A Simple, Logical System for Proving the Existence of God — Idealist Metaphysics

[GrantHenderson]

...

Let me add something on this objective v. subjective distinction. Let's imagine we are observing ourselves shoot a basketball. I see the ball come up when I raise my arms, go through the air after releasing, and go through the hoop or bounce off the rim or miss everything entirely. Then I can describe this entire process with concepts of cause-effect, parabolic motion, air friction, impact angle, etc. The difficulty for nearly all modern philosophies and sciences, especially idealism, occurrs when we move from the lawfulness of the transforming perceptions to the lawfulness of the inner concepts.

The conceptual process generally appears as a stream of words we speak to ourselves, or written symbols if we are more precise in thinking through the observations. It is generally ignored that there is a lawfulness to this stream of word-concepts as well. There are several reasons for that, apart from the fact that general human evolution of cognition has arrived to this stage of abstraction

1. It is more difficult to observe the stream of concepts, i.e. it requires turning our observation inwards.

2. The stream of concepts transform according to a different Time-experience, i.e. it is over a longer period of normal Time-experience that the lawfulness can be discerned, relative to observing the basketball go from my hands to the hoop.

3. We simply aren't aware to look for the lawfulness. Our concepts are considered the source material, so to speak. It is forgotten that they arrived within us through a living flow of ideal activity. If we do acknowledge this, it is generally in the most abstract way, like "my concepts come from MAL". Practically this is the same as saying they came from nowhere or pure nothingness.

So what we are speaking of is really whether there is an inner lawfulness to our concepts and whether it can be discerned. Note that I am not bringing this up as a completely separate issue from your original post. We cannot learn to observe the inner lawfulness until we also learn to reason through pure thoughts, i.e. philosophical or mathematical axioms, premises, etc. When we do that, we are already halfway to discovering the objective nature of inner meaningful experience, or at least well beyond the thinking which simply observes and describes basketballs going through or not going through hoops. Now we only need to ask ourselves what we are doing inwardly to think in this way and seek the answer in the observation of our thinking. To discern the inner lawfulness, it will help to consider overarching Ideas which structure our experience over relatively lengthy periods of time, like that of "day and night", "fall or spring", "modern age". We can try to discern how these evolving ideas brought us to our current experience, and our remembered or anticipated experience. All of these things are quite possible and very accessible to the modern soul, but also require a pardigmatic shift in perspective. We must discern that there is an entire depth structure of lawful ideal forces which shape and direct our current thinking.

Part of what I was trying to make clear in my previous comment is that I actually agree with what you're saying here. We cannot prove meaning by concepts about reality, but rather by observing our raw experiences. We must explain how experience forms concepts in order to explain how those conceptualizations serve to explain more abstract phenomena. While, how experience forms concepts can only be reasoned by concept, it is concept derived directly from experience, about experience, and so has more epistemic certainty to the experiencing agent than concepts about reality that do not directly pertain to the experiencing agent.

What I don’t understand is, what's the difference between trying to make sense of the inner workings of conceptual abstractions through self reflection, and trying to define them by the same means? Nothing, as far as I can tell. Thus, I don’t see how this inner exploration doesn't allow me to claim that concepts are formed by “attributing meaning to properties” (as per my analysis). This is derived from my inner exploration of how we form concepts.

Additionally, remember that the goal of this post is to know or prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality. How does this, in itself, achieve that goal? No hardcore realist will ever agree with the idea that things only exist insofar as they are experienced, because they will always claim that our experience of things does not prove that there are no things outside of experience. Rather, concepts about reality are required to reason this, and these concepts are based on meanings confirmed by raw experience (as you mention).
I think one can potentially avoid sacrificing the “lawfulness of transforming perceptions” for the “lawfulness of inner concepts” by demonstrating how the “lawfulness of transforming perceptions” logically entails the “lawfulness of the inner concept”— in this case, for how consciousness is fundamental to reality.

[AshvinP]

...

Let me add something on this objective v. subjective distinction. Let's imagine we are observing ourselves shoot a basketball. I see the ball come up when I raise my arms, go through the air after releasing, and go through the hoop or bounce off the rim or miss everything entirely. Then I can describe this entire process with concepts of cause-effect, parabolic motion, air friction, impact angle, etc. The difficulty for nearly all modern philosophies and sciences, especially idealism, occurrs when we move from the lawfulness of the transforming perceptions to the lawfulness of the inner concepts.

The conceptual process generally appears as a stream of words we speak to ourselves, or written symbols if we are more precise in thinking through the observations. It is generally ignored that there is a lawfulness to this stream of word-concepts as well. There are several reasons for that, apart from the fact that general human evolution of cognition has arrived to this stage of abstraction

1. It is more difficult to observe the stream of concepts, i.e. it requires turning our observation inwards.

2. The stream of concepts transform according to a different Time-experience, i.e. it is over a longer period of normal Time-experience that the lawfulness can be discerned, relative to observing the basketball go from my hands to the hoop.

3. We simply aren't aware to look for the lawfulness. Our concepts are considered the source material, so to speak. It is forgotten that they arrived within us through a living flow of ideal activity. If we do acknowledge this, it is generally in the most abstract way, like "my concepts come from MAL". Practically this is the same as saying they came from nowhere or pure nothingness.

So what we are speaking of is really whether there is an inner lawfulness to our concepts and whether it can be discerned. Note that I am not bringing this up as a completely separate issue from your original post. We cannot learn to observe the inner lawfulness until we also learn to reason through pure thoughts, i.e. philosophical or mathematical axioms, premises, etc. When we do that, we are already halfway to discovering the objective nature of inner meaningful experience, or at least well beyond the thinking which simply observes and describes basketballs going through or not going through hoops. Now we only need to ask ourselves what we are doing inwardly to think in this way and seek the answer in the observation of our thinking. To discern the inner lawfulness, it will help to consider overarching Ideas which structure our experience over relatively lengthy periods of time, like that of "day and night", "fall or spring", "modern age". We can try to discern how these evolving ideas brought us to our current experience, and our remembered or anticipated experience. All of these things are quite possible and very accessible to the modern soul, but also require a pardigmatic shift in perspective. We must discern that there is an entire depth structure of lawful ideal forces which shape and direct our current thinking.

Part of what I was trying to make clear in my previous comment is that I actually agree with what you're saying here. We cannot prove meaning by concepts about reality, but rather by observing our raw experiences. We must explain how experience forms concepts in order to explain how those conceptualizations serve to explain more abstract phenomena. While, how experience forms concepts can only be reasoned by concept, it is concept derived directly from experience, about experience, and so has more epistemic certainty to the experiencing agent than concepts about reality that do not directly pertain to the experiencing agent.

