Idealism Misses The Point

[Objects Are Real]

I couldn't agree more. Very well said. Though the wisdom and truths of thousands of years ago remains unchanged, modernity for better and worse has changed us. In the way, perhaps, are cultural barriers unprecedented, and if that is the case, then the prescription that you have given here seems essential.

I believe that objects are real because consciousness is real, but also because I believe in the Vedic, Platonic, and Christian tripartite onotology, as delineated by mathematician and physicist, Dr. Wolfgang Smith.

I will try to summarize this. Much of the following you will probably already know, given that some comports very nicely with idealism (I think).

Smith explains that the objects of perception, that are independent of our mind, contain qualities (color, shape, texture, scent, etc.). Corporeal objects include all from molecules, to chairs, to galaxies. They have both a spatial and a temporal bound. Of such objects, physics can make only a model. Because such objects are independent of mind, and because they contain aspects that cannot reduce to physics (qualities), these objects have "being" - objects are real. The term that Smith gives to such objects is "corporeal." Corporeal objects, though perceptible, do not themselves perceive, and that is because the lack mind (a chair isn't thinking). With that said, we accept all of the empirical findings of physics, and so we embrace the fact that all corporeal (qualitative) objects are "associated with" quantities (mass, weight, width, etc.) and it is this aspect of which physics indeed can "see" and in fact is the only thing physics could "see." Of the apple, physics "sees" reflected light wave frequencies, not color; it "sees" circumference (a number literally) not roundness. Thus, the physicist, in his work, doesn't see the real world, rather he finds only a model. These models have proven to be stupendously successful, and because of this, the physicist began to believe models more so than the corporeal reality of which they describe. Reason, in absence of truth, can lead one to absurdities, and the reasoning that led to a belief in the primacy of models committed the scientist and now culture to A.N. Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." It is said that, for decades, Whitehead toured the US and Britain trying to explain to the physics community that the "bifurcation" in which they were engaged is "creating a muddle" of both physics and philosophy. This fell on deaf ears then, and does so still.

The corporeal world (real objects) then is that which is independent of mind, contains qualities, has a spatial bound discoverable by physics, and because corporeal objects change in time, they have a temporal bound. "The corporeal" per Smith, is the lowest tier in the tripartite cosmos. As you see, physics doesn't make the list. This is because it, unlike the corporeal, has no standalone existence. Something must have being in order to be ontological. Physics, which is "sub-corporeal" only "exists" in so far as it participates in the corporeal. In Smith's terms, "Every corporeal object X is associated with a physical object SX." The circumference of an apple, which is literally a number, is obviously caused by the real apple, and not the other way around. Once we understand these basics, can we see clearly where it is that physics fits within the cosmos. The materialist has placed physics in the highest, giving to it a godlike status, whereas in fact it, in the final count, physics doesn't even make the cut to the lowest.

(Of my use of "lowest" I apologize for a pejorative tone. Being one with the highest, certainly there is nothing "low" about the corporeal. One of Smith's great quotes is, "The highest mode of causation was discovered at its lowest point." We venerate all strata with in the triune tripartite cosmos).

The next level up in Smith's understanding of the tripartition is mind, which is synonymous with soul. Because mind is in the middle, Smith terms it "the intermediary domain." The mind is one degree freer than the corporeal, and that's because while corporeality is bound by both space and time, the intermediary (the mind) has no spatial location, though it is bound by time. For example, one cannot cut a perception in half, or weigh a thought in grams, however, thoughts indeed change in time, and so mind has a temporal limitation. Because it enjoys a degree of freedom more than the corporeal, mind is situated ontologically above the spatially bound corporeal. Mind, therefore, has primacy over the material world. Because there is a union between the two, one of course can effect the other, thus if I have a brain injury, it will effect the way in which I perceive. However, as neuroscientist Sharon Begley has said, "Most of the material changes of the brain are caused by thinking." I would say that a bottom-up view of the world can be disqualified on neuroscientific grounds, and as both Smith and Bernardo show, irretrievably so by way of quantum mechanics.

Highest is that which has neither a spatial or temporal bound. This is what Smith calls "The Aeviternal." Required is making an account for the existence of the intermediary and corporeal, both of which, like the line and circumference of geometry, cannot come to be but for something that is dimensionless, this being in the case of geometry, a point. In a tripartite cosmos, "the aeviteral" point serves this purpose for the intermediary (time) and corporeal (space).

