Saving the materialists

[Cleric]

I don't agree with you Cleric. Perhaps you live in a society where people still keep their feet on the ground to some extent, and their verbal thoughts make some sense, I am not sure. From what I see and read from around the world, the situation is much, much more dramatic than you describe. I was reading today of a mother, whose teen daughter got up one day saying she wanted to change pronouns and transition to male gender. The mother felt the school, the medical system, the discourse her daughter had been exposed to, had instigated that. So she decided to do an experiment. She contacted her medical services pretending she was herself willing to transition, to see how the process was going to unfold. She told her doctor she was feeling nonbinary, wanted her pronouns changed in her records, wanted testosterone treatment, mastectomy surgery, and possibly lower body surgery. Anyone willing to read the appalling report can find it here. So, in one of the preparation calls with her clinic's gender specialists, she got asked to comment on feeling that her inside was not matching her outside. She bubbled something about always wanting to dress in jeans and sweatshirts, and feeling it would be nice to have her nonbinary identity match that. As she reports, the doctor replied:

"Like, having control over what you wear and yeah. Kind of that feeling of just, yeah, this is who I am today. That’s awesome. Yeah."

So they were discussing something very concrete. And this is a doctor in the practice of her profession, coming up with words such as these. Now, please tell me: don't you think chances are high that this person was regurgitating a semi-conscious woke narrative, driven by words that came out of one another, through the colonized support of her vocal tract? Do you think that the word "awesome" in the context of that discussion and sentence has any other connection with meaning than a LaaS connection? Is there any plausible reason to assess that there's any trace of the concrete meaning of "awesome" in how the word is thrown out in that word sequence?

This is not an isolated example of typical present-day verbalizing. I could provide a thousand more examples. And let me be clear, I don't consider myself exempt from this LLM related plague, though I don't think I am an extreme case. We are at the point that people these days have a hard time completing a sentence, when they cannot enter the first part in Chat GPT. And if they do complete it, it's probably that they recall words that GPT or Google assigned them, last time they did a search. This applies to all possible contexts and situations. It's not unspecified people in a ghetto (as some would be tempted to imagine), but experts, neighbors, folks at social gatherings, people who are "knowledge workers". In the city where I live, the majority of students at the most reputed university affirm they are not able to read books. They really mean it, and they just say it, there are surveys. And guess what? They just don't read them, that's fine. They don't have the mind space, and they candidly say it. Awesome. Like, yeah, that's just who we are as students today. We are not less than enough. And so the system adapts, and anyone can become, for example a teacher, with grade F results, just because if they had to select more strictly, hardly anyone would pass. By the way, more than 1/10 of the entire population around me lives under antidepressant medication. You get the idea. Or do you?

Federica, I guess we have a different focus on what 'thinking in mere words' means. What I mean is thinking that indeed lives in a completely abstracted-away token plane. It's like doing pure mathematics but in ways that can be quite chaotic and inconsistent. I don't see the examples you give as resulting from some linguistic entrapment. As a matter of fact, if you ask any of these woke people about it, they'll say it's all about feelings. It's how I feel about myself, how I feel dissatisfied with my biological organization, how I want to express myself in ways that are suppressed by society, and so on. And the doctor thinks it is 'awesome' because these people really feel they are on a mission. They think that the rigid outdated society, living in millennia-old norms and dogmas, is preventing human beings from living to their full potential, being what they want to be, being free to express the way they feel, and so on. From a spiritual scientific perspective, it is all very clear - at least in the most general lines. This is all a submission of the "I" to the disorganized astral nature, instead of drawing upon higher ideal forces that can direct and organize that nature. In this view, the greatest blasphemy is to question how one feels. If I'm a biological man but I feel like I want to feel feminine, to walk like a woman, to dress like one, etc, then this is simply taken for what my true essence is. This is particularly problematic in today's trend of letting small children 'choose' their gender depending on how they feel, what clothes they like, etc. All this rests upon the tragic mistake of assuming that the way these children feel somehow emerges from the pure truth of their innermost being. Any attempt to explain that the human being goes through continuous development and at this early age it is especially important for the child to be open toward a healthy authority and be guided, is taken as the greatest example of indoctrination and crime against expression of true self. It is extremely difficult to converse with such people because not only everything is emotionally charged to the extreme (which makes any rationality practically impossible) but also the very position that is assumed sees everything in the inverse. For example, if I say that the child needs developmental guidance by wise and loving adults, it will be immediately responded: "But this is precisely what we are so vehemently fighting against! How do you know that it is not precisely through this 'guidance' that you instill artificial masks over the child's true being, and force it for its whole life to play a role of something that it is not? That's why we strive from the earliest moment to encourage the child in expressing its true being, free from any dogmatic constraints." The problem with this, of course, is that the thus 'liberated' child simply becomes a feast table for A and L spirits, who find there their own freedom for expression.

Anyway, this is a whole painful topic. My point was only to give an example of how thinking in words in itself is not the culprit of the problem. Indeed, if we focus on fighting language, we'll simply miss the deeper chaotic surges of the astral nature. Not only that, but we can easily conceive how this condition can grow into a form of spirituality that lives much more pictorially in the images of its feeling life. Even language can be refined and become the poetic expression of this feeling life. In fact, not too few of the most eloquent poets, lyrics writers, and so on, are people with... let's call it 'complicated' sexuality. These people may speak not too differently from how you said about drawing the words from ourselves. If you ask them, their true essence (and in fact, many of these people consider themselves spiritual) flows out into the words. This alone should make us aware that the degenerate matrix flow is something far deeper and we only lose focus if we decide that some particular aspect (like language) is the main supporting lattice of that flow. I think you'll agree that 'fixing' language won't in itself prevent people from wanting to express in non-traditional ways. It's a similar mistake that Eugene makes when saying that many of the problems can be eliminated if the word "I" is eliminated from language. This word, he assumes, only fuels the sense of self and separateness. Little thought is given that one can be just as egoistic, even without having the "I" word (like it could be in the case of animals). It all stems from our desire to feel lifted above the causes of evil and be able to put our finger on them. This, of course, only leaves the true dynamics in the blind spot.

It is true that everything is interconnected and things go hand in hand most of the time. Language degenerates as it mirrors the degenerate astral flow. It is also true, of course, that being irradiated with such language from early on, similarly resonantly brings us closer to that flow. But the point remains that none of this can be attributed primarily to thinking in words. Try telling one such person that their gender dysphoria is simply a word game in their mind. They'll rip you apart. It's all about how they feel, how they want to express, and so on. It becomes a word game when such people begin to spin theories out of thin air, trying to show gender is acquired not born with, and so on. Thinking in these verbal patterns really traverses abstract space that can hardly be consolidated with full reality, but it resonates with how these people feel. It seems to them that the words justify and validate the way they feel, and this is what counts for them since these feelings are their most precious asset, the thing that makes them who they are.