What I don’t understand is, what's the difference between trying to make sense of the inner workings of conceptual abstractions through self reflection, and trying to define them by the same means? Nothing, as far as I can tell. Thus, I don’t see how this inner exploration doesn't allow me to claim that concepts are formed by “attributing meaning to properties” (as per my analysis). This is derived from my inner exploration of how we form concepts.

Additionally, remember that the goal of this post is to know or prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality. How does this, in itself, achieve that goal? No hardcore realist will ever agree with the idea that things only exist insofar as they are experienced, because they will always claim that our experience of things does not prove that there are no things outside of experience. Rather, concepts about reality are required to reason this, and these concepts are based on meanings confirmed by raw experience (as you mention).
I think one can potentially avoid sacrificing the “lawfulness of transforming perceptions” for the “lawfulness of inner concepts” by demonstrating how the “lawfulness of transforming perceptions” logically entails the “lawfulness of the inner concept”— in this case, for how consciousness is fundamental to reality.

I assume you haven't been following other posts here, which is fine, but this is practically the issue we have been trying to clear up for months now. I would again recommend you look The Central Topic essay written by Cleric.

Do you agree that inner concepts are also perceptions, like the trees I perceive outside or the words I perceive in a post here? Critical idealism (Kant, Schop, etc.) failed to realize this, and that's how we got the "concepts are modeling raw experience" mindset. We must ask ourselves whether there is any justification to speak of "raw experience" in the absence of our own conceptual activity. We can be more precise here - experience doesn't form concepts, but our thinking activity. The question is whether it is justified to treat inner concepts as essentially different from outer perceptions when reasoning through experience? They both arise in the process of observation.

viewtopic.php?t=687

It is quite arbitrary to regard the sum of what we experience of a thing through bare perception as a totality, as the whole thing, while that which reveals itself through thoughtful contemplation is regarded as a mere accretion which has nothing to do with the thing itself. If I am given a rosebud today, the picture that offers itself to my perception is complete only for the moment. If I put the bud into water, I shall tomorrow get a very different picture of my object. If I watch the rosebud without interruption, I shall see today's state change continuously into tomorrow's through an infinite number of intermediate stages. The picture which presents itself to me at any one moment is only a chance cross-section of an object which is in a continual process of development. If I do not put the bud into water, a whole series of states which lay as possibilities within the bud will not develop. Similarly I may be prevented tomorrow from observing the blossom further, and will thereby have an incomplete picture of it.

It would be a quite unobjective and fortuitous kind of opinion that declared of the purely momentary appearance of a thing: this is the thing.

[GrantHenderson]

Let me add something on this objective v. subjective distinction. Let's imagine we are observing ourselves shoot a basketball. I see the ball come up when I raise my arms, go through the air after releasing, and go through the hoop or bounce off the rim or miss everything entirely. Then I can describe this entire process with concepts of cause-effect, parabolic motion, air friction, impact angle, etc. The difficulty for nearly all modern philosophies and sciences, especially idealism, occurrs when we move from the lawfulness of the transforming perceptions to the lawfulness of the inner concepts.

The conceptual process generally appears as a stream of words we speak to ourselves, or written symbols if we are more precise in thinking through the observations. It is generally ignored that there is a lawfulness to this stream of word-concepts as well. There are several reasons for that, apart from the fact that general human evolution of cognition has arrived to this stage of abstraction

1. It is more difficult to observe the stream of concepts, i.e. it requires turning our observation inwards.

2. The stream of concepts transform according to a different Time-experience, i.e. it is over a longer period of normal Time-experience that the lawfulness can be discerned, relative to observing the basketball go from my hands to the hoop.

3. We simply aren't aware to look for the lawfulness. Our concepts are considered the source material, so to speak. It is forgotten that they arrived within us through a living flow of ideal activity. If we do acknowledge this, it is generally in the most abstract way, like "my concepts come from MAL". Practically this is the same as saying they came from nowhere or pure nothingness.

So what we are speaking of is really whether there is an inner lawfulness to our concepts and whether it can be discerned. Note that I am not bringing this up as a completely separate issue from your original post. We cannot learn to observe the inner lawfulness until we also learn to reason through pure thoughts, i.e. philosophical or mathematical axioms, premises, etc. When we do that, we are already halfway to discovering the objective nature of inner meaningful experience, or at least well beyond the thinking which simply observes and describes basketballs going through or not going through hoops. Now we only need to ask ourselves what we are doing inwardly to think in this way and seek the answer in the observation of our thinking. To discern the inner lawfulness, it will help to consider overarching Ideas which structure our experience over relatively lengthy periods of time, like that of "day and night", "fall or spring", "modern age". We can try to discern how these evolving ideas brought us to our current experience, and our remembered or anticipated experience. All of these things are quite possible and very accessible to the modern soul, but also require a pardigmatic shift in perspective. We must discern that there is an entire depth structure of lawful ideal forces which shape and direct our current thinking.

Part of what I was trying to make clear in my previous comment is that I actually agree with what you're saying here. We cannot prove meaning by concepts about reality, but rather by observing our raw experiences. We must explain how experience forms concepts in order to explain how those conceptualizations serve to explain more abstract phenomena. While, how experience forms concepts can only be reasoned by concept, it is concept derived directly from experience, about experience, and so has more epistemic certainty to the experiencing agent than concepts about reality that do not directly pertain to the experiencing agent.

What I don’t understand is, what's the difference between trying to make sense of the inner workings of conceptual abstractions through self reflection, and trying to define them by the same means? Nothing, as far as I can tell. Thus, I don’t see how this inner exploration doesn't allow me to claim that concepts are formed by “attributing meaning to properties” (as per my analysis). This is derived from my inner exploration of how we form concepts.

Additionally, remember that the goal of this post is to know or prove that consciousness is fundamental to reality. How does this, in itself, achieve that goal? No hardcore realist will ever agree with the idea that things only exist insofar as they are experienced, because they will always claim that our experience of things does not prove that there are no things outside of experience. Rather, concepts about reality are required to reason this, and these concepts are based on meanings confirmed by raw experience (as you mention).
I think one can potentially avoid sacrificing the “lawfulness of transforming perceptions” for the “lawfulness of inner concepts” by demonstrating how the “lawfulness of transforming perceptions” logically entails the “lawfulness of the inner concept”— in this case, for how consciousness is fundamental to reality.

I assume you haven't been following other posts here, which is fine, but this is practically the issue we have been trying to clear up for months now. I would again recommend you look The Central Topic essay written by Cleric.