The ancients held that man is a representation of the cosmos. Per Smith, as the unified macrocosm is stratified as aeviternal, intermediary, and aeviternal, man and woman are composed of spirit, soul (mind), and body.

This is all to say that, if one accepts that the cosmos is tripartite, then the corporeal objects which have standalone existence are real.

[ScottRoberts]

If my conception of idealism is incorrect, please forgive me. However, from "satchitananda," it seems that idealism is chit in absence of sit and ananda. What I mean is that consciousness is not its own free-floating thing, yet is part of a triple world that is a unification, a whole, it is one satchitananda, a name of God. There is no chit without sit and ananda. My instinct tells me that idealism separates isolates chit from its whole form. This tripartite view is also Platonic.

First, why take 'satchitananda' as your starting point? It is revelation. However, one of my favorite quotes (Lessing) goes something like "Revelation is not rational when it is revealed, but is revealed so it may become rational." So in that spirit, let's explore 'satchitananda'. It is usually translated as "being/consciousness/bliss". But bliss is something felt, so it is within consciousness. What, then, is consciousness other than feeling? Well, there is thinking, So how about replacing 'chit' with 'thinking'. What about 'being'? Well, it doesn't get us anywhere to just say "what is, is", so why make a big deal about 'being'? Perhaps what is meant is more on the lines of the power to make things exist. I would call this 'willing', e.g. what turns the idea of a house into a house one can live in. So, taking all this into account, and to relate what is revealed into something philosophy can work with, something familiar, how about naming "what is fundamental" as willing/thinking/feeling. And then we can refer to this trio with the word 'mind' or 'consciousness'. But are they three three things or one? I say one, but that will take more argument, which I don't think I need to go into now (for a taste, if interested, see here on relating thinking and feeling).

In sum, I think your instinct (see bolded sentence) has misled you. I'm not aware of any idealist who would restrict 'mind' or 'consciousness' to thinking and exclude willing and thinking. Certainly, BK doesn't.

I agree that perception is required in order for a person to take a measurement from which is derived a quantity. The quantitative aspect of the trunk is indeed associated with the real (corporeal) object and this is why such quantities are technologically useful. In this, the Platonist accepts quantities as a basis for the empirical findings of physics. But, we know better than to be coaxed into thinking that physics is an ontology or is the cause of the corporeal world. Of the trunk physics can only see circumference, it cannot see the brown bark. And thus, physics gives a partial view of reality, a model only - an abstraction. Despite the demands of materialists, abstractions like physics cannot be its own ontology. Physics is in desperate need of one. This is to say that once we have a real ontology, can we see that qualities are primary and quantities secondary, and knowing this will show us where physics properly fits within an authentic ontology. The materialist places physics toward the top or highest, and yet an authentic tripartite ontology clearly sees it at the bottom, rather as not even ontological rather only a model of that which is.

On the physics bits, I agree. The only questionable thing to me is saying that quantity is secondary. I would think that God (speaking simplistically) would need concepts like bigger and smaller, number of electrons to match number of protons in an atom, and so forth, to make the world. Physicists, then, are simply finding the quantities already there in the objects of perception.

Concerning the difference between sensation and perception, one should consider James Gibson. He gives to us the crucial difference between classical and ecological optics.

Or one could simply note that sensations alone are not objects of perception. To turn sensations (red) into an object (rose) one needs to apply a concept of a rose to the sensations. Which is to say, thinking, though this we do subconsciously with familiar objects.

Ultimately, the takeaway from Gibson is that when we see the red of a rose, we are not seeing "a thing of the mind" as Descartes or the materialist would have, we are per Gibson seeing some "out there" in the real world, we see the actual environment as it really is.

Yes, but when putting things into an idealist framework, one must be careful about phrases like '"out there" in the real world'. Is this implying that "in here" is not real? I would certainly object to that. To an idealist (of my persuasion at least), there is stuff "out there", meaning outside of my mind, but not outside of all minds. I view sense perceptions as words being spoken to us by other minds (spiritual beings) but in our fallen state, we don't recognize them as language.