[Cleric]

Speaking of 'saving the materialists' I was a little bit surprised by this:



Not that I expect SH to abandon her physics modeling approach, but to be fair, I thought she was far more dismissive of such ideas. For example, in the comments someone says "We are the Universe studying itself." and she replies "Indeed!" Well, this is already such a cliché in our age that it can be considered as an instance of swot mentality where it is only repeated habitually without any attempt to follow the consequences of such a statement. But still, it is nice that she's at least conscious of the checkpoints (locality, smooth extension of space, etc.) as not being some absolute and unquestionable truths.

[AshvinP]

And speaking of the gender transitioning phenomena, as viewed from the medical provider's perspective, here is a great interview from JP with an ex-propagandist (it's also a good example of how we can approach such issues with as much careful and dispassionate inquiry as possible). Clearly we can discern all the deeper astral surges at work, which would be there regardless of whether the doctors were saying "awesome" to the children's feelings or handing out pictorial cartoons which conveyed the same "awesome" thought. One factor which isn't touched upon much in this interview (but probably in others) is good old-fashioned greed. It's not difficult to see how much money can be extracted from the medical-insurance complex by providers via a whole new 'field of care' with all its supporting studies, literature, abstract philosophies and theories, etc. We won't redeem greed by 'fixing language', only by becoming conscious of what it is our encoded thoughts actually symbolize.

[Federica]

Federica, I guess we have a different focus on what 'thinking in mere words' means. What I mean is thinking that indeed lives in a completely abstracted-away token plane. It's like doing pure mathematics but in ways that can be quite chaotic and inconsistent. I don't see the examples you give as resulting from some linguistic entrapment. As a matter of fact, if you ask any of these woke people about it, they'll say it's all about feelings. It's how I feel about myself, how I feel dissatisfied with my biological organization, how I want to express myself in ways that are suppressed by society, and so on. And the doctor thinks it is 'awesome' because these people really feel they are on a mission. They think that the rigid outdated society, living in millennia-old norms and dogmas, is preventing human beings from living to their full potential, being what they want to be, being free to express the way they feel, and so on. From a spiritual scientific perspective, it is all very clear - at least in the most general lines. This is all a submission of the "I" to the disorganized astral nature, instead of drawing upon higher ideal forces that can direct and organize that nature. In this view, the greatest blasphemy is to question how one feels. If I'm a biological man but I feel like I want to feel feminine, to walk like a woman, to dress like one, etc, then this is simply taken for what my true essence is. This is particularly problematic in today's trend of letting small children 'choose' their gender depending on how they feel, what clothes they like, etc. All this rests upon the tragic mistake of assuming that the way these children feel somehow emerges from the pure truth of their innermost being. Any attempt to explain that the human being goes through continuous development and at this early age it is especially important for the child to be open toward a healthy authority and be guided, is taken as the greatest example of indoctrination and crime against expression of true self. It is extremely difficult to converse with such people because not only everything is emotionally charged to the extreme (which makes any rationality practically impossible) but also the very position that is assumed sees everything in the inverse. For example, if I say that the child needs developmental guidance by wise and loving adults, it will be immediately responded: "But this is precisely what we are so vehemently fighting against! How do you know that it is not precisely through this 'guidance' that you instill artificial masks over the child's true being, and force it for its whole life to play a role of something that it is not? That's why we strive from the earliest moment to encourage the child in expressing its true being, free from any dogmatic constraints." The problem with this, of course, is that the thus 'liberated' child simply becomes a feast table for A and L spirits, who find there their own freedom for expression.

Anyway, this is a whole painful topic. My point was only to give an example of how thinking in words in itself is not the culprit of the problem. Indeed, if we focus on fighting language, we'll simply miss the deeper chaotic surges of the astral nature. Not only that, but we can easily conceive how this condition can grow into a form of spirituality that lives much more pictorially in the images of its feeling life. Even language can be refined and become the poetic expression of this feeling life. In fact, not too few of the most eloquent poets, lyrics writers, and so on, are people with... let's call it 'complicated' sexuality. These people may speak not too differently from how you said about drawing the words from ourselves. If you ask them, their true essence (and in fact, many of these people consider themselves spiritual) flows out into the words. This alone should make us aware that the degenerate matrix flow is something far deeper and we only lose focus if we decide that some particular aspect (like language) is the main supporting lattice of that flow. I think you'll agree that 'fixing' language won't in itself prevent people from wanting to express in non-traditional ways. It's a similar mistake that Eugene makes when saying that many of the problems can be eliminated if the word "I" is eliminated from language. This word, he assumes, only fuels the sense of self and separateness. Little thought is given that one can be just as egoistic, even without having the "I" word (like it could be in the case of animals). It all stems from our desire to feel lifted above the causes of evil and be able to put our finger on them. This, of course, only leaves the true dynamics in the blind spot.

It is true that everything is interconnected and things go hand in hand most of the time. Language degenerates as it mirrors the degenerate astral flow. It is also true, of course, that being irradiated with such language from early on, similarly resonantly brings us closer to that flow. But the point remains that none of this can be attributed primarily to thinking in words. Try telling one such person that their gender dysphoria is simply a word game in their mind. They'll rip you apart. It's all about how they feel, how they want to express, and so on. It becomes a word game when such people begin to spin theories out of thin air, trying to show gender is acquired not born with, and so on. Thinking in these verbal patterns really traverses abstract space that can hardly be consolidated with full reality, but it resonates with how these people feel. It seems to them that the words justify and validate the way they feel, and this is what counts for them since these feelings are their most precious asset, the thing that makes them who they are.

Leaving aside the question of gender dysphoria (on which I agree with you) I thought I will try again to stress that I don’t suggest “fighting language”. As said, language is a divine prerogative. Nonetheless, I think that today language is, through the LLM technologies in particular, a key domain of evil attack on humanity, in particular written language - its most indirect form. Even before the advent of LLMs, we were prone to speak or write mindlessly, to associate, to babble, to lose meaning and still keep uttering or writing word sequences. But today this tendency is becoming much worse, under the effects of this technology, primarily through the written symbols. This technology's effect on the brain is to make us captive of words in themselves - that is of their associative, thoughtless quality, which is anchored by their perceptible side (mere strokes).This is the same exact quality we find in worded LLM outputs.

I think there is no argument that this is happening: the human ability to use language thoughtfully is rapidly decreasing. And so, putting this into perspective, language has been first stripped of its feeling quality, and now it’s being stripped of its meaningful content. There is no thought content in the LLM output - obviously - but our linguistic output is also losing its thought content. As I said, more and more often we don’t have enough fuel to sustain the thought process with enough strength to properly form and express an articulated reasoning. Artificial support is more and more required. What Steiner blamed as the lazy habit of thinking in mere words is now being institutionalized in our brain, through the LLMs. We are continually encouraged to externalize reasoning, and so our intellectual muscles atrophy.

What I am saying is, since language is under attack, we should: revive language by rediscovering its sound quality (I'll not develop on this now) and we should also, not fight verbal thinking or language, but fight its progressive separation from meaning, by strengthening pictorial thinking and direct connection with meaning. I realize that “thinking in words in itself is not the culprit of the problem”, still, we are more and more thinking in mere words, in disconnection from meaning, because of LLMs, not only because of astral nature, and this is a serious problem. At this rate, we will soon be mere outlets of what an LLM has instructed us to say, with less and less control and internalization of what it actually means, even on a mere intellectual plane.