Do you agree that inner concepts are also perceptions, like the trees I perceive outside or the words I perceive in a post here? Critical idealism (Kant, Schop, etc.) failed to realize this, and that's how we got the "concepts are modeling raw experience" mindset. We must ask ourselves whether there is any justification to speak of "raw experience" in the absence of our own conceptual activity. We can be more precise here - experience doesn't form concepts, but our thinking activity. The question is whether it is justified to treat inner concepts as essentially different from outer perceptions when reasoning through experience? They both arise in the process of observation.

viewtopic.php?t=687

It is quite arbitrary to regard the sum of what we experience of a thing through bare perception as a totality, as the whole thing, while that which reveals itself through thoughtful contemplation is regarded as a mere accretion which has nothing to do with the thing itself. If I am given a rosebud today, the picture that offers itself to my perception is complete only for the moment. If I put the bud into water, I shall tomorrow get a very different picture of my object. If I watch the rosebud without interruption, I shall see today's state change continuously into tomorrow's through an infinite number of intermediate stages. The picture which presents itself to me at any one moment is only a chance cross-section of an object which is in a continual process of development. If I do not put the bud into water, a whole series of states which lay as possibilities within the bud will not develop. Similarly I may be prevented tomorrow from observing the blossom further, and will thereby have an incomplete picture of it.

It would be a quite unobjective and fortuitous kind of opinion that declared of the purely momentary appearance of a thing: this is the thing.

Clerics post is interesting and well articulated.

How I would put it in my own words (and correct me if I’m wrong) is that we can experience sense perceptions and observe “what they are to us”, but we can never conceive of the means by which those thoughts “arrive” to us as sense perceptions, because our experience is limited to the observer frame in which it perceives. We can try to conceptualize a means for how observed experiences “arrive”, but since the means for that conceptualization cannot be observed, said conceptualization has no, or limited empirical value.

As such, the mind doesn’t know the meaning of objects, and it doesn’t know the objects of meaning, it just knows that it perceives content as qualitatively meaningful. Perhaps, we can reasonably claim, without abstracting, that it “bridges meaning and content”.

Note that what I have proposed in my post only makes one abstraction beyond this direct observation — the answer to “What is a reality”. Can we make this abstraction with complete epistemic certainty? Clearly, Cleric has demonstrated that we can conceptualize direct observations without diminishing return on empirical value. I would argue that reality being “all that is not nothing” is validated by the empirical fact that we experience reality.

You mentioned in your first comment that my axioms assume consciousness - namely, that defining reality implicates the role of consciousness. It does. So It’s a good thing that consciousness is all that we can assume.
I think my analysis mirrors observations of sense perception. This is why I think it might have the potential to work.

[AshvinP]

Clerics post is interesting and well articulated.

How I would put it in my own words (and correct me if I’m wrong) is that we can experience sense perceptions and observe “what they are to us”, but we can never conceive of the means by which those thoughts “arrive” to us as sense perceptions, because our experience is limited to the observer frame in which it perceives. We can try to conceptualize a means for how observed experiences “arrive”, but since the means for that conceptualization cannot be observed, said conceptualization has no, or limited empirical value.

As such, the mind doesn’t know the meaning of objects, and it doesn’t know the objects of meaning, it just knows that it perceives content as qualitatively meaningful. Perhaps, we can reasonably claim, without abstracting, that it “bridges meaning and content”.

Note that what I have proposed in my post only makes one abstraction beyond this direct observation — the answer to “What is a reality”. Can we make this abstraction with complete epistemic certainty? Clearly, Cleric has demonstrated that we can conceptualize direct observations without diminishing return on empirical value. I would argue that reality being “all that is not nothing” is validated by the empirical fact that we experience reality.

You mentioned in your first comment that my axioms assume consciousness - namely, that defining reality implicates the role of consciousness. It does. So It’s a good thing that consciousness is all that we can assume.
I think my analysis mirrors observations of sense perception. This is why I think it might have the potential to work.

We can certainly conceptualize the means by which thoughts arrive - that is presupposed in these posts of mine and Cleric's TCT essays. It is of utmost important to build a conceptual foundation for higher understanding. The meaningful context which exists 'behind' our current perceptual perspective and shapes our inner experience, including our concepts, could be conceived as the "nothingness" you mention - it appears as formless forces which influence the world of our experience but are not directly perceived by the intellect. The problem is when we conflate conceptualization with genuine understanding of these currently invisible forces, which are all lumped into one force by the intellect and go by the abstract label of "God", "Consciousness", "Energy", "Idea","Will/MAL", "Nothingness", etc.

With idealism, there is something it is like to experience MAL from the perspectives within its rich, archetypal depth structure. We are not on the 'other side' of this experiential perspective - there is no hard wall separating us into "alters" with personal bubbles of consciousness that must model 'reality-in-itself' (this latter concept is a product of Kantian/Schop dualism). Our conceptualization can only be a symbol pointing to this higher experience of MAL's inner perspectives, like the words I am writing can only be symbols to you of the rich meaning that I am experiencing from my inner perspective and trying to convey with the words. The word-concepts themselves cannot be configured in any way for you to completely grasp that meaningful perspective. They cannot "prove" that meaning to you, only point in its general direction. In fact, with modern technology, we are even coming to the point where my words may not "prove" there is any inner perspective behind the words you are perceiving, only a programmed algorithm.

With that in mind, I want to try a slightly different approach as well. Here are a few questions:

1) You conclude, "Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties." Why do you say "Reality" instead of "Thinking"? For context of what I am asking, consider the following:

Observation and thinking are the two points of departure for all the spiritual striving of man, in so far as he is conscious of such striving. The workings of common sense, as well as the most complicated scientific researches, rest on these two fundamental pillars of our spirit. Philosophers have started from various primary antitheses: idea and reality, subject and object, appearance and thing-in-itself, “I” and “Not-I”, idea and will, concept and matter, force and substance, the conscious and the unconscious, [being and nothingness]. It is easy to show, however, that all these antitheses must be preceded by that of observation and thinking, this being for man the most important one.

Whatever principle we choose to lay down, we must either prove that somewhere we have observed it, or we must enunciate it in the form of a clear thought which can be re-thought by any other thinker. Every philosopher who sets out to discuss his fundamental principles must express them in conceptual form and thus use thinking. He therefore indirectly admits that his activity presupposes thinking. Whether thinking or something else is the chief factor in the evolution of the world will not be decided at this point. But that without thinking, the philosopher can gain no knowledge of such evolution, is clear from the start. In the occurrence of the world phenomena, thinking may play a minor part; but in the forming of a view about them, there can be no doubt that, its part is a leading one.

2) Is the purpose of your essay to 'prove' to others that consciousness is fundamental and there is only consciousness? If so, what practical effect do you hope this will have?

3) You write: "With only some of these axioms amounting to an explanation of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be real and unreal.
With all 5 axioms, reality is just real. Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality."

What is meant here by "explanation"? Are these axioms by themselves explanations for Reality as we experience it?

[GrantHenderson]

Clerics post is interesting and well articulated.