[Objects Are Real]

Satchitananda is just to illustrate that consciousness cannot be separated from Sat of ananda, as in human form mind cannot be separated from being or corporeality. It feels as though BK is offering a chit in absence of sat and ananda. BK grounds all of reality in nature, but doesn't account for its cause other than by suggesting that nature caused nature. To explain that consciousness is simply nature, he uses the term "unfolding," however, because "unfolding" is a process, it must have a beginning, a beginning that isn't accounted for on the basis of nature unfolding. BK's consciousness seems to be akin to the line of geometry, a line being one dimensional. In order to start or come to be, the line requires something that has no dimension, and that is in geometry, a point. It seems that BK's consciousness lacks a beginning, which as a process does not seem tenable.

[Federica]

I couldn't agree more. Very well said. Though the wisdom and truths of thousands of years ago remains unchanged, modernity for better and worse has changed us. In the way, perhaps, are cultural barriers unprecedented, and if that is the case, then the prescription that you have given here seems essential.

I believe that objects are real because consciousness is real, but also because I believe in the Vedic, Platonic, and Christian tripartite onotology, as delineated by mathematician and physicist, Dr. Wolfgang Smith.

I will try to summarize this. Much of the following you will probably already know, given that some comports very nicely with idealism (I think).

Smith explains that the objects of perception, that are independent of our mind, contain qualities (color, shape, texture, scent, etc.). Corporeal objects include all from molecules, to chairs, to galaxies. They have both a spatial and a temporal bound. Of such objects, physics can make only a model. Because such objects are independent of mind, and because they contain aspects that cannot reduce to physics (qualities), these objects have "being" - objects are real. The term that Smith gives to such objects is "corporeal." Corporeal objects, though perceptible, do not themselves perceive, and that is because the lack mind (a chair isn't thinking). With that said, we accept all of the empirical findings of physics, and so we embrace the fact that all corporeal (qualitative) objects are "associated with" quantities (mass, weight, width, etc.) and it is this aspect of which physics indeed can "see" and in fact is the only thing physics could "see." Of the apple, physics "sees" reflected light wave frequencies, not color; it "sees" circumference (a number literally) not roundness. Thus, the physicist, in his work, doesn't see the real world, rather he finds only a model. These models have proven to be stupendously successful, and because of this, the physicist began to believe models more so than the corporeal reality of which they describe. Reason, in absence of truth, can lead one to absurdities, and the reasoning that led to a belief in the primacy of models committed the scientist and now culture to A.N. Whitehead's "fallacy of misplaced concreteness." It is said that, for decades, Whitehead toured the US and Britain trying to explain to the physics community that the "bifurcation" in which they were engaged is "creating a muddle" of both physics and philosophy. This fell on deaf ears then, and does so still.

The corporeal world (real objects) then is that which is independent of mind, contains qualities, has a spatial bound discoverable by physics, and because corporeal objects change in time, they have a temporal bound. "The corporeal" per Smith, is the lowest tier in the tripartite cosmos. As you see, physics doesn't make the list. This is because it, unlike the corporeal, has no standalone existence. Something must have being in order to be ontological. Physics, which is "sub-corporeal" only "exists" in so far as it participates in the corporeal. In Smith's terms, "Every corporeal object X is associated with a physical object SX." The circumference of an apple, which is literally a number, is obviously caused by the real apple, and not the other way around. Once we understand these basics, can we see clearly where it is that physics fits within the cosmos. The materialist has placed physics in the highest, giving to it a godlike status, whereas in fact it, in the final count, physics doesn't even make the cut to the lowest.

(Of my use of "lowest" I apologize for a pejorative tone. Being one with the highest, certainly there is nothing "low" about the corporeal. One of Smith's great quotes is, "The highest mode of causation was discovered at its lowest point." We venerate all strata with in the triune tripartite cosmos).

The next level up in Smith's understanding of the tripartition is mind, which is synonymous with soul. Because mind is in the middle, Smith terms it "the intermediary domain." The mind is one degree freer than the corporeal, and that's because while corporeality is bound by both space and time, the intermediary (the mind) has no spatial location, though it is bound by time. For example, one cannot cut a perception in half, or weigh a thought in grams, however, thoughts indeed change in time, and so mind has a temporal limitation. Because it enjoys a degree of freedom more than the corporeal, mind is situated ontologically above the spatially bound corporeal. Mind, therefore, has primacy over the material world. Because there is a union between the two, one of course can effect the other, thus if I have a brain injury, it will effect the way in which I perceive. However, as neuroscientist Sharon Begley has said, "Most of the material changes of the brain are caused by thinking." I would say that a bottom-up view of the world can be disqualified on neuroscientific grounds, and as both Smith and Bernardo show, irretrievably so by way of quantum mechanics.

