Why I believe Analytic Idealism is flawed

[Lou Gold]

...

Sure, in speaking at all we're forced into the nominal. Name it yin in dynamic relationship with yang, I still find no dichotomous duality, or actual boundary ... at least no more a boundary than the 49th parallel.

No boundary, no manifestation. No manifestation, no dichotomy. No?

[Lou Gold]

...

Sure, in speaking at all we're forced into the nominal. Name it yin in dynamic relationship with yang, I still find no dichotomous duality, or actual boundary ... at least no more a boundary than the 49th parallel.

I find that there are boundaries that are fun to play with but not so much fun to argue about.



I like idealism because its expanded plausibility allows the term 'real' to be applied to a greater diversity of experience and possibilities for communion. However, I find it suboptimal for finding goodness and beauty as well as truth. One is rather shaky on a one-legged stool. Of course, for me, the stool is a story. I loved Mark Vernon applying Dante toward BK. Guess I'm a trinitarian.

[Soul_of_Shu]

No boundary, no manifestation. No manifestation, no dichotomy. No?

I'm referring here to a subjectified Mind><objectified Mind relational dynamic—not about a demarcation point between two distinct forms— and I'm now seeing better joepoe's point with the problematic abstraction being any so-called 'boundary' in that dynamic that defines the subject as a form contra another form, which can seem akin to the issue with physicalism. Seems a good issue to be raised in the upcoming AMA.

[Lou Gold]

No boundary, no manifestation. No manifestation, no dichotomy. No?

I'm referring here to a subjectified Mind><objectified Mind relational dynamic—not about a demarcation point between two distinct forms— and I'm now seeing better joepoe's point with the problematic abstraction being any so-called 'boundary' in that dynamic that defines the subject as a form contra another form, which can seem akin to the issue with physicalism. Seems a good issue to be raised in the upcoming AMA.

OK, above my paygrade methinks. Does ontology do the contra dance in framing a fundamental physicalism vs idealism problematic? Intuitively, I feel that it does but I don't have the lingo to discuss it philosophically.

[Soul_of_Shu]

OK, above my paygrade methinks. Does ontology do the contra dance in framing a fundamental physicalism vs idealism problematic? Intuitively, I feel that it does but I don't have the lingo to discuss it philosophically.

Well insofar as physicalism and idealism offer distinctly contrasting and contrary ontological premises, how else could it be framed? But I'd rather stay focused here on jp's original post. As such, I await his replies to the relevant commentary.

[Lou Gold]

OK, above my paygrade methinks. Does ontology do the contra dance in framing a fundamental physicalism vs idealism problematic? Intuitively, I feel that it does but I don't have the lingo to discuss it philosophically.

Well insofar as physicalism and idealism offer distinctly contrasting and contrary ontological premises, how else could it be framed? But I'd rather stay focused here on jp's original post. As such, I await his replies to the relevant commentary.

It's not that ontology might offer a different framing but that ontology itself may be a problematic framing. But you're right. Do stay focused on the theme of this thread. Sorry for the distraction.

[AshvinP]

It's not about what BK is consciously proposing, but how his 'objective idealism', with 'dissociated alters', functions for all intents and purposes. As the OP says, it makes the exact same abstraction of materialism-dualism, but in the form of "atomized subject beholding ideas of Big Subject across a dissociative boundary". So now we practically have conceived the ontology with a subject/object (or subject/Subject) divide, and we end up with the same hard problems and the same abstraction of 'ideas' into illusory and acausal floating thought-forms which foam up into Consciousness upon dissociation (birth) and dissolve back into it upon death.

Well, how is it the 'exact' same abstraction? Under materialism, that which is deemed to be 'out there' is of an entirely discrete ontological category, which would exist were there no consciousness at all. Under idealism, it's subjectified and objectified aspects of one ontological category, i.e. Mind, in dynamic relationship. Again, why should this be defined as a 'divide' rather than a 'dynamic'?

What does the materialist say? Before you were born, you existed as only potential in the unified field of matter/energy. Once you were conceived or born, the matter/energy combined and differentiated in such a way as to create a new living being, eventually capable of refleftive thoughts which simply try to model the real world 'out there' which preexisted it, but is essentially creating qualia (meaning) which have nothing to do with what is really out there. Your thoughts are added onto this preexisting black box, but themselves have no causal efficacy. When you die, your thoughts and memories will die with you and the very notion of "you" as an individuated consciousness will cease.

Does analytic idealism say anything different? It simply replaces the conceptual forms above with different words (dissociation, alter, entropic soup, blind will of MAL, instinctive consciousness, etc.), but their practical meaning is the exact same. How your individuated thoughts and memories came into the world, relate to that world (modeling a preexisting world of material or mental stuff), and will dissolve back out of that world are practically the same. The epistemological and ethical implications are the exact same. At best, it gives us an abstract wildcard concept - "who knows what really happens after death, maybe you will survive". Such a speculation is meaningless for all practical purposes and intents. None of it changes the way we relate to nature, other humans, or the higher Cosmic structure one bit.