How I would put it in my own words (and correct me if I’m wrong) is that we can experience sense perceptions and observe “what they are to us”, but we can never conceive of the means by which those thoughts “arrive” to us as sense perceptions, because our experience is limited to the observer frame in which it perceives. We can try to conceptualize a means for how observed experiences “arrive”, but since the means for that conceptualization cannot be observed, said conceptualization has no, or limited empirical value.

As such, the mind doesn’t know the meaning of objects, and it doesn’t know the objects of meaning, it just knows that it perceives content as qualitatively meaningful. Perhaps, we can reasonably claim, without abstracting, that it “bridges meaning and content”.

Note that what I have proposed in my post only makes one abstraction beyond this direct observation — the answer to “What is a reality”. Can we make this abstraction with complete epistemic certainty? Clearly, Cleric has demonstrated that we can conceptualize direct observations without diminishing return on empirical value. I would argue that reality being “all that is not nothing” is validated by the empirical fact that we experience reality.

You mentioned in your first comment that my axioms assume consciousness - namely, that defining reality implicates the role of consciousness. It does. So It’s a good thing that consciousness is all that we can assume.
I think my analysis mirrors observations of sense perception. This is why I think it might have the potential to work.

We can certainly conceptualize the means by which thoughts arrive - that is presupposed in these posts of mine and Cleric's TCT essays. It is of utmost important to build a conceptual foundation for higher understanding. The meaningful context which exists 'behind' our current perceptual perspective and shapes our inner experience, including our concepts, could be conceived as the "nothingness" you mention - it appears as formless forces which influence the world of our experience but are not directly perceived by the intellect. The problem is when we conflate conceptualization with genuine understanding of these currently invisible forces, which are all lumped into one force by the intellect and go by the abstract label of "God", "Consciousness", "Energy", "Idea","Will/MAL", "Nothingness", etc.

With idealism, there is something it is like to experience MAL from the perspectives within its rich, archetypal depth structure. We are not on the 'other side' of this experiential perspective - there is no hard wall separating us into "alters" with personal bubbles of consciousness that must model 'reality-in-itself' (this latter concept is a product of Kantian/Schop dualism). Our conceptualization can only be a symbol pointing to this higher experience of MAL's inner perspectives, like the words I am writing can only be symbols to you of the rich meaning that I am experiencing from my inner perspective and trying to convey with the words. The word-concepts themselves cannot be configured in any way for you to completely grasp that meaningful perspective. They cannot "prove" that meaning to you, only point in its general direction. In fact, with modern technology, we are even coming to the point where my words may not "prove" there is any inner perspective behind the words you are perceiving, only a programmed algorithm.

With that in mind, I want to try a slightly different approach as well. Here are a few questions:

1) You conclude, "Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties." Why do you say "Reality" instead of "Thinking"? For context of what I am asking, consider the following:

Observation and thinking are the two points of departure for all the spiritual striving of man, in so far as he is conscious of such striving. The workings of common sense, as well as the most complicated scientific researches, rest on these two fundamental pillars of our spirit. Philosophers have started from various primary antitheses: idea and reality, subject and object, appearance and thing-in-itself, “I” and “Not-I”, idea and will, concept and matter, force and substance, the conscious and the unconscious, [being and nothingness]. It is easy to show, however, that all these antitheses must be preceded by that of observation and thinking, this being for man the most important one.

Whatever principle we choose to lay down, we must either prove that somewhere we have observed it, or we must enunciate it in the form of a clear thought which can be re-thought by any other thinker. Every philosopher who sets out to discuss his fundamental principles must express them in conceptual form and thus use thinking. He therefore indirectly admits that his activity presupposes thinking. Whether thinking or something else is the chief factor in the evolution of the world will not be decided at this point. But that without thinking, the philosopher can gain no knowledge of such evolution, is clear from the start. In the occurrence of the world phenomena, thinking may play a minor part; but in the forming of a view about them, there can be no doubt that, its part is a leading one.

2) Is the purpose of your essay to 'prove' to others that consciousness is fundamental and there is only consciousness? If so, what practical effect do you hope this will have?

3) You write: "With only some of these axioms amounting to an explanation of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be real and unreal.
With all 5 axioms, reality is just real. Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality."

What is meant here by "explanation"? Are these axioms by themselves explanations for Reality as we experience it?

We can certainly conceptualize the means by which thoughts arrive - that is presupposed in these posts of mine and Cleric's TCT essays. It is of utmost important to build a conceptual foundation for higher understanding. The meaningful context which exists 'behind' our current perceptual perspective and shapes our inner experience, including our concepts, could be conceived as the "nothingness" you mention - it appears as formless forces which influence the world of our experience but are not directly perceived by the intellect. The problem is when we conflate conceptualization with genuine understanding of these currently invisible forces, which are all lumped into one force by the intellect and go by the abstract label of "God", "Consciousness", "Energy", "Idea","Will/MAL", "Nothingness", etc.

How would you explain the difference between “conceptualizing” the invisible forces, and “genuinely understanding” the invisible forces?

(Btw, In my post I’m referring to absolute nothingness, not ontic nothingness.)

I still don’t see how a demonstration of how our inner experiences are shaped is going to help me demonstrate how consciousness is fundamental to reality, because such demonstrations are applicably limited to the workings of mind. Even a demonstration of how our inner experiences are shaped by MAL doesn’t extend its reasoning past mind. In order for me to say that mind = reality, I have to extend my reasoning from mind to reality, and show how they are equivalent. I don’t think the lack of spiritual exploration in my writing here is due to a false conception of its lack of importance in general. I have essays on the nature of language, and the nature of inference, etc. A comprehensive theory of mind/reality as a whole would most certainly require these things. I just don’t see how it directly pertains to what I’m demonstrating here.

I’ve been under the impression that your trying to claim I’m approaching the problem in the wrong way. But now I suspect that you are intending to claim that it is a problem that literally cannot be solved — This may be true. But I’m hoping you can clarify that this is indeed what you are intending to claim.

1) You conclude, "Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties." Why do you say "Reality" instead of "Thinking"? For context of what I am asking, consider the following:
Because the theory pertains to reality. In order to demonstrate that reality is conscious I have to give reality conscious attributes, but not the other way around.

2) Is the purpose of your essay to 'prove' to others that consciousness is fundamental and there is only consciousness? If so, what practical effect do you hope this will have?

Yes. The practical effect could be to show that everyone is connected by consciousness, which would hopefully act as an incentive for everyone to care for one another as they would care for themselves. But this post isn’t, in itself, something that people could use to make theirs or others lives better. It doesn’t have utility as a tool for self improvement.

3) You write: "With only some of these axioms amounting to an explanation of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be real and unreal.
What is meant here by "explanation"? Are these axioms by themselves explanations for Reality as we experience it?
I need to reword this — my bad. They are facts about reality. The theory as a whole is an explanation which uses these axioms.