Not to blame the original nature of language, as I tried to say many times. But language is being colonized and served back to us in a deceiving manner. I don’t deny the effect of the astral nature on thought, and the necessity to purify the astral nature, in order to purify thought. But I am highlighting something additional. Something that acts already at the basic intellectual level, and needs to be taken into account also by someone who is not called to develop higher cognition and work on their astral nature. And I believe that someone who is interested in developing their sense-free thinking is also subject to this threat, to the extent that one is generally exposed to the technological world. I believe that, once pictorial, living meaning is strengthened (as you have illustrated in various posts! for ordinary and less ordinary people this strengthening may correspond to different experiences) the ordinary person and the awakening soul alike will express themselves with better purposefulness and a more solid connection between the underlying meaning and the verbal rendering, be this in form of the inner voice or communications of some kind.

Please believe me, I don’t dream of an inner world where verbal thinking is eliminated or policed I am not crazy. I realize that “language degenerates as it mirrors the degenerate astral flow”. But I would add that language also degenerates because written language is being severed from meaning in our head as an effect of the LLM intrusion in our linguistic processes. And if we don’t actively counter that, it’s going to work on us (excluding the Initiates), even regardless of how critical of LLMs one may be, or how much one is actively using them as external thought aid/replacement.

I believe that the sense of abstractness, mannerism, separateness from meaning that I personally receive from words, not in everyday life or when writing here, but when I try to imbue them with as much meaning and feeling as possible, depends partly of this epochal ‘LLM mood’ but perhaps more on the feeling numbness typical of normal modern language. With respect to both problems, I feel it’s helpful for me to meditate on an image rather than on a string of words, to accompany prayer with visualization, and sometimes to avoid familiar words, or words alltogether, to instill a prayerful mood in an extended sound for example. With this said, I don’t deny or minimize that there are other and deeper astral causes that also affect these activities.

[AshvinP]

As a side discussion related to the topic of saving the idealists (in this case), I'd like to get some feedback on how to convey a very subtle point to Felipe (ouroboric idealism). I have come across this same line of reasoning before on Discord with a person who went by "Elk" (Cleric is familiar), and I simply couldn't figure out a way of clearly conveying the problem to him. The Steiner quotes clearly weren't working, as he presumes Steiner is simply appealing to some transcendent reality in order to criticize critical idealism, when the whole point of the latter is that such a reality cannot be said to exist and therefore cannot be appealed to (as we know, of course, that is not what Steiner is doing). Here is the discussion so far, but I am holding off on a reply for now and hoping a few minds working on the task will be better than one. (Felipe in red, my responses in blue)

***

Whether you are asleep in bed and dreaming or you awake to find yourself in bed, in each case the environment you encounter is nothing more than the network of your thoughts—as wrote Kant, “All bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts”—in each case the environment you encounter (dream environment or bedroom) involves only appearances which are the reflections that arise on the surface of the mind (in neither case can you possibly interact with things-in-themselves, that is); it’s just you caught up in perpetual dream.

But, of course, if “reflections”, the question arises of what these are “reflections” of (if the mind be taken to be a mirror figuratively speaking, that is)—the point is that even questions, thoughts, and convictions are instances of these “reflections” too.

What about time? What about apparent succession, change, and duration? Well, it is no crime to grant empirical reality to time while granting to it no transcendental reality and giving to it instead a transcendental ideality.

As Hume remarked, “To begin with the senses, ’tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu’d existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation”.

The problem is that, under this way of philosophizing, the "me", "you", "us", etc. that is having the dream must also be a reflective dream appearance in the same sense as the dream environment, so then the entire philosophy relies on reflective appearances to explain other reflective appearances within its chain of reasoning. It becomes entirely self-defeating in that way. Steiner points this out in Philosophy of Freedom Ch IV, where he is addressing Schopenhauer and critical idealism. [Steiner quote]


I would say that there is nothing self-defeating in the philosophizing expressed above specifically because such philosophizing does not grant any reality to anything beyond the activity of reflecting, meaning that nothing has to be accounted for beyond reflecting qua reflecting; and, in any case, any account of anything whatsoever (e.g., the activity of reflecting) amounts to another “reflection” under the method discussed above.

It is an error of philosophizing to insist, I argue, that anything has constitutive reality beyond one’s representations: “It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: How shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning” (Hume); and it is this connection “without any foundation in reasoning” that is already presupposed in the Steinerian objection you raise to my above observation that one can go no further than one’s representations or immanent “reflections”.

Under my method of philosophizing, when you say “only my real eye and my real hand could have mental pictures as modifications”, you are already presupposing, without justification, that representations require something beyond representation as their ground. This exemplifies precisely what Hume warned against—the assumption of connections that experience cannot validate—viz., “By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from [ii] the energy of the mind itself, or from [iii] the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from [iv] some other cause still more unknown to us?” (Hume). Your critique claims to show an internal contradiction in my position, but it actually imports an external metaphysical commitment about what can and cannot generate representations. You assume that only “real” organs, as opposed to represented ones, can give rise to mental pictures. But this assumption exceeds what we can legitimately claim from within the sphere of representation itself. Any attempt to posit or refer to something beyond representations—whether “real” hands or “real” eyes—is itself just another representation arising within thought. Thus, your objection begs the question by presupposing exactly what needs to be demonstrated.

Additionally, the Steinerian objection you raised seems to take for granted the transcendental realist criterion of truth (“only my real eye and my real hand could have mental pictures as modifications”), conflating empirical with transcendental realism, even when—as Fichte noted—the transcendental realist criterion of truth has been “the common source of all the objections, skeptical as well as dogmatic, which have been raised against the critical philosophy”.

The point, which your Steinerian objection seems to have missed (making said objection a case of ignoratio elenchi eo ipso), is that even questions, thoughts, and convictions (Steinerian or otherwise) are instances of these “reflections” too. When Steiner raises objections about the status of “real” eyes and hands, these objections themselves are reflections within thought: the very act of questioning the status of reflections is itself a reflection, and this creates a comprehensive philosophical framework where even attempts to step outside it necessarily operate within it.

Ok, so would you Steiner basically captures your position here:

"The critical idealist can, however, go even further and say: I am confined to the world of my mental pictures and [cannot] escape from it. If I think of a thing as being behind my mental picture, then thought is again nothing but a mental picture. An idealist of this type will either deny the thing-in-itself entirely or at any rate assert that it has no significance for human beings, in other words, that it is as good as non-existent since we can know nothing of it.

To this kind of critical idealist the whole world seems a dream, in the face of which all striving for knowledge is simply meaningless. For him there can be only two sorts of men: victims of the illusion that their own dream structures are real things, and the wise ones who see through the nothingness of this dream world and who must therefore gradually lose all desire to trouble themselves further about it. From this point of view, even one's own personality may become a mere dream phantom. Just as during sleep there appears among my dream images an image of myself, so in waking consciousness the mental picture of my own I is added to the mental picture of the outer world. We have then given to us in consciousness, not our real I, but only our mental picture of our I. Whoever denies that things exist, or at least that we can know anything of them, must also deny the existence, or at least the knowledge, of one's own personality. The critical idealist then comes to the conclusion that “All reality resolves itself into a wonderful dream, without a life which is dreamed about, and without a spirit which is having the dream; into a dream which hangs together in a dream of itself.”"