Highest is that which has neither a spatial or temporal bound. This is what Smith calls "The Aeviternal." Required is making an account for the existence of the intermediary and corporeal, both of which, like the line and circumference of geometry, cannot come to be but for something that is dimensionless, this being in the case of geometry, a point. In a tripartite cosmos, "the aeviteral" point serves this purpose for the intermediary (time) and corporeal (space).

The ancients held that man is a representation of the cosmos. Per Smith, as the unified macrocosm is stratified as aeviternal, intermediary, and aeviternal, man and woman are composed of spirit, soul (mind), and body.

This is all to say that, if one accepts that the cosmos is tripartite, then the corporeal objects which have standalone existence are real.

OAR,

Thank you for this detailed elaboration! A quick google search (yeah…) tells me that the philosophy you are presenting here is called Perennialist. I am not familiar with it, so I will only comment on your specific notes. Also note that, despite the name of this forum, not all of its members are followers of BKs idealism (I am not).

Smith explains that the objects of perception, that are independent of our mind, contain qualities (color, shape, texture, scent, etc.). Corporeal objects include all from molecules, to chairs, to galaxies.

Is the statement that object of perceptions contain qualities and are independent of mind, something Smith postulates and asks us to believe in - maybe because he ponders it’s obvious enough - or does he provide more ground for such a statement? If it's a postulate, many questions arise:


- Have you ever perceived a molecule? Or is it the model physics has created of a molecule that you have perceived?

- When one becomes painfully aware that a headache, or a feeling of anxiety is coming, are these not perceptions?

- If you think back and remember the moment when you drank a glass of water yesterday, and hold that thought in your mind, would you not call that thought the object of your current perception? In other words, what is the difference between you perception of the thought of a molecule (how else would you perceive it other than so?) and your perception of the thought of yourself drinking a glass of water yesterday?

- If plants and animals are not corporeal objects (I guess they are not, because you said that objects don’t perceive) so what are they? And/or how do you define perception?


The point here is that, rather than “accepting” or “believing in” a given worldview, it seems more appropriate to use our direct activity, our experience of reality, and carefully see what can be ascertained from there, and maybe check whether the worldview in question matches and respects the immediate given of our direct experience. So for example, it appears that as soon as we approach the question of reality, there is an inevitable observation that it’s impossible for us to say anything whatsoever about reality without recognizing that we first need to become aware (or perceive) our thoughts about it. Otherwise, without these perceptions, we can’t even start to produce the least bit of worldview.

The most intimate, direct, primordial, natural, obvious and true fact of experience - as we can all directly realize without any need to believe in it - is that we become aware of, or perceive, a variety of inputs which include sensory perceptions, perceptions of bodily sensations, perceptions of feelings and emotions, and perceptions of our own thoughts. All these things become known to our consciousness in a common modality, that of perception. Once we see this fact of immediate experience, should we not be very careful and have very solid reasons - and not only habitual, vaguely intuitive, postulating, or prescriptive ones - to start off our inquiry about the nature of reality by segmenting the experience of perception in arbitrary categories, such as perceptions of so-called "corporeal objects" (that we actually call so only by virtue of overimposing a mental category on them) and "other perceptions"? If we care about respecting our most unprejudiced and intimate apprehension of reality as closely as possible, we should be very careful when a worldview suggests that we do so.

As you see, physics doesn't make the list. This is because it, unlike the corporeal, has no standalone existence. Something must have being in order to be ontological.

If I can be a little provocative, it seems that physics didn’t make it but for some reason ontology did?

Because it enjoys a degree of freedom more than the corporeal, mind is situated ontologically above the spatially bound corporeal. Mind, therefore, has primacy over the material world. Because there is a union between the two, one of course can effect the other, thus if I have a brain injury, it will effect the way in which I perceive.

Following your own logic here, I would like to ask: where is the effect of mind on the corporeal, in the example of a brain injury? Brain is a corporeal object, affecting the way our five corporeal senses record the reality of other corporeal objects. Where is mind here, based on your premises? In case your answer is: “perception is something we become aware of in our mind and this is where mind comes in in the example” then the necessity of starting the inquiry from the given of our consicous experience, rather than from a theory of corporeal reality, should appear even more evidently. And the sheer fact of experience that mind cognizes with a unified approach a spectrum of objects of perceptions that include senses, inner sensations, feelings, and thoughts/memories, really cannot be disregarded on any sound basis, I would argue. Do you agree?