[Elessar2]

Noticed the Lao Tzu quote on p. 1.

Aeon discusses Zhuangzi today:

There is a well-known story in the Zhuangzi, the ‘Fable of a Frog in the Well’. It is a conversation between a well frog and a sea turtle. The frog brags about its own comfortable abode and way of life in a caved-in well to a visiting sea turtle. When the turtle describes for the frog what the sea is like, the frog is completely dumbfounded, not knowing what to make of the turtle’s description. This is a tale about the limited world of the well for the frog in contrast with the limitless world of the sea for the turtle.

Zhuangzi mocked the Confucians and the Mohists as being like frogs in a well while at the same time extolling the virtues of roaming in the world of limitlessness, like the sea. Importantly, unlike Plato’s portrayal of the people shackled in the cave, Zhuangzi’s critique of the frog is not that its world is unreal but rather that its perspective is limited.

Like the frog, Bernardo loves to talk on and on about the world being constituted by Mind @ Large, but has no experiential path of his own to put his ideas into action. He could at the very least choose the path of contemplation, or the path of manifestation, yet chooses neither in favor of more dry ivory tower ministrations.

[Soul_of_Shu]

What does the materialist say? Before you were born, you existed as only potential in the unified field of matter/energy. Once you were conceived or born, the matter/energy combined and differentiated in such a way as to create a new living being, eventually capable of refleftive thoughts which simply try to model the real world 'out there' which preexisted it, but is essentially creating qualia (meaning) which have nothing to do with what is really out there. Your thoughts are added onto this preexisting black box, but themselves have no causal efficacy. When you die, your thoughts and memories will die with you and the very notion of "you" as an individuated consciousness will cease.

Does analytic idealism say anything different? It simply replaces the conceptual forms above with different words (dissociation, alter, entropic soup, blind will of MAL, instinctive consciousness, etc.), but their practical meaning is the exact same. How your individuated thoughts and memories came into the world, relate to that world (modeling a preexisting world of material or mental stuff), and will dissolve back out of that world are practically the same. The epistemological and ethical implications are the exact same. At best, it gives us an abstract wildcard concept - "who knows what really happens after death, maybe you will survive". Such a speculation is meaningless for all practical purposes and intents. None of it changes the way we relate to nature, other humans, or the higher Cosmic structure one bit.

Yes, I can go along with some of this, but still it's not clear to me how any actual segregated divide factors in, however hindered the interplay may be, as Mind cannot ever be other than Mind, in whatever ideated aspect it may appear. But perhaps that quibble is a moot point that misses the point. In any case, the only response to this critique I'm interested in would be one in which it is hashed out with BK in some extended dialogue. Alas, that ain't gonna happen here, or in some AMA format. Meanwhile I await some response from jp to the relevant commentary, should there be any clarification to add.

[Jim Cross]

What does the materialist say? Before you were born, you existed as only potential in the unified field of matter/energy. Once you were conceived or born, the matter/energy combined and differentiated in such a way as to create a new living being, eventually capable of refleftive thoughts which simply try to model the real world 'out there' which preexisted it, but is essentially creating qualia (meaning) which have nothing to do with what is really out there. Your thoughts are added onto this preexisting black box, but themselves have no causal efficacy. When you die, your thoughts and memories will die with you and the very notion of "you" as an individuated consciousness will cease.

Does analytic idealism say anything different? It simply replaces the conceptual forms above with different words (dissociation, alter, entropic soup, blind will of MAL, instinctive consciousness, etc.), but their practical meaning is the exact same. How your individuated thoughts and memories came into the world, relate to that world (modeling a preexisting world of material or mental stuff), and will dissolve back out of that world are practically the same. The epistemological and ethical implications are the exact same. At best, it gives us an abstract wildcard concept - "who knows what really happens after death, maybe you will survive". Such a speculation is meaningless for all practical purposes and intents. None of it changes the way we relate to nature, other humans, or the higher Cosmic structure one bit.

Yes, I can go along with some of this, but still it's not clear to me how any actual segregated divide factors in, however hindered the interplay may be, as Mind cannot ever be other than Mind, in whatever ideated aspect it may appear. But perhaps that quibble is a moot point that misses the point. In any case, the only response to this critique I'm interested in would be one in which it is hashed out with BK in some extended dialogue. Alas, that ain't gonna happen here, or in some AMA format. Meanwhile I await some response from jp to the relevant commentary, should there be any clarification to add.

Ashvin,

I don't normally read your comments but I happened to see this one embedded in Shu's and found I agree exactly with what you are saying. The terms ae different but otherwise it might as well be materialism. This might be a good criticism to post on the other thread that is asking for critiques.

I wouldn't say, however, that qualia have nothing to do with what is out there. Qualia are the elements of consciousness which is the model of the world and our interface with it at the same time.