The quote you cited from Steiner tacitly involves the same error I already alluded to above—as I already pointed out, and as Fichte observed, the transcendental realist criterion of truth has been “the common source of all the objections, skeptical as well as dogmatic, which have been raised against the critical philosophy”. Steiner, when he tells us that “To this kind of critical idealist the whole world seems a dream, in the face of which all striving for knowledge is simply meaningless” is tacitly taking for granted the very transcendental realist criterion of truth that critical philosophy specifically rejects as necessary: seeking knowledge is not meaningless under critical idealism, it is rather sought in the rules of the understanding. Steiner is repeating the very mistake Fichte pointed out—and which Kant himself addressed in his many replies to misinterpretations of his critical idealism (cf. his reply to the Göttingen review)—Steiner is tacitly basing his critique of critical idealism on the transcendental realist criterion of truth, which criterion of truth the critical philosophy rejects, and which criterion has been “the common source of all the objections, skeptical as well as dogmatic, which have been raised against the critical philosophy”.

This part wasn't so much a critique of critical idealism, but a description of the logically coherent forms it can take. Some 19th-20th century thinkers certainly adopted it in this form and I have personally come across many mystically oriented idealists who feel that striving for knowledge is meaningless outside of utilitarian aims in sensory life. Even if such people say "striving for knowledge is a good thing", functionally they spend most of their time deconstructing other systems of knowledge but building up nothing else in its place. I'm not saying that's you, of course, but such lines of thinking certainly exist.

I get what you are saying - if there is no transcendental realist criterion of truth, there is no reason to say the phenomenal facts we order through our 'categories' of understanding is not 'true knowledge'. It is the only possible knowledge there ever could be, that could ever be imagined to exist. But Steiner is correct to say that critical idealism, properly understood, denies the thing-in-itself or says it is as good as non-existent, right? If that is correct, then what happens to the supersensible aspects of our immanent existence which we intuitively feel, but are not subjected to the categories of understanding in any way similar to sensory facts?

For example, when we try to tell a story from our life, we don’t physically or imaginatively see from where or when we draw the memory images and corresponding words that we articulate. Nevertheless, we somehow know ‘where’ to find the memories. We know how to pull out the story we intend to tell and not the one we would rather keep private. So even though we don't see anything concrete before our memory pictures and voice manifest, and we don't need to apply any spatiotemporal, causal, etc. categories, we have a certain intuitive orientation to the intended story within our conscious state. This intended orientation can't be seen as something existing in front of our physical eye or our mind’s eye, yet our entire inner life flows through its ‘curvature’ in the act of telling the story.

We have to use spatiotemporal language to convey this immanent reality, but it's not actually anywhere in space or a temporal 'frame' of experience that precedes other frames or comes after other frames. Is it meaningless to strive toward a greater, more precise understanding of this experience? Are we applying our thinking toward the non-existent thing-in-itself if we do? Practically all critical idealists I have come across would say yes to those questions and avoid pursuing them any further. What about you?



The point that I was making was that it is simply not the case that, as Steiner suggests, for the critical idealist “all striving for knowledge is simply meaningless”: Steiner is here presupposing that knowledge is either based on the transcendental realist criterion of truth or meaningless, whereas it is specifically this that the transcendental idealist rejects; the transcendental idealist does not insist that “all striving for knowledge is simply meaningless”, rather he insists that knowledge can be satisfactorily based on the empirical realist criterion of truth.

As it pertains to what you call “supersensible aspects of our immanent existence which we intuitively feel, but are not subjected to the categories of understanding in any way similar to sensory facts”: even these “supersensible aspects” are grounded in the categories of the understanding by virtue of having reference to the “I”, the synthetic unity of apperception, the source of the application of the categories of the understanding and hence of the realization of experience; even a memory is a species of experience, and hence involves reference to the unity of apperception and eo ipso involves the application of the categories (even a memory involves the application of the categories, viz., reference to the subject (the “I think” of the unity of apperception) which is the source of the application of the categories of the understanding, otherwise it would be utterly meaningless to me). “The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts has thus a principle according to which the whole enquiry must be directed, namely, that they must be recognised as a priori conditions of the possibility of experience, whether of the intuition which is to be met with in it or of the thought” (Kant, KrV, A 94).

Additionally, critical idealism—depending on who you ask—need not deny the thing-in-itself: for thinkers such as Fries, Herbart, and Beneke, the thing-in-itself is essential to critical idealism (to preserve the receptivity of sensibility); for Fichte and Schelling, however, intellectual intuition was necessary to overcome Kantian dualisms; Kant himself, the originator of critical idealism, would be adamantly opposed to denying the thing-in-itself, since Kant specifically insisted on the passivity of sensibility (even if, for Kant, the thing-in-itself is problematic only, not assertoric, not apodeictic). For my part, as a more conservative Kantian, I agree that the thing-in-itself must remain a part of critical idealism as that which we can think of but that which we can have no knowledge of, viz., as a problematic concept, not as assertoric and not as apodeictic (cf. Kant, KrV, B 311).

The issue concerning the maintenance of the thing-in-it-self in the context of critical idealism in particular or in philosophizing more broadly hinges on what stance one takes concerning whether our sensibility is passive or intellectual intuition is the case for us.


So when we speak of "knowledge", under idealism, essentially we are speaking about the inner lives of beings, i.e. intents, ideas, feelings, thoughts, sensations. In pre-Kantian dogmatic metaphysics, it was essentially concluded that every perspective is limited to knowing the sphere of their own 'personal' inner experiences. Kantian critical philosophy did not really change this, in fact it provided a more unassailable philosophical justification for the same conclusion. This is also at the basis for BK's model of 'dissociated alters' - it is simply taken for granted that each perspective has its own private sphere of experiences and then BK comes up with speculative ways of 'explaining' this presupposed reality. When taken to the logical extreme, you say we are not even justified to speculate about MAL, other dissociated alters, and so on, rather if we are consistent, we should arrive at a kind of solipsism (which I think you call 'transcendental solipsism'). This is basically what Steiner is referring to as "striving for knowledge is meaningless". We eventually say that it is a fool's errand to, not only try and experience the inner lives of other perspectives, but to even imagine there are other perspectives beyond our own.

But what is the basis for this assumption that a "perspective" has its own private sphere of experiences, except pre-Kantian dogmatic metaphysics based on naive experience in sensory life, where things appear to be neatly separated by spatial boundaries? What is the basis for saying the experiences of my family, friends, and so on are not also implicit in my present state of being, only obscured by my lack of interest and antipathy for the inner lives of these other relative perspectives? This is the problem with modern solipsistic frameworks, which are the only logical conclusion of critical idealism. They disincentivize any searching for the more encompassing spheres of inner experience in which we find the thoughts, feelings, impulses, wishes, goals, etc. of many other relative perspectives within the Whole. These are not only other human perspectives, but those responsible for the very spacetime fabric and planetary processes in which our lives unfold. All such striving is deemed a 'transcendental trap' and hence is 'meaningless'.