[Objects Are Real]

Thank you, again.

Just a quick note that, Wolfgang Smith is not a perennialist. He spells this out more in the paper, "Christianity and the Vedic Tradition."

Yes, based on physics, Wolfgang deduces that corporeal objects have spatial and temporal parameters, however, based on perception we know them as qualitative. Perception and qualities are the primary things. A corporeal object's qualities speak of their essence, their "is'ness," being. Corporeal objects contain Aristotelian morphe, or "form," as well as matter. Matter is available to physics, where as form is not.

As for perceiving a molecule: Anything that has a spatial location is perceptible, even if only by an electron microscope or a measuring device of quantum mechanics. Going tinier than a molecule, the moment that a position of an electron is known, it is now classical, i.e., it is part of the "real" perceptible world. A quantum electron prior to measurement is not perceptible, and many physicists, including Smith, hold that it's not even "really" there until measured.

As for a headache: Yes, certainly. A corporeal object is anything that is part of the classical world of physics, and thus is perceptible by hadron collider, microscope, eye, or telescope, etc. It has a spatial location. But, something doesn't have to be corporeal in order to be perceived. The castle of one's dream is basically an hallucination, and yet it is perceptible. As for pain, I like BK's anecdote about sadness. BK asks us to imagine yourself weeping. Look in the mirror to find a red face, tears, etc. He asks whether or not the redness or the tears "are" sadness. No, they are not, and in fact no salinity of tears or their amount will equal sadness, nor would blood volume to the face. Sadness is that which is felt and it "causes" all of the manifestations seen on corporeal substances (skin, tears). Skin and tears are not sadness, mentation is.

Yes, the thought of drinking water yesterday is the re-experience of an actual event that happened in the past. Again, perception does not have to be of something corporeal. A memory is mental not corporeal.

Animals, like humans, have a corporeal aspect to them because they have bodies that have weight, height, a spatial location. Animals, like humans, think and so they are conscious. Animals lack a sense of "the good" and morality, because their minds are instinctual, whereas the human mind is both instinctual and rational. Humans have all three capacities (corpus, anima, spiritus, whereas animals have corpus and anima. This is Aristotelian. Plants, as far as we know, do not perceive and so they are corporeal only, just like a chair. In Nagel's terms, there is nothing like being a plant, whereas "there is something like being a bat."

I agree that, "rather than “accepting” or “believing in” a given worldview.." however, your questions show that I didn't explain Smith's metaphysics very well. Perhaps watch Smith's recent interviews. A good start might be his interview on "Asking Anything."

[Federica]

Thank you, again.

Just a quick note that, Wolfgang Smith is not a perennialist. He spells this out more in the paper, "Christianity and the Vedic Tradition."

Yes, based on physics, Wolfgang deduces that corporeal objects have spatial and temporal parameters, however, based on perception we know them as qualitative. Perception and qualities are the primary things. A corporeal object's qualities speak of their essence, their "is'ness," being. Corporeal objects contain Aristotelian morphe, or "form," as well as matter. Matter is available to physics, where as form is not.

As for perceiving a molecule: Anything that has a spatial location is perceptible, even if only by an electron microscope or a measuring device of quantum mechanics. Going tinier than a molecule, the moment that a position of an electron is known, it is now classical, i.e., it is part of the "real" perceptible world. A quantum electron prior to measurement is not perceptible, and many physicists, including Smith, hold that it's not even "really" there until measured.

As for a headache: Yes, certainly. A corporeal object is anything that is part of the classical world of physics, and thus is perceptible by hadron collider, microscope, eye, or telescope, etc. It has a spatial location. But, something doesn't have to be corporeal in order to be perceived. The castle of one's dream is basically an hallucination, and yet it is perceptible. As for pain, I like BK's anecdote about sadness. BK asks us to imagine yourself weeping. Look in the mirror to find a red face, tears, etc. He asks whether or not the redness or the tears "are" sadness. No, they are not, and in fact no salinity of tears or their amount will equal sadness, nor would blood volume to the face. Sadness is that which is felt and it "causes" all of the manifestations seen on corporeal substances (skin, tears). Skin and tears are not sadness, mentation is.

Yes, the thought of drinking water yesterday is the re-experience of an actual event that happened in the past. Again, perception does not have to be of something corporeal. A memory is mental not corporeal.