On that note, I think I need to rewrite the whole thing so it better reflects what we have discussed here.

[AshvinP]

Clerics post is interesting and well articulated.

How I would put it in my own words (and correct me if I’m wrong) is that we can experience sense perceptions and observe “what they are to us”, but we can never conceive of the means by which those thoughts “arrive” to us as sense perceptions, because our experience is limited to the observer frame in which it perceives. We can try to conceptualize a means for how observed experiences “arrive”, but since the means for that conceptualization cannot be observed, said conceptualization has no, or limited empirical value.

As such, the mind doesn’t know the meaning of objects, and it doesn’t know the objects of meaning, it just knows that it perceives content as qualitatively meaningful. Perhaps, we can reasonably claim, without abstracting, that it “bridges meaning and content”.

Note that what I have proposed in my post only makes one abstraction beyond this direct observation — the answer to “What is a reality”. Can we make this abstraction with complete epistemic certainty? Clearly, Cleric has demonstrated that we can conceptualize direct observations without diminishing return on empirical value. I would argue that reality being “all that is not nothing” is validated by the empirical fact that we experience reality.

You mentioned in your first comment that my axioms assume consciousness - namely, that defining reality implicates the role of consciousness. It does. So It’s a good thing that consciousness is all that we can assume.
I think my analysis mirrors observations of sense perception. This is why I think it might have the potential to work.

We can certainly conceptualize the means by which thoughts arrive - that is presupposed in these posts of mine and Cleric's TCT essays. It is of utmost important to build a conceptual foundation for higher understanding. The meaningful context which exists 'behind' our current perceptual perspective and shapes our inner experience, including our concepts, could be conceived as the "nothingness" you mention - it appears as formless forces which influence the world of our experience but are not directly perceived by the intellect. The problem is when we conflate conceptualization with genuine understanding of these currently invisible forces, which are all lumped into one force by the intellect and go by the abstract label of "God", "Consciousness", "Energy", "Idea","Will/MAL", "Nothingness", etc.

With idealism, there is something it is like to experience MAL from the perspectives within its rich, archetypal depth structure. We are not on the 'other side' of this experiential perspective - there is no hard wall separating us into "alters" with personal bubbles of consciousness that must model 'reality-in-itself' (this latter concept is a product of Kantian/Schop dualism). Our conceptualization can only be a symbol pointing to this higher experience of MAL's inner perspectives, like the words I am writing can only be symbols to you of the rich meaning that I am experiencing from my inner perspective and trying to convey with the words. The word-concepts themselves cannot be configured in any way for you to completely grasp that meaningful perspective. They cannot "prove" that meaning to you, only point in its general direction. In fact, with modern technology, we are even coming to the point where my words may not "prove" there is any inner perspective behind the words you are perceiving, only a programmed algorithm.

With that in mind, I want to try a slightly different approach as well. Here are a few questions:

1) You conclude, "Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties." Why do you say "Reality" instead of "Thinking"? For context of what I am asking, consider the following:

Observation and thinking are the two points of departure for all the spiritual striving of man, in so far as he is conscious of such striving. The workings of common sense, as well as the most complicated scientific researches, rest on these two fundamental pillars of our spirit. Philosophers have started from various primary antitheses: idea and reality, subject and object, appearance and thing-in-itself, “I” and “Not-I”, idea and will, concept and matter, force and substance, the conscious and the unconscious, [being and nothingness]. It is easy to show, however, that all these antitheses must be preceded by that of observation and thinking, this being for man the most important one.

Whatever principle we choose to lay down, we must either prove that somewhere we have observed it, or we must enunciate it in the form of a clear thought which can be re-thought by any other thinker. Every philosopher who sets out to discuss his fundamental principles must express them in conceptual form and thus use thinking. He therefore indirectly admits that his activity presupposes thinking. Whether thinking or something else is the chief factor in the evolution of the world will not be decided at this point. But that without thinking, the philosopher can gain no knowledge of such evolution, is clear from the start. In the occurrence of the world phenomena, thinking may play a minor part; but in the forming of a view about them, there can be no doubt that, its part is a leading one.

2) Is the purpose of your essay to 'prove' to others that consciousness is fundamental and there is only consciousness? If so, what practical effect do you hope this will have?

3) You write: "With only some of these axioms amounting to an explanation of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be real and unreal.
With all 5 axioms, reality is just real. Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality."

What is meant here by "explanation"? Are these axioms by themselves explanations for Reality as we experience it?

We can certainly conceptualize the means by which thoughts arrive - that is presupposed in these posts of mine and Cleric's TCT essays. It is of utmost important to build a conceptual foundation for higher understanding. The meaningful context which exists 'behind' our current perceptual perspective and shapes our inner experience, including our concepts, could be conceived as the "nothingness" you mention - it appears as formless forces which influence the world of our experience but are not directly perceived by the intellect. The problem is when we conflate conceptualization with genuine understanding of these currently invisible forces, which are all lumped into one force by the intellect and go by the abstract label of "God", "Consciousness", "Energy", "Idea","Will/MAL", "Nothingness", etc.

How would you explain the difference between “conceptualizing” the invisible forces, and “genuinely understanding” the invisible forces?

(Btw, In my post I’m referring to absolute nothingness, not ontic nothingness.)

I still don’t see how a demonstration of how our inner experiences are shaped is going to help me demonstrate how consciousness is fundamental to reality, because such demonstrations are applicably limited to the workings of mind. Even a demonstration of how our inner experiences are shaped by MAL doesn’t extend its reasoning past mind. In order for me to say that mind = reality, I have to extend my reasoning from mind to reality, and show how they are equivalent. I don’t think the lack of spiritual exploration in my writing here is due to a false conception of its lack of importance in general. I have essays on the nature of language, and the nature of inference, etc. A comprehensive theory of mind/reality as a whole would most certainly require these things. I just don’t see how it directly pertains to what I’m demonstrating here.

I’ve been under the impression that your trying to tell me that I’m approaching the problem in the wrong way. But now I suspect that you are intending to claim that it is a problem that literally cannot be solved — This may be true. But I’m hoping you can clarify that this is indeed what you are intending to claim.

Maybe it’s impossible to do what I’m trying to do. Maybe the fact that my reasoning of inner experience extends onto reality contradicts that which can be reasoned from inner experience. But how, precisely?

That is not my argument. If we define the problem as "how to prove God, Consciousness, etc. with our intellectual conceptual arguments", then yes that is unsolvable because it presupposes a flawed understanding of our conscious spiritual activity, i.e. Thinking and its relation to sense-perceptions and inner concepts. If the problem is "how can we attain to greater understanding of that which we are labeling God, Consciousness, etc.", then I say this can be worked on by every individual, and real progress can be made, to an extent 99.9%+ of people surely think is impossible right now.