Thank you for your further engagement, Ashvin. However, once again, the transcendental realist criterion of truth is embedded and presupposed in your continued attempt to argue in favor of “many other relative perspectives within the Whole” and the meaninglessness of knowledge-striving in critical idealism—hence, you continue to beg the question against critical idealism by way of presupposing the criterion of truth which it calls into question (what critical idealism calls into question you continue to tacitly take for granted, hence the petitio principii in your own and Steiner’s attempted objections against critical idealism).

In the context of the transcendental realist criterion of truth perhaps “striving for knowledge is meaningless” because knowledge must entail (under transcendental realism) correspondence between the mind’s perceptions and some thing-in-itself or “many other relative perspectives within the Whole” (the skeptic will have no difficulty in doubting that the mind’s perceptions correspond to some thing-in-itself or “many other relative perspectives within the Whole”). Under empirical realism and critical idealism, however, striving for knowledge is specifically not meaningless because knowledge is not understood as correspondence or resemblance to anything beyond representations but conformity to the rules of the understanding and reference to the unity of apperception.

The “Whole” you refer to: insofar as you imply something beyond representations, you beg the question and the skeptic has every right to call into question the possibility of any knowledge of such kind; if, however, you imply the structure of experience, then you are in agreement with rather than in conflict against critical idealism and empirical realism.


It is interesting because I feel that you are presupposing the transcendental realist criterion of truth (TRCT) when stating that "'many other relative perspectives within the whole' presupposes the TRCT". In other words, you imagine that these relative perspectives, if they exist, can only exist beyond your own immanent perspective. It is a very subtle error that is happening here, and it all stems from the (mostly unconscious) assumption that one's own perspective is by default cut off from the inner experiences of one's family, friends, people on the street, etc. Of course there are good reasons for feeling this way in modern times, but that doesn't justify making this feeling of 'cut-offness' into a philosophical assumption at the basis of one's epistemology.

Through our reasoning, we easily see that our present state of experience, at any given time, is what it is only because the rest of the World state is just the way it is. For example, our organs would not exist without the Earthly and Cosmic environment from whose elements the bodily form has been built up. Our inner life wouldn’t be what it is without the social environment of the whole human civilization. Our present thinking wouldn’t be what it is without the linguistic forms in which we express our thoughts, and without all the understanding that humanity has brought to light in time. If we truly understand our reasoning as a means of gaining true knowledge, then this knowledge overcomes the default feeling that our first-person experiential perspective is enclosed and cut off from all other perspectives.

In that sense, we can only think "many other relative perspectives within the Whole" implicates the TRCT if we already conceive of these perspectives as existing in some transcendent space beyond our immanent experience. Then we use that conception *rooted in TRCT* to deny knowledge of the Whole's existence by calling it an appeal to TRCT. The Whole is the structure of experience, it is the categories of understanding, but it can't be found contained within the content of *our mental representations* of that structure and those categories, just as my inner life, in its full richness, is not found contained in the shapes and squiggles of the words in this post. This is the subtle trap that the critical idealist continually falls into - mistaking the content of their mental representations for the categorical structure of experience. I hope you can sense how difficult this is to detect - we can only become sensitive to it when we try to experience the difference between the content of our thinking (what we are thinking about) and what we are *doing* in our thinking to produce that content.


It is not correct to say that I am “presupposing the transcendental realist criterion of truth when stating that ‘many other relative perspectives within the Whole’ presupposes the TRCT”: it is true that I acknowledge the transcendental realist criterion of truth (TRCT), but not in order to endorse it; rather, I acknowledge the TRCT to make clear my Kantian-based departure from it. As I mentioned, what is meant by “Whole” here is crucial: if we mean to imply (by “Whole”) some transcendental reality beyond one’s own sphere of representations, then by definition we do take for granted the transcendental realist criterion of truth (and, to be frank, I am skeptical about any transcendental reality of any kind as I point out in my “Transcendental Solipsism” analysis); if, however, we mean to imply (by “Whole”) only the unity of experience (unity of apperception), then we by definition depart from the TRCT and side with empirical realism. For the record, I—like Kant—endorse the empirical realist criterion of truth and expressly repudiate the transcendental realist criterion of truth, especially because the TRCT inevitably is vulnerable to skeptical challenges (which skeptical challenges the empirical realist criterion aims to nullify).

You say that “these relative perspectives [viz., ‘many other relative perspectives within the Whole’], if they exist, can only exist beyond your own [or one’s own] immanent perspective”—yet this must be true, because any unity of apperception is, as Kant himself notes, one experience. What is any “perspective” if not a unique unity of apperception? Hence, why I conclude the apodeicticity of transcendental solipsism, even if I concede the inevitable problematic status of metaphysical solipsism. By definition, “these perspectives” (viz., what you have called “many other relative perspectives within the Whole”) can be and must be nothing more than unique unities of apperception—that transcendental solipsism is apodeictic is incontestable (it implies an absurdity to suggest that I can be who I am not, it implies absurdity to insist that my perspective can be not my perspective). “There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception. That it deserves this name is clear from the fact that even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the a priori concepts (space and time), is only possible through relation of the intuitions to such unity of consciousness. The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts, just as the manifoldness of space and time is the a priori ground of the intuitions of sensibility” (Kant, KrV, A 107).

It is ironic that you mention a “subtle trap that the critical idealist continually falls into”—ironic because hitherto you have failed to actually engage with critical idealism on its own terms, and you’ve continued to take for granted specifically what critical idealism calls into question (namely, the transcendental realist criterion of truth)—to say nothing of that fact that you’ve not only taken the TRCT for granted (which involves petitio principii against critical idealism) but you have even attributed it to me when I have expressly affirmed my rejection of it. To be be clear: I am not treating other perspectives as necessarily “beyond” one’s own immanent perspective because I do not presuppose the reality of other such perspectives; my point is that *if* there are other minds (or other perspectives) beyond myself, then they by definition would be not myself and hence inaccesible to me and independent of me eo ipso (hence, the apodeicticity of transcendental solipsism). Your attribution to me of transcendental realism may be legitimate if I did take for granted the reality of other minds—but I don’t (hence such attribution is illegitimate), and my point is only that minds essentially must be independent and capable of interacting only with their own respective representations.

Your suggestion, Ashvin, that we might access other perspectives through overcoming “lack of interest and antipathy” involves ignoratio elenchi because it doesn’t address the fundamental logical problem I’ve been emphasizing: that such access would still necessarily occur through (and in fact simply be) one’s own representations (leaving, eo ipso, the question of the reality of anything beyond one’s own representations completely unanswered and, I’d say, unanswerable because any answers to any questions whatsoever will always be representations in one’s own sphere of representations).


How are you defining "one's own sphere of representations"? For example, are the inner perspectives of your family members within this sphere, like their experiences of interacting with you? What kind of representation would their inner experiences be? Can you alter those inner experiences by changing your representations?


The key thing to note here is that I am not assuming that what I call my “family members” have “inner perspectives” or “experiences”—my whole point is that I am. It assuming the reality of other minds.

