
b) experience in podcasting
c) academic standing
d) popular following

It's hard for a man on a mission to hear a voice in the wilderness.

[Ben Iscatus]

Ash, I wonder if you might interview him on behalf of "Imagine" magazine? This could be part "Imagine a world where physicalism is no more", and part, "The importance of Imagination in the future."

[Starbuck]

I think that any argument against 'analytic' philosophy will have to engage BK on an analytic level. BK has repeatedly referred to people like Hegel, Whitehead and to an extent Steiner as being obscurantists. I admit some sympathy with this as I can't get my head around many of the objections posted on this site. The language does not seem precise to me!

[Ben Iscatus]

he language does not seem precise to me!

Yes, clarity of expression is one of BK's greatest attributes. It astonishes me how someone for whom English is not his native language can be so clear and precise.

[Starbuck]

he language does not seem precise to me!

Yes, clarity of expression is one of BK's greatest attributes. It astonishes me how someone for whom English is not his native language can be so clear and precise.

Many of the best English speakers I have met have been like that. They learn in a formal setting and with more metacognitive focus on meaning rather than just parrotting their elders.

It is his great attribute, but maybe he misses nuanced objection to his theory because the objector is unable to meet those standards. Its so easy to get lost down rabbit holes with metaphysics, so I have sympathy for his stance. The irony is that someone like Whitehead was at the heart of analytic thought, yet BK (who is no slouch) finds him so incomprehensible. He talks about 'processes' as ultimate, like Rovelli talks about 'relationships' as ultimate, or Tegmark with 'information'. Bernardo would argue they are saying exactly nothing!

[AshvinP]

Ash, I wonder if you might interview him on behalf of "Imagine" magazine? This could be part "Imagine a world where physicalism is no more", and part, "The importance of Imagination in the future."

Ben,

I would be happy to bring it to his attention in any way feasible. I'm just not sure what that would be. I wouldn't want to spring it on him out of the blue... he would need to be notified beforehand of the nature of the questions/discussion.

[AshvinP]

I think that any argument against 'analytic' philosophy will have to engage BK on an analytic level. BK has repeatedly referred to people like Hegel, Whitehead and to an extent Steiner as being obscurantists. I admit some sympathy with this as I can't get my head around many of the objections posted on this site. The language does not seem precise to me!

Well, I am sure you will at least admit we have tried to explain the objections in just about as many ways as can be imagined at this point. From highly involved essays with pictures, videos, and what not to more bullet point arguments in brief posting. From the angle of modern philosophy, ancient mythology and spirituality, VR simulations, every day experience in the world, etc. Usually it is helpful for questions be to asked if there is genuine interest in clearing up confusion and understanding the objections. (also I was unaware BK addressed Steiner as an "obscurantist", but am interested in knowing the source for that). Recently I explained the objection as follows in response to Ben's article on Hegel v. Kant.

I generally agree with the author, but it gets unnecessarily complex (as Hegel's own formulations do). Another way to put Hegel's critique of Kant is, logical thinking always leads back to its own reality. Consider two statements:

1) The Cosmos is universal Will.

2) I think the Cosmos is universal Will.

There is no real semantic difference here. Even if I leave out "I think" from #1, it is implicit in the sentence. All logically reasoned assertions point back to the reality of the Thinking which thinks the assertions. Hegel perceived how that is true, not only in philosophical assertions, but in the entire unfolding of human history. That entire history is an image of Thinking awakening to itself, moving from implicit to explicit (in a dialectical fashion), through mythology, philosophy, socioeconomics, politics, science, and aesthetics.

Or in respones to JMG:

JMG, no is denying that our perceptions and intellectual cognitions (intellect is a mode of perceiving meaning) of the world content are representations, especially an idealist like Steiner. If it has spatial structure, yet the essential reality is non-spatial, then it must be a representation. Kant, Schop, Steiner, all agree on that. The major epistemic issue is whether the representations can disclose *true aspects* of the reality to our Reason. Whether the latter runs up against an impenetrable veil, hard boundary, or whatever one wants to call it, when it seeks to trace back the representations, the shadows on the cave wall, to the ideal archetypal forms which are responsible for the shadows. These forms are not physical, but are durational meaning. I feel that this may not have been clear in our last few exchanges, and I will take the blame for that confusion. But hopefully we are back to the core issue now.

I am picking Schopenhauer, specifically, because you mentioned him in the last exchange, and because he, unlike Kant, made a *positive assertion* about what the noumena is and rooted that assertion in his direct introspective experience. The issue is whether that direct introspective experience is possible without the ideal content, which can only be discerned by Thinking. When one goes into a deep mystical meditative state, and has an experience of "oneness with the universal Will", is that person experiencing meaning and, if so, what faculty is actually discerning that meaning? Perhaps you disagree with Schop entirely about the Will, in which case we could switch the experience to whatever it is you think is experienced in such a state.

I feel the language used is pretty straightforward and the logical progression is pretty tight, but I am happy to clarify any of the points made for anyone who is still confused on these objections to Kant/Schop epistemology (which is the basis of BK's analytic idealism). To answer my own question above, the faculty which discerns the meaning of "universal Will" can only be our own Thinking faculty. We also need to resist the urge to downgrade "meaning" to some secondary or epiphenomenal quality of the world content. That is the materialist-dualist position, not the consistent idealist one or the position that is evident from our own experience of the world cotent, in which meaning is inseperable from perception and irreducible to any other quantity or quality.