Animals, like humans, have a corporeal aspect to them because they have bodies that have weight, height, a spatial location. Animals, like humans, think and so they are conscious. Animals lack a sense of "the good" and morality, because their minds are instinctual, whereas the human mind is both instinctual and rational. Humans have all three capacities (corpus, anima, spiritus, whereas animals have corpus and anima. This is Aristotelian. Plants, as far as we know, do not perceive and so they are corporeal only, just like a chair. In Nagel's terms, there is nothing like being a plant, whereas "there is something like being a bat."

I agree that, "rather than “accepting” or “believing in” a given worldview.." however, your questions show that I didn't explain Smith's metaphysics very well. Perhaps watch Smith's recent interviews. A good start might be his interview on "Asking Anything."

OAR,

I am more interested in understanding your view, in your words, rather than indirectly research the view of one of the philosophers who have inspired it. But I have asked too many questions at once. If I am allowed to reformulate my point in only one core question, I would ask the following.

Because you have agreed that, rather than “accepting” or “believing in” a given worldview, it’s more appropriate to use our direct activity, our experience of reality, and carefully see what can be ascertained from there; and because you have agreed that spatial and aspatial objects of perception alike are encompassed by our consciousness (become known to us as conscious experiences by means of us perceiving thoughts about them), what is the logical justification for derailing such a great start in the direct exploration of what knowledge is (what reality is) and, all of a sudden, take a peek at the science of physics and its deductions, and all of a sudden accept 'as is' what physics has to say about the nature of reality, before even asking what science is, how it inquires reality, etc.?
Instead of turning our attention, as we should, to the primordial, omnipresent, fundamental activity that emerges across the board of all that we can ever experience - instead of turning our attention to the nature of the activity of thinking - why take such a discontinuous leap of theoretical (ontological) faith, and decide to start the inquiry anew from the deductions of science? Thinking unequivocally permeates all objects of experience, before any guesswork is thrown out, before any ontology is postulated, before any physics can even start modeling any theories of reality. Hence such activity requires our attention first, in continuity with our most direct experience of anything, so that we can proceed on solid grounds, and later come to understand the truth of “objects are real” and the truth of the triadic nature of the spiritual world, not as a theory to accept or believe in, but as a direct experience that progressively emerges from within.

[Objects Are Real]

Yes, I think we can start with the most obvious two things: 1) I am aware; 2) I then discover that objects that are outside of my mind seem to have independent existence. Then, if I want to discover more about these objects, I find that they offer what James Gibson calls, "affordances." The stone "affords" the ability to be thrown, to be art, it affords the ability to make fire, etc. Upon further thinking, we discover that the qualitative, gray and round stone is associated with "quantities," such as weight, length, etc., these quantities only known after we've devise scientific instruments. The scientific instruments allows for a thorough transition from quality to quantity. These quantitative world, available through measuring instruments, allow us to discover innumerably more about the stone and nature. In so doing, technology arises, and physics (plus chemistry, etc.) prove themselves to be stupendously more successful than a mere gross examination. Because physics and the technology which springs forth, is so successful, scientists attribute to physics its own ontology (physicalism), which is a mistake given that, because physics "exists" only in so far as it participates in corporeal reality, it is "sub-onotlogical" (it's the stone that is real not the 4.672" representing it) .

That's a long way of saying that, because it is reasonable to think that corporeal objects have being independent of my mind, and because they of the success of scientific measurement, I think it is reasonable to believe that corporeal objects are associated with quantities, a realm that physics discovers from which we create technology. With that said, mind is primary in the process, given that thing #1, as mentioned above, is awareness.

Because that which we deduce by way of the empirical findings of science seems to comport with the activity of a qualitative world external to our body, and because the specificity of that behavior depends on the extent to which we understand that qualitative objects' quantities, suggests that it is reasonable to think that objects external to our bodies can be "partly" understood by physics, this physics giving us a much richer perspective about the world. This doesn't mean that physics is ontological, just that it is useful and that it provides access to the domain of abstract quantities. This is not to forget that the only "real" things here is the mind deducing it all and the corporeal stone which affords its deductions.

Yes, I agree with you that direct experience is primary. Mind being primary to corporeal reality (a stone) doesn't mean that the stone doesn't "really" exist. The stone, or any corporeal entity that has both a spatial and a temporal parameter exist, they have being. Mind, which has no spatial parameter, enjoys a degree of freedom more than the corporeal, given that mind is bound only by time. Mind is therefore primary to anything corporeal. In this ontology, physics doesn't make the list given that physics lacks being. Physics only "is" by virtue of a truly existing corporeal reality.