Your question about what sort of inner experiences may correspond to what I call my “family members” involves ignoratio elechi because it assumes that I take for granted what I doubt: namely, the reality of other minds.

By “one’s own sphere of representations” I mean a mind (myself) and its immanent Vorstellungen (to use Kant’s German terminology).
Your series of questions takes for granted the transcendental reality of other minds which I specifically call into question.

You have to understand that, per the philosophical position I am laying out here, what I call my “family members” are not necessarily “other minds” but only a system of my ephemeral perceptions: “That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct, or independent, and external, is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination. When the mind looks farther than what immediately appears to it, its conclusions can never be put to the account of the senses; and it certainly looks farther, when from a single perception it infers a double existence, and supposes the relations of resemblance and causation betwixt them” (Hume); “The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning” (Hume). Crucially—and here is the upshot—“To begin with the senses, ’tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu’d existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation” (Hume).


PS - one reason I am interested to find helpful ways of responding in this situation is because, in the case of Elk, he ended up expressing suicidal plans and followed through with it, and I am sure this seemingly impenentrable fortress of logic, this solipsistic 'end game', helped seal the deal for him. Felipe shows no such signs right now, but it's easy to see how such a view can reinforce an already lurking desire to end the corporeal journey. Unfortunately this is only solipsistic direction in which otherwise healthy reasoning can lead when it refuses to experience what it is doing in the process of reasoning.

[Federica]

As a side discussion related to the topic of saving the idealists (in this case), I'd like to get some feedback on how to convey a very subtle point to Felipe (ouroboric idealism). I have come across this same line of reasoning before on Discord with a person who went by "Elk" (Cleric is familiar), and I simply couldn't figure out a way of clearly conveying the problem to him. The Steiner quotes clearly weren't working, as he presumes Steiner is simply appealing to some transcendent reality in order to criticize critical idealism, when the whole point of the latter is that such a reality cannot be said to exist and therefore cannot be appealed to (as we know, of course, that is not what Steiner is doing). Here is the discussion so far, but I am holding off on a reply for now and hoping a few minds working on the task will be better than one. (Felipe in red, my responses in blue)

Here’s my unpolished take. I would start from the Hume quote, since he really feels the compelling character of those statements. I will write as if addressing him directly - easier. As a (seamless) guide, I would use the last RoP chapter, rather than PoF, because there is more attention to the psychology of the critical idealist there, and more insight in how to understand them, and possibly awaken them.


"To begin with the senses, ’tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu’d existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation” (Hume)"


The bold is true, but let’s consider “their objects”. Why multiple objects? Isn’t this already an elaboration of what bare senses can lend? Mere senses only give a chaotic, uncategorized, ensemble of ‘perceptibles’ [let's avoid Steiners vocabulary], randomly stacked against one another. It is possible to figure that if we imagine the experience of a person born blind, after receiving successful eye-surgery. In the newly opened sight capacity, one wouldn’t know where any distinct object begins, ends, stands, lies, floats, and why and how. One would only be assaulted by an at-first unprocessable, overwhelming avalanche of sensations. Not to be pedantic, but to highlight that this uncategorized sensory chaos must be recognized as the ground quality of our bare sensory perception, even though, after a life of sensory experience, we perceive it in seamless symbiosis with an added layer, which allows us to categorize and make sense of the content of our, for example, visual field. So, the senses only give rise to an uncategorized, unorganized perceptual experience, at every moment, within the soul. Still, one can agree with that:

"A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination. When the mind looks farther than what immediately appears to it, its conclusions can never be put to the account of the senses (Hume)"

Indeed, the conclusions of reason cannot be put to the account of the senses, and some of those conclusions may indeed be inferences. However, it can be shown that there also exist some conclusions that reason can form, which can be put to the account of objective reality.

To wit, Hume’s reasoning relies on the following thought sequence: the senses create the visual sensation, because in the absence of the eye, no visual sensation is perceived. Right. The mental pictures I form of that visual sensation must therefore have the same self-created character. They must be my creation as well. As such, I have no right to transfer anything of that sequence outside myself. In case anyone is tempted to search for a proper support for knowable external reality, with foundation in what the senses can lend, they should realize that one is faced with a wall: sensory inquiry fails to lead one outside oneself. So far so good. It makes sense.

However, at this exact juncture, a possibility of inquiry may have been overlooked. What this overlooking may consist of can be illustrated, but for that to be fruitful, it is necessary to remain temporarily open to the possibility that the thing in itself may be knowable. This is an invitation to contemplate with philosophical equanimity the following working thoughts. The only goal is to explore whether or not it is possible that the critical-idealist’s perspective is a strong appearance, rather than a conclusive state of reality. Since only dogmatic belief could prevent one from engaging in such an exercise, for the sake of striving for knowledge, it's supposed this is accepted.

What if the idea that the thing in itself is outside us, and we are thus striving to know something external to us, is actually only a belief, presupposition, or arbitrary point of departure? As a matter of fact, it must be so, since there is no a priori way to ascertain that we are not already united with the thing we strive to know - although it certainly seems like we are not. In order to notice the arbitrary character of this statement (“the objects of knowledge are outside me”) it is necessary to also scrutinize and eliminate any beliefs that the thing in itself is only material, and that what we are prompted to inquire through the five senses is the fullness of reality (for idealists, none of these should be a problem I guess).

If we refrain from fixing attention only on the material side of things, we can consider the possibility that we 'already' are intrinsically united with reality. Under this possibility, the reason why it doesn’t appear like we exist in such a unitary state, may be the following. Whatever the thing in itself exactly is in its ideal-material nature, when we approach it in hope to know it, we do it by necessity through the senses first, and through mental pictures then. This peculiar approach happens by necessity, because our human organization forces us to approach reality in splitted manner: on the one hand, we represent it within our senses, and on the other, we form it again, in mental picture form. But what if this split is due, not to the reality of things, not to our null chances to intimately know them, but to how we stand as human beings, in consciousness and matter?

In other words, if we refrain from hidden assumptions, the possibility arises that it's not because of the nature of reality that we know it through the senses first, but because of how we are ‘shaped’ within this same reality. If this is possible, then it is also entirely possible that the thing in itself is unitary - an indissociable bundle of ideal and material constituents - and it’s our human nature that forces us to experience an initial sensory attempt to know it, followed by a mental-picture attempt. This means that, when we split reality and form ‘bare’ sensory perceptions within ourselves, this rendering afforded by the senses is not as ‘as is’ as it initially appears. On the contrary, we are stripping unitary reality of its ideal layer - its conceptual layer. In this way, such conceptual essence - and this is admittedly somewhat mind-bending at first - can be realized as an original constituent element of reality in itself. A constituent element in which we also share, though it doesn’t appear like that, because our attention is inevitably focused on what the senses can give first, in a disjointed way.