The bold is the issue - why has this become the goal? From the dawn of materialism, it seems to me the goal of those in opposition has been to resist the mindset which increasingly says there is no meaningful sentient activity in the Cosmos or Nature, other than human and some animal activity. It has been to couteract this 'deadening' of the Cosmos to a reductionistic and mechanistic entity, and to recover the living experience of meaning weaving throughout the forms of Nature. What does an intellectual 'proof' that mind=reality accomplish in service of that goal?

We need look no further than this forum to see how people are no more likely to take seriously that sentient activity works through the animal, plant, and mineral kingdoms, if they say "mind=reality", "consciousness=reality", "god=reality", or anything similar, even when backed up with clever intellectual arguments (and the clever materialist can also make such arguments for 'particles' = reality, in some form or another). This is what I call "conceptualizing" the invisible forces rather than seeking genuine understanding of them. It is fine, and enormously helpful, if people use these methods to strengthen their own logical thinking faculty, but if they then rest comfortable with these intellectual arguments about the invisible forces, no genuine understanding will be reached. For the latter, our sphere of cognition-perception must be expanded to make what was formerly an invisible domain of meaningful forces, more transparent.

1) You conclude, "Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties." Why do you say "Reality" instead of "Thinking"? For context of what I am asking, consider the following:
Because the theory pertains to reality. In order to demonstrate that reality is conscious I have to give reality conscious attributes, but not the other way around.

2) Is the purpose of your essay to 'prove' to others that consciousness is fundamental and there is only consciousness? If so, what practical effect do you hope this will have?

Yes. The practical effect could be to show that everyone is connected by consciousness, which would hopefully act as an incentive for everyone to care for one another as they would care for themselves. But this post isn’t, in itself, something that people could use to make theirs or others lives better. It doesn’t have utility as a tool for self improvement.

3) You write: "With only some of these axioms amounting to an explanation of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be real and unreal.
What is meant here by "explanation"? Are these axioms by themselves explanations for Reality as we experience it?
I need to reword this — my bad. They are facts about reality. The theory as a whole is an explanation which uses these axioms.

On that note, I think I need to rewrite the whole thing so it better reflects what we have discussed here.

We at least agree on the last part of #2. If intellectual theories could ever substitute for experiential knowledge of the interconnected conscious dynamics at issue, thereby motivating people to freely do unto others, then we wouldn't be in the state we are in. You must admit, philosophical idealism has come up with many rigorous theories for the "consciousness is fundamental" position in the last 300 or so years. Why is the one you are working on suddenly going to win over the hearts and minds of the masses?

A theory simply cannot be an "explanation" in any meaningful sense of that word. Let's take a more clear topic - would you say the theory of general relativity explains the essence of reality, i.e. what the equations of GR are reflecting in their full meaningful, qualitative dimensions?

Reworking the paper is fine, and reflects a very healthy humility, but my interest is only in pointing to a concrete path of thinking and experience which can foster genuine understanding of that which we only speak of abstractly in our theories.

[GrantHenderson]

We can certainly conceptualize the means by which thoughts arrive - that is presupposed in these posts of mine and Cleric's TCT essays. It is of utmost important to build a conceptual foundation for higher understanding. The meaningful context which exists 'behind' our current perceptual perspective and shapes our inner experience, including our concepts, could be conceived as the "nothingness" you mention - it appears as formless forces which influence the world of our experience but are not directly perceived by the intellect. The problem is when we conflate conceptualization with genuine understanding of these currently invisible forces, which are all lumped into one force by the intellect and go by the abstract label of "God", "Consciousness", "Energy", "Idea","Will/MAL", "Nothingness", etc.

With idealism, there is something it is like to experience MAL from the perspectives within its rich, archetypal depth structure. We are not on the 'other side' of this experiential perspective - there is no hard wall separating us into "alters" with personal bubbles of consciousness that must model 'reality-in-itself' (this latter concept is a product of Kantian/Schop dualism). Our conceptualization can only be a symbol pointing to this higher experience of MAL's inner perspectives, like the words I am writing can only be symbols to you of the rich meaning that I am experiencing from my inner perspective and trying to convey with the words. The word-concepts themselves cannot be configured in any way for you to completely grasp that meaningful perspective. They cannot "prove" that meaning to you, only point in its general direction. In fact, with modern technology, we are even coming to the point where my words may not "prove" there is any inner perspective behind the words you are perceiving, only a programmed algorithm.

With that in mind, I want to try a slightly different approach as well. Here are a few questions:

1) You conclude, "Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties." Why do you say "Reality" instead of "Thinking"? For context of what I am asking, consider the following:




2) Is the purpose of your essay to 'prove' to others that consciousness is fundamental and there is only consciousness? If so, what practical effect do you hope this will have?

3) You write: "With only some of these axioms amounting to an explanation of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be real and unreal.
With all 5 axioms, reality is just real. Therefore, consciousness is fundamental to reality."

What is meant here by "explanation"? Are these axioms by themselves explanations for Reality as we experience it?

We can certainly conceptualize the means by which thoughts arrive - that is presupposed in these posts of mine and Cleric's TCT essays. It is of utmost important to build a conceptual foundation for higher understanding. The meaningful context which exists 'behind' our current perceptual perspective and shapes our inner experience, including our concepts, could be conceived as the "nothingness" you mention - it appears as formless forces which influence the world of our experience but are not directly perceived by the intellect. The problem is when we conflate conceptualization with genuine understanding of these currently invisible forces, which are all lumped into one force by the intellect and go by the abstract label of "God", "Consciousness", "Energy", "Idea","Will/MAL", "Nothingness", etc.

How would you explain the difference between “conceptualizing” the invisible forces, and “genuinely understanding” the invisible forces?

(Btw, In my post I’m referring to absolute nothingness, not ontic nothingness.)

I still don’t see how a demonstration of how our inner experiences are shaped is going to help me demonstrate how consciousness is fundamental to reality, because such demonstrations are applicably limited to the workings of mind. Even a demonstration of how our inner experiences are shaped by MAL doesn’t extend its reasoning past mind. In order for me to say that mind = reality, I have to extend my reasoning from mind to reality, and show how they are equivalent. I don’t think the lack of spiritual exploration in my writing here is due to a false conception of its lack of importance in general. I have essays on the nature of language, and the nature of inference, etc. A comprehensive theory of mind/reality as a whole would most certainly require these things. I just don’t see how it directly pertains to what I’m demonstrating here.

I’ve been under the impression that your trying to tell me that I’m approaching the problem in the wrong way. But now I suspect that you are intending to claim that it is a problem that literally cannot be solved — This may be true. But I’m hoping you can clarify that this is indeed what you are intending to claim.