[Cleric K]

Yes, I think we can start with the most obvious two things: 1) I am aware; 2) I then discover that objects that are outside of my mind seem to have independent existence. Then, if I want to discover more about these objects, I find that they offer what James Gibson calls, "affordances."

OAR, would you agree that there's a logical gap in between 1) and 2)? The point is that when we say "I discover the objects outside my mind" we secretly imply quite serious metaphysical demands. We practically implicitly postulate a realm of objects 'on the other side' of conscious experience.

But if we try to stick to the given we can express ourselves much more cautiously. First we have to step back and recognize that what we know is spiritual experiences, perceptions - color, sound and so on. When I look at the stone I first and foremost have a visual experience. The idea that these perceptions are stimulated by the corporeal stone on the other side of my consciousness, is quite secondary and comes along only when I begin to think about the perceptions (which are the given). The most obvious example is dreaming. When I dream I can experience the color perception of a stone and even all its other sensory counterparts - I can touch and feel that it is hard, I can feel its weight and so on. But saying that I have discovered an object outside my consciousness is too strong of a claim.

Please don't get me wrong. I'm not saying that all reality is exhausted by the screen of perceptions and that there's nothing 'behind' that screen. The goal is simply to have a stable thinking foundation where we avoid presuming certain things which later on will prove to be impossible hard problems. Thus if we want to be true to the given all we can say is "I experience all kinds of perceptions - colors, sounds, feelings, thoughts and so on. I also experience that some of these perceptions are completely aligned with my intuitive intents - mainly thoughts. For example, the inner perceptions of verbal thoughts are completely aligned with my intuitive spiritual activity. My feelings are much less aligned with my intents. I can't always overcome a feeling of sorrow or anger. As far as the perceptions that we generally call 'bodily', I have least control. Of course, I can will the movements of my body and my perceptions are more or less aligned with my spiritual intents, yet this is not guaranteed (for example a limb can be paralyzed). Finally I have such perceptions, like that of the stone, which seem completely independent of my intentions, except if I interact with them through my will. I can't think the movement of a stone perception in the same way I can move an imagined stone."

Notice how when we express in this way we stay on firm soil at all times. All of the above is drawn completely from direct experience, it doesn't depend on any metaphysical postulates about various partitions of reality. We can appreciate this through the fact that the above description is equally valid in both the waking and dreaming state. That's because we're not building a theory of reality but only describing given facts.

I repeat that this is not meant to deny the existence of realities which are quite independent of our immediate spiritual intents. Independence doesn't automatically imply a distinct metaphysical realm. My dream stone can also be completely independent of my dream intents but are we justified to claim that there's a real corporeal stone that explains why I can't imagine the stone perceptions otherwise? So we don't gain too much if we simply postulate some metaphysical wall in order to explain why my intents are reflected in the perceptions of thoughts but not in the perceptions of stones. Instead, we can start investigating this gradient of independence from thinking, through feeling, to will and sensory perceptions and try to see if we can gain deeper consciousness within the corporeal processes.

All of this doesn't deny the tripartition that you describe. It only suggests that our spiritual being can grow from the middle both downwards and upwards. Then we can discover that all of reality is spiritual in nature. Maybe there are kinds of spiritual intents which are active even in the stone and which we cognize at our mind level as laws of nature. Then the question is whether we can develop these other forms of cognition through which we can know the spirit that works even in the stone.

[Objects Are Real]

Cleric, yes you are exactly correct that the assumption that external objects are independent of mind is a huge metaphysical judgement. The reason we do this is because, in time, we realize that objects do not change based on volition alone. The baby lacks "object permanence" therefore in a way they do not appreciate the extent to which they're separate. At a little less than a year, the baby realizes more of the distinction. From then on, it is reasonable to believe that objects have standalone existence. Now, it might ultimately not be the case that objects are independent, however, I think it's more reasonable to believe that they are, and that's mainly based on the fact that every single, normal, experience with objects enforces such.

If you're saying that perception is a spiritual experience, I agree. I believe that there is no way possible to experience a quality (the color of a corporeal stone), qualities being that which cannot reduce to physics, without having a spirit to unite the non-physical interplay.