So we may come to realize how in our sense perceptions we strip reality of its concepts. Then, through thinking, we have a chance to realize its unity again: we reintegrate the concepts. However, to see that we operate so, to see that we re-enter the concepts, not that we merely patch them back on bare sensations, we have to attend to the act - not the product - of thinking them, that is, to the ongoing act of fishing out the mental pictures, not to the pictures themselves, as formed cognitive frames, since these are only the severed side, the other side of our splitted cognition. In this way, we may consciously reconstitute reality to its fullness, from within it. We simultaneously partake in it by becoming aware of existing at the shared origin of that ever-unfolding mental-picture generating process.

To summarize, just because our human organization initially leads us to disjointed, split knowing attempts, doesn’t mean that the thing in itself, of which we may be an inherent part, is correspondingly shaped. Bare sensory experience is not as ‘bare’ as it looks, but already the inner result of some form of processing, of which we are the agents. This is due to our peculiar human nature, uncomfortably spread all the way across consciousness and matter, but endowed with a mind aperture just as uncomfortably almost overstretched in that split, at that boundary. The processing of the senses is that we strip reality of its inherent conceptual nature, thus represent to ourselves only a fractured reality. Then, through cognition, we reconstitute for ourselves the true unity, but to realize that we are actually doing it, we can’t ask the mental pictures to help. These are continually receding thought-perceptions, and we remain eternally behind the unitary flow, if we try to grasp the latter in sequential reasoning, through snatching philosophical mental pictures the traditional way. Though such tradition is what has allowed us to reach this frontier. As the known expression goes (adapted): what got us here won’t get us there. So, to move forward, we need to consciously enter that center of unitary reality in which we are already sharing: the actual ideal process that, apprehended from the splitted side of our normal cognition, looks like concatenations of mental pictures - trains of thought. Ordinary conscious inquiry can’t guide us inside that knowing. However, it certainly can lead us to its frontier - to the solid realization that an evolved cognitive method needs to be deployed from here - more advanced than the sequential design of already condensed mental pictures in our head, which inevitably leaves us eternally behind.

[Cleric]

As a side discussion related to the topic of saving the idealists (in this case), I'd like to get some feedback on how to convey a very subtle point to Felipe (ouroboric idealism). I have come across this same line of reasoning before on Discord with a person who went by "Elk" (Cleric is familiar), and I simply couldn't figure out a way of clearly conveying the problem to him. The Steiner quotes clearly weren't working, as he presumes Steiner is simply appealing to some transcendent reality in order to criticize critical idealism, when the whole point of the latter is that such a reality cannot be said to exist and therefore cannot be appealed to (as we know, of course, that is not what Steiner is doing). Here is the discussion so far, but I am holding off on a reply for now and hoping a few minds working on the task will be better than one. (Felipe in red, my responses in blue)

Here's my view.
(I see that Federica has replied too, I haven't read it yet, sorry if what I'm writing overlaps.)

Let's start by saying that I'm skeptical about any progress. He seems to be too satisfied with his intellectual stance, resting in a cemented philosophical armchair. But nevertheless, one possibility for experimentation is to play strictly the transcendental solipsism game. Otherwise, he immediately deflects everything by saying that you misunderstand the basis. So the way would be to stay within his world of representations.

Then we can once again lead the question about "How can we speak of things that could potentially be found as first-person experiences but are as of yet unsuspected?" And here one should point attention to the most elementary examples, such as certain soul tendencies and traits that have steered our whole flow of existence, yet without much awareness. The critical point to stress on is that not only can we awaken to the existence of such tendencies but together with this we attain to the degrees of freedom of inner activity through which we can augment their curvatures. I see that you already tried to speak about this but it seems he completely ignored it. He probably took it as if you were trying to sneak in metaphysics. So I guess this is a point of approach that is compatible with his solipsistic mood.
1. Can he admit that just because we do not have awareness of something at present (such as a soul tendency), it doesn't mean that it is forever bound to remain within the thing-in-itself (no matter whether we believe in it or not). The thing to observe here is that something that previously could only be attributed to the thing-in-itself, becomes inner reality that can be experientially known and steered through intuitive intent.
2. If he admits that possibility, then we are faced with an important problem: in transcendental solipsism are we allowed to think about any such hidden curvatures? This puts us at odds with our beliefs because we should accept for real only representations that can be experineced. Does this mean that since any such curvatures may or may not exist according to the transcendental solipsist, one should refrain from thinking about them, and if they do exist we simply leave it to fate to lead us to a stage of development where we gain consciousness of them?

If this stage of personal awakening could be somehow negotiated, the next step would be if there's openness that some even deeper aspects of the total dream flow can be awakened to, such that we can steer destiny, direct the bodily growth process and so on. This can be pushed even further by asking whether one can awaken to divine tendencies that shape even more fundamental aspects of the flow of representations. In other words, can he go solipsism all the way to the Divine, or his solipsism can only make so much sense of the flow, while the majority will always remain as the mystery of the thing-in-itself?

It should be stressed that we remain within the solipsistic view at all times. We are not speaking about a metaphysical model of some speculative Divine mind, but whether our own mind can awaken to its Godly roots. This is, of course, problematic on the moral side and must be complemented in many ways, but they will be deflected by saying that he doesn't even know if other minds/souls exist. So it's better to stay in his frame and see how far he is willing to push the boundaries of his own solipsistic mind. The key question would be if he feels that this mind is fundamentally limited, surrounded by the forever unknowable mystery of the thing-in-itself (or whether it even exists!) or if he is open that he is a solipsistic God in diminished consciousness who can gradually awaken to his higher creative aspects and steer the dream in novel ways. Needless to say, if he takes his human radius as an immutable given, any attempt to speak of higher cognition is doomed to be seen as metaphysical speculations that only shuffle representations.

[AshvinP]

Thank you both for this feedback - I think all of our thoughts on the problematic perspective are generally converging in the same direction. Cleric's questions have really honed in on the functional constraints at play when such beliefs are held, which may at least have some potential of sparking a sense of, "ahhh, I see how this philosophical framework could prevent me from exploring meaningful domains of my Divine Mind that I would otherwise be able to explore and get creatively involved in". I am also highly dubious that this will happen, but it's probably the best shot. Here is the response I posted and let's see if/what he responds.

Ok, so let's agree that we cannot take for granted any transcendent reality of 'other minds', and in fact such a reality cannot possibly be known. Now the question becomes, what are the limits of our own 'system of ephemeral perceptions'? How do we address aspects of immanent representations that can be *potentially* experienced but are *not yet* experienced? So here are the key questions:

1 - Even if we do not have awareness of something at present, for example an antipathy for interacting with a certain person, does that mean it must forever remain as an unknowable thing-in-itself (whether the latter is functioning as a problematic concept or otherwise). Can something that previously could only be attributed to the thing-in-itself, because of *our* limited awareness within our system of representations, become something that is experientially known and possibly given direction through our intentional activity?

2 - If that is possible, are we even allowed to think about any such potentially experienceable soul tendencies within transcendental solipsism? To think about them would put us at odds with our philosophical beliefs, would it not, since we should only accept as 'real' those representations that can be currently experienced, whereas everything else must be attributed to practically non-existent realm of things-themselves that shouldn't be appealed to? Does this mean that, since any such hidden aspects may or may not exist according to the transcendental solipsist, one should refrain from thinking about them? And if they do exist, do we simply leave it to fate to lead us to a stage of development where we gain consciousness of them?