Maybe it’s impossible to do what I’m trying to do. Maybe the fact that my reasoning of inner experience extends onto reality contradicts that which can be reasoned from inner experience. But how, precisely?

That is not my argument. If we define the problem as "how to prove God, Consciousness, etc. with our intellectual conceptual arguments", then yes that is unsolvable because it presupposes a flawed understanding of our conscious spiritual activity, i.e. Thinking and its relation to sense-perceptions and inner concepts. If the problem is "how can we attain to greater understanding of that which we are labeling God, Consciousness, etc.", then I say this can be worked on by every individual, and real progress can be made, to an extent 99.9%+ of people surely think is impossible right now.

The bold is the issue - why has this become the goal? From the dawn of materialism, it seems to me the goal of those in opposition has been to resist the mindset which increasingly says there is no meaningful sentient activity in the Cosmos or Nature, other than human and some animal activity. It has been to couteract this 'deadening' of the Cosmos to a reductionistic and mechanistic entity, and to recover the living experience of meaning weaving throughout the forms of Nature. What does an intellectual 'proof' that mind=reality accomplish in service of that goal?

We need look no further than this forum to see how people are no more likely to take seriously that sentient activity works through the animal, plant, and mineral kingdoms, if they say "mind=reality", "consciousness=reality", "god=reality", or anything similar, even when backed up with clever intellectual arguments (and the clever materialist can also make such arguments for 'particles' = reality, in some form or another). This is what I call "conceptualizing" the invisible forces rather than seeking genuine understanding of them. It is fine, and enormously helpful, if people use these methods to strengthen their own logical thinking faculty, but if they then rest comfortable with these intellectual arguments about the invisible forces, no genuine understanding will be reached. For the latter, our sphere of cognition-perception must be expanded to make what was formerly an invisible domain of meaningful forces, more transparent.

1) You conclude, "Reality must be that which gives qualitative meaning to its properties/non-properties." Why do you say "Reality" instead of "Thinking"? For context of what I am asking, consider the following:
Because the theory pertains to reality. In order to demonstrate that reality is conscious I have to give reality conscious attributes, but not the other way around.

2) Is the purpose of your essay to 'prove' to others that consciousness is fundamental and there is only consciousness? If so, what practical effect do you hope this will have?

Yes. The practical effect could be to show that everyone is connected by consciousness, which would hopefully act as an incentive for everyone to care for one another as they would care for themselves. But this post isn’t, in itself, something that people could use to make theirs or others lives better. It doesn’t have utility as a tool for self improvement.

3) You write: "With only some of these axioms amounting to an explanation of reality, reality runs a contradiction by implicating to be real and unreal.
What is meant here by "explanation"? Are these axioms by themselves explanations for Reality as we experience it?
I need to reword this — my bad. They are facts about reality. The theory as a whole is an explanation which uses these axioms.

On that note, I think I need to rewrite the whole thing so it better reflects what we have discussed here.

We at least agree on the last part of #2. If intellectual theories could ever substitute for experiential knowledge of the interconnected conscious dynamics at issue, thereby motivating people to freely do unto others, then we wouldn't be in the state we are in. You must admit, philosophical idealism has come up with many rigorous theories for the "consciousness is fundamental" position in the last 300 or so years. Why is the one you are working on suddenly going to win over the hearts and minds of the masses?

A theory simply cannot be an "explanation" in any meaningful sense of that word. Let's take a more clear topic - would you say the theory of general relativity explains the essence of reality, i.e. what the equations of GR are reflecting in their full meaningful, qualitative dimensions?

Reworking the paper is fine, and reflects a very healthy humility, but my interest is only in pointing to a concrete path of thinking and experience which can foster genuine understanding of that which we only speak of abstractly in our theories.

As far as I can tell, your criticisms suggest that god cannot be empirically proven. No chance that would happen. Although empirics do inform my logical axioms, we cannot form inner concepts demonstrating how our sense perceptions pertain to “god”. I don’t think any of this negates the proposal that one cannot construct a truthful (or at least valid) proof procedure for “god”, but rather, highlights the limitations of logical proof in general— especially one of this nature. One problem with logical proofs, as you point out, is a problem of achieving consensus on definitions. Another problem is the reduction in epistemic certainty by abstracting away from inner concepts.

I can’t argue with these. They are all true.

For the longest time, I thought you were claiming that, contrary to my argument, the way to logically prove god was through inner concepts — I couldn’t understand why you thought that could make for a valid argument. Now I realize that you are claiming that inner concepts are the most epistemically certain conceptualizations we can engage in with regards to the structure and function of consciousness — more so than any logical proof of an abstract god. Additionally, they can inform us about attributes of a potential God that won’t be found in a proof procedure such as this one.

Can’t argue with that.

[AshvinP]

As far as I can tell, your criticisms suggest that god cannot be empirically proven. No chance that would happen. Although empirics do inform my logical axioms, we cannot form inner concepts demonstrating how our sense perceptions pertain to “god”. I don’t think any of this negates the proposal that one cannot construct a truthful (or at least valid) proof procedure for “god”, but rather, highlights the limitations of logical proof in general— especially one of this nature. One problem with logical proofs, as you point out, is a problem of achieving consensus on definitions. Another problem is the reduction in epistemic certainty by abstracting away from inner concepts.

I can’t argue with these. They are all true.

For the longest time, I thought you were claiming that, contrary to my argument, the way to logically prove god was through inner concepts — I couldn’t understand why you thought that could make for a valid argument. Now I realize that you are claiming that inner concepts are the most epistemically certain conceptualizations we can engage in with regards to the structure and function of consciousness — more so than any logical proof of an abstract god. Additionally, they can inform us about attributes of a potential God that won’t be found in a proof procedure such as this one.

Can’t argue with that.

Grant,

I apologize if my posts have been unclear on the nature of the criticism. There are four general points:

1) Even assuming a conceptual proof can be made for the Ontic Prime (I say this is a bad assumption), it seems to me that the one you presented is a tautology. I think you have embedded the conclusion within the definitions of Reality and God, by making the latter extremely broad.

For ex. - Axiom 1) Consciousness has a proposed definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to its properties” ---> this sounds to me like "Consciousness is Reality" because there is no experience of Reality without qualitative meaning.

2) We can empirically investigate the structure of Consciousness by looking at our own Thinking activity and how it is shaped by the currently invisible meaningful context. This comes through a combination of inner meditative practice and logical reasoning through first-person experience as it manifests (without assuming the "essence" of anything from the outset). We already know that what gives reality its conceptual meaning, whether the concepts of Being or Nothingness (absolute or otherwise), is our Thinking (see Steiner quote previously posted). So, naturally, that is the place to investigate the OP. It is here where we find the underlying activity (thinking) and the product of that activity (concepts) united, the noumenon and phenomenon, and therefore transparent to us.