As far as a dream, yes, while the stone of the dream is qualitative and mental, that stone is not corporeal. This is because to any corporeal object must have both a spatial and temporal bound. The stone of the dream has no spatial existence, given that there is no actual weight of such an entity. That stone of the dream, however, has a temporal bound because it is a thing of the mind, and though mind lacks a spatial bound, mind does have a temporal bound. As the stone of the dream is perceived, time is ticking so that there will be a time in the dream that one stops perceiving the stone. In short, the stone of the dream is not corporeal (spatially bound), it is only mental (temporally bound).

I think I mostly agree with you. I believe that the corporeal object with its qualities that do not reduce to physics, is united with the human perception of it by faculty of the human spirit. As man is a theomorphic representation of God and the cosmos, the human spirit is analogous to the to "aeviternal point" of the cosmos. The aeviternal point that which unites the spatial and the temporal, the point itself being bound neither by space or time. Per Plato, the past comes infinitely close to the present yet never touches the present, and the future comes infinitely close to the present yet never touches the present. We LIVE only in the present and it is here that we perceive, instantaneously in the now. There is no present or now in physics, and so by way of spirit do we "tap in" to it. It's in fact the only thing we can live and perceive.

[Federica]

Cleric, yes you are exactly correct that the assumption that external objects are independent of mind is a huge metaphysical judgement. The reason we do this is because, in time, we realize that objects do not change based on volition alone. The baby lacks "object permanence" therefore in a way they do not appreciate the extent to which they're separate. At a little less than a year, the baby realizes more of the distinction. From then on, it is reasonable to believe that objects have standalone existence. Now, it might ultimately not be the case that objects are independent, however, I think it's more reasonable to believe that they are, and that's mainly based on the fact that every single, normal, experience with objects enforces such.

If you're saying that perception is a spiritual experience, I agree. I believe that there is no way possible to experience a quality (the color of a corporeal stone), qualities being that which cannot reduce to physics, without having a spirit to unite the non-physical interplay.

As far as a dream, yes, while the stone of the dream is qualitative and mental, that stone is not corporeal. This is because to any corporeal object must have both a spatial and temporal bound. The stone of the dream has no spatial existence, given that there is no actual weight of such an entity. That stone of the dream, however, has a temporal bound because it is a thing of the mind, and though mind lacks a spatial bound, mind does have a temporal bound. As the stone of the dream is perceived, time is ticking so that there will be a time in the dream that one stops perceiving the stone. In short, the stone of the dream is not corporeal (spatially bound), it is only mental (temporally bound).

I think I mostly agree with you. I believe that the corporeal object with its qualities that do not reduce to physics, is united with the human perception of it by faculty of the human spirit. As man is a theomorphic representation of God and the cosmos, the human spirit is analogous to the to "aeviternal point" of the cosmos. The aeviternal point that which unites the spatial and the temporal, the point itself being bound neither by space or time. Per Plato, the past comes infinitely close to the present yet never touches the present, and the future comes infinitely close to the present yet never touches the present. We LIVE only in the present and it is here that we perceive, instantaneously in the now. There is no present or now in physics, and so by way of spirit do we "tap in" to it. It's in fact the only thing we can live and perceive.

OAR,

As it seems to me, what you are doing here is that, rather than letting go of your conceptual/philosophical structure for a moment, following instead the direct insights enclosed in the given of experience, you are trying to maintain hold of your existing framework, and trying to get Cleric’s words from that standpoint, and fit them into your grid. This is completely understandable, but also not in line with the initial purpose of - as an experiment - letting go of beliefs, theories, and metaphysical assumptions, and looking instead at what can be extracted from experience directly.

So for example, what you say about dreams, only can be rationalized afterwards, after we wake up, by means of your pre-existing metaphysical framework. Then we can choose to hold a certain philosophical position as a starting point, and rationalize: “the dreamt stone is a mental object, because it has so many bonds, etc. etc”. But that was not the deal
In fact, the direct experience of the stone that we become aware of during the dream is perceived in the same way as the direct experience of a stone we perceive in awakened state, if we stick to the given. Just as much as we can say that the stone reasonably seems corporeal in the dream - but it actually isn’t - so can we also say that the stone we perceive in waking state “reasonably” seems corporeal. But how do we know we are not being misled? How do we make sure we are not simply overimposing our metaphisical grid onto the given perception? In fact we don’t make any steps forward if we try to stick to what seems reasonable. Does this make sense?