[AshvinP]

Here is the response, which basically sidesteps the questions. He distinguishes his position from metaphysical solipsism, which at least holds open his philosophy as a kind of starting point for deeper exploration, but functionally he doesn't seem interested in any such exploration. I followed up with some more questions to see if he budges in that direction at all.

Thank you for these interesting questions, Ashvin, and I should like to say that an answer to these is already contained in my analysis of transcendental solipsism. If you refer to my analysis of transcendental solipsism, you will note that there I state that “any perception, idea, judgment, belief, conviction, feeling, sensation, and literally everything that constitutes one’s mental life is an immanent representation, such that transcendental (or critical) solipsism is inescapably apodeictic”, and there I add that “even theories, or arguments for or against the freedom of the will, amount to immanent representations in me: any conviction of any kind amounts to immanent representations in me (representations whose potential connection to transcendental reality, if there even is a transcendental reality beyond my representations, must remain always inevitably problematic at best, because of the inescapably apodeictic status of transcendental solipsism, and because of the inescapably problematic status of a hypothetical transcendental reality)”.

The key thing to grasp here is not that the transcendental solipsist dogmatically denies the reality of anything beyond the present set of perceptions in the mind—for, after all, the transcendental solipsist concedes the problematic status of metaphysical solipsism—rather, the transcendental solipsist only goes so far as to epistemologically point out that “To begin with the senses, ’tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu’d existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation”.

Your questions refer to things-in-themselves, but the key thing to remember here is that the transcendental solipsist remains perfectly silent concerning any alleged things-in-themselves (and if he does affirm anything at all concerning things-in-themselves, he concedes that such an affirmation is more immanent representation).


Thanks, and while that may answer #1, it doesn't seem to address #2. After all, what is the purpose of immersing oneself in transcendental solipsism, and criticizing/cautioning others (like BK) of their dogmatic metaphysics, if not to question whether there is any value in thinking about aspects of immanent representations that are so far unexperienced?

Or is transcendental solipsism simply a *starting point* to decondition from dogmatic metaphysical thinking habits, from which deeper as-of-yet mysterious aspects of our immanent representations can then be explored? For example, when I am feeling in depressed mood, most people cannot simply override this mood by forming new mental representations. There is therefore a mysterious quality of this mood that 'outweighs' my philosophical or scientific representations (the latter simply comment on the mood, but usually cannot modify it).

Does transcendental solipsism deem the exploration of this mysterious aspect a foolish pursuit of the thing-itself, or does it rather invite such exploration? If the latter, then can we also imagine exploring even deeper aspects of our immanent representations, for example the body's metabolic processes, the Earth's revolution around the Sun (the seasons), and so on? If we symbolize these deeper aspects with certain philosophical, scientific, or religious pictures and terms, will they automatically be deemed as falling prey to TRCT?

[AshvinP]

Ok well, after his last response, I simply gave up

Actually, my clarification that “any perception, idea, judgment, belief, conviction, feeling, sensation, and literally everything that constitutes one’s mental life is an immanent representation” sufficiently addresses not only the two questions you raised but any possible question which may arise —because whether I am convinced that either “x” or “y” is a sufficient response to question “q”, then I have a conviction, and “any perception, idea, judgment, belief, conviction, feeling, sensation, and literally everything that constitutes one’s mental life is an immanent representation, such that transcendental (or critical) solipsism is inescapably apodeictic”.

Your question—viz., “After all, what is the purpose of immersing oneself in transcendental solipsism, and criticizing/cautioning others (like BK) of their dogmatic metaphysics, if not to question whether there is any value in thinking about aspects of immanent representations that are so far unexperienced?”—seems to simply take for granted what the transcendental solipsist doubts (namely, transcendental reality): “To begin with the senses, ’tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu’d existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation”. Such that your question once again repeats the same error that has been consistently present in your statements hitherto: taking for granted the very transcendental realist criterion of truth which is called into question by the transcendental solipsist.

The key thing to keep in mind here—which it seems that you are continuing to fail to grasp—is that it does not matter what I think, believe, feel, desire, conceive, am convinced of [whether concerning any alleged “unexperienced aspects” or what have you], etc., it all amounts to representations in me (hence, the apodeicticity of transcendental solipsism).

When you ask, Ashvin, about the purpose of immersing oneself in transcendental solipsism, or suggest that it might be a “starting point” for deeper exploration, you continue to fail to recognize that such purposes or explorations (whatever they may be) would themselves be representations in me (not by coincidence but necessarily because of the apodeicticity of transcendental solipsism). There is nothing I can hold on to, no thought I can have, no conviction I may be swayed by, no philosophical position I may establish, etc., which would not already be a representation in me—for I could not know that which I cannot know, and all knowledge necessarily must have reference to the unity of apperception or be no knowledge at all.
It makes no difference how far I venture or how profoundly I think, I access only more and more immanent representations.

The key thing to remember here is the apodeicticity of transcendental solipsism: any attempt to call into question transcendental solipsism only further demonstrates its apodeicticity ; whatsoever I reach for, whatsoever I grasp, must be and can be nothing other than representations in me (cf. Kant, KrV, A 107).


I already understand what you are saying, Felipe, but I am trying to gently direct your attention, through these questions, to the inner contradiction that occurs in your line of reasoning. As soon as you speak of representations "in me", or "my" sphere of representations, or similar things, in the way that you do, you are implicitly comparing it to a domain of reality that is NOT "in you", that is outside "your" sphere of representations. Therefore you are invoking a transcendent reality beyond immanent representations, even if you are doing it 'negatively'. It is the functional equivalent of someone who invokes the transcendent reality in a positive way to establish their position, like BK. Transcendent solipsism and analytic idealism are two sides of the same coin.

I hope you don't take personal offense to that comparison. I know this is very difficult for you to notice, so I am trying to help you see it. Please understand that I have come across this many times before - 'transcendent solipsism' is not original, as I'm sure you would also admit - and thus I can tell exactly where the error in reasoning resides. The only question is how to make this error more apparent, which is admittedly very difficult, especially in these online formats. Nevertheless, I will keep trying to think of ways to express what's happening here, because even if it doesn't dawn on you, there are surely others who hold practically the same position in different forms (in fact all modern philosophies end up being solipsistic in this same way).

In conclusion, the reason you feel this way:

"Actually, my clarification that “any perception, idea, judgment, belief, conviction, feeling, sensation, and literally everything that constitutes one’s mental life is an immanent representation” sufficiently addresses not only the two questions you raised but any possible question which may arise..."

is precisely because you hold a negative concept of a realm of things-themselves that exist beyond "your" sphere of representations, which is simply the heads side of coin to the person who holds a positive concept of such a realm, which is the tails side. This negative concept squishes your thinking from all sides and prevents it from exploring deeper aspects of your immanent representations, just like it does for the analytic idealist. Thus you feel that all striving for knowledge, all asking of questions, is meaningless and can be summarily dismissed by a single string of mental representations in your present state. This means that transcendental solipsism self-evidently = metaphysical solipsism = epistemic nihilism, for all intents and purposes.