3) If the practical aim is to recover the experience of ideal activity permeating the world around us, which was stripped away by materialist mindset, logical proofs for "mind=reality" are entirely inadequate. We can easily discern this by reflecting on how many times such proofs have been given and how little difference they have made to human experience of the world. What reason do we have to think logical proofs can alter the very cognitive perspective and experience of human beings? At best, they can only be the very first symbolic steps taken towards a more living understanding, and, more importantly, a means of strenghtening our logical thinking faculty (Logos).

4) (this is new) Even without inner work of the sort mentioned above, we can reason out how mind=reality in much greater resolution. For ex., we can reason out what relation there is between the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms we perceive and our own inner activity of willing, feeling, thinking. We can reason out how nested hierarchical Ideas actually structure our daily experience, or the entire human experience over long stretches of time. Many similar things can be reasoned out, relating ourselves and our inner activity to the meaningful World Content we perceive, including all other living organisms. Isn't this more of a fruitful path and satisfying explanation than the broad conclusion, "mind=reality"?

[lorenzop]

In line with what others have already posted, I think the main point is that even if one were to develop an airtight proof of God (or anything) . . . a 'proof' is merely a term we use to designate a temporary feeling of satisfaction in the mind, as in,"I am happy with a line of reasoning and I can stop here". Also, a proof doesn't necessarily result in compelling us to action.
I assume what we all want is an authentic, honest understanding and connection to God/Reality. (I use the terms God and Reality interchangably.)
So the question becomes - What determines our relationship to Reality?
In answering this question - we then know what to nurture/culture in our lives.

[AshvinP]

1) Even assuming a conceptual proof can be made for the Ontic Prime (I say this is a bad assumption), it seems to me that the one you presented is a tautology. I think you have embedded the conclusion within the definitions of Reality and God, by making the latter extremely broad.

For ex. - Axiom 1) Consciousness has a proposed definition -- “That which gives qualitative meaning to its properties” ---> this sounds to me like "Consciousness is Reality" because there is no experience of Reality without qualitative meaning.

2) We can empirically investigate the structure of Consciousness by looking at our own Thinking activity and how it is shaped by the currently invisible meaningful context. This comes through a combination of inner meditative practice and logical reasoning through first-person experience as it manifests (without assuming the "essence" of anything from the outset). We already know that what gives reality its conceptual meaning, whether the concepts of Being or Nothingness (absolute or otherwise), is our Thinking (see Steiner quote previously posted). So, naturally, that is the place to investigate the OP. It is here where we find the underlying activity (thinking) and the product of that activity (concepts) united, the noumenon and phenomenon, and therefore transparent to us.

3) If the practical aim is to recover the experience of ideal activity permeating the world around us, which was stripped away by materialist mindset, logical proofs for "mind=reality" are entirely inadequate. We can easily discern this by reflecting on how many times such proofs have been given and how little difference they have made to human experience of the world. What reason do we have to think logical proofs can alter the very cognitive perspective and experience of human beings? At best, they can only be the very first symbolic steps taken towards a more living understanding, and, more importantly, a means of strenghtening our logical thinking faculty (Logos).

4) (this is new) Even without inner work of the sort mentioned above, we can reason out how mind=reality in much greater resolution. For ex., we can reason out what relation there is between the mineral, plant, and animal kingdoms we perceive and our own inner activity of willing, feeling, thinking. We can reason out how nested hierarchical Ideas actually structure our daily experience, or the entire human experience over long stretches of time. Many similar things can be reasoned out, relating ourselves and our inner activity to the meaningful World Content we perceive, including all other living organisms. Isn't this more of a fruitful path and satisfying explanation than the broad conclusion, "mind=reality"?

As an elaboration on these points, consider the following analogies from Steiner re: imaginative thinking (keeping in mind "conventional science" can also be substituted for "conceptual philosophy"):

Suppose we had some kind of structure artistically built up out of layers of paper rolls, some of them standing upright, others at an angle — all of these arranged artistically into some kind of a structure. Now imagine we had not just rolls of plain paper, but inside each roll a beautiful picture had been painted. Of course, just looking at the rolled up paper, we wouldn't see the paintings on the inside of the rolls. And yet, the paintings are there! And they must have been painted before the paper rolls were arranged in the artistic structure.
...
These are not dead pictures, but living forces that build up everything meant to exist on earth. And we draw out what is artfully hidden in the structure made up of the individual rolls of the cosmic edifice — which science describes. This is what confronts us in our outer life. I have given much thought to finding an analogy corresponding as closely as possible to the facts of the matter and have come up with this image of the paper rolls with their living, active pictures. When you think this analogy through, you will find that when we first look at this structure, we cannot know anything about the paintings inside the rolls. If the structure is rather artful and ingenious, we can get an artful and ingenious description of it; however, it will not contain a word about the paintings inside the rolls.

You see, that's how it is with the conventional sciences. They describe this artistic structure, while ignoring completely the paintings on the inside of each roll. Now, you may wonder if a description of the elaborate structure of the rolls allows us to get an idea and to really know what is inside each roll as long as the rolls are rolled up and part of the whole structure? No, it does not! Conventional science is completely unable to arrive at the idea that the spiritual underlies our cosmic edifice. Therefore, simply continuing along the lines of conventional science will not lead to an understanding of spiritual science; something else must be added, something that has nothing to do with ordinary science.
...
What conventional science is doing cannot be called “reading the world.” If you look at what is written on a page of some book or other publication and you can't read at all, then what is written there will of course remain completely in comprehensible to you. Still, you could describe the handwriting; you could describe the lines, loops, and crossbars; you could tell what the individual letters look like and how they are combined. It will be a nice description, not unlike the one contemporary science gives of outer physical reality or the one contemporary history provides. However, this is not the same as reading.

Obviously, people do not learn to read by taking a page from a book, without having any idea what it means to read, and trying to figure out the meaning of the text from the shape of the letters. Reading is taught in childhood. We learn to read not by describing the shape of the letters, but because something spiritual is conveyed to us, and we are mentally and spiritually stimulated to read.
...
As you remember the themes running through our lectures, you will see I have always tried to use images. Today I am also using them, for it is only through images that one can lead the way into the spiritual. As soon as images are crammed into concepts applying only to the physical plane, they no longer contain what they should.
...
People will gradually have to realize that we have to speak more and more in images. Of course, if we were to speak in pictures only, we would be going against modern European culture, so we can't do that. But we can gradually allow ordinary thinking, applicable only on the physical plane, to turn into thinking about the spiritual world, and then into pictorial thinking, which develops under the influence of the spiritual world. Natural scientists also develop a view of the world, but if they think their view is clear and comprehensible, they make the same mistake as we would if we claimed we could paint a portrait, and the subject would then step out of the canvas and walk around the room.