Saving the materialists

[Cleric]

In any case, I easily believe it when you say that the pictorial flow is also constrained and guided, though I can’t sense it directly.

Well, this is a general principle. We begin to sense certain constraints only as we find the wiggle space. We emerge from some constraints - as far as this is possible in our Earthly flow - but then there are even higher-order constraints that we do not yet sense directly. Nevertheless, once we understand this principle, we can address these not yet known constraints through the prayerful openness and surrender. This prayer-space later becomes the wiggle-space.

[AshvinP]

Well, hopefully the discussion lingers within him for a bit. In any case it was a good exchange and helpful for me as well.

Thank you, Ashvin, for your meaningful contributions here. Your observations above have positively inspired my thoughts and have given me a lot to consider and reflect on. I am thankful for your contributions.

[Federica]

Going through the lecture cycle "The Mystery of Death", I've come across a passage that is relevant to the recent language discussion in this thread. It's about translation, and how approximate a translation most often is, in its ability to evoke a definite soul experience. This reminds me of the almost imperceptible but constant "spanner in the working" that reading things in English translation is, not only because of the limited mastery of a language, but especially because of the text's translated character. I got used to that, since the vast majority of what I read nowadays is English translation, but when I occasionally read something original, almost surprisingly, things flow in a special way, a light way. It's as if there's a possibility of immediate closeness of soul. But in a translation, that has to be reconstructed, like an archeologist would do.

Just think how Ernst Haeckel is an Englishman in his whole world view, insofar as he has based his world view on science. He is completely an Englishman, because he has taken up English thought-forms. Everything that he thinks is influenced by English nature. He starts from Darwin and Huxley. He regards Spencer as his philosophical God. One can translate Haeckel very easily into English, while one cannot really translate a book of Hegel or a book of spiritual science into English. You may be surprised about me saying this, because you know that spiritual-scientific books are translated into English. But what you read in the books, can only approximately be rendered in English translations. One can never really translate, for example, the archetypically German sentence which belongs together with the sensibility of Meister Eckhart, and everything that has developed in German culture in relation to Meister Eckhart. You cannot translate this sentence correctly into English: “In dem Gemüte lebt das Fünklein, in dem sich in der Menschenseele die Weltseele offenbart” (The spark in which the world-soul reveals itself to the human soul, lives in man's soul). It is impossible to translate it really into English, because for that which is experienced in the word “Gemüt” no translation exists. Also the original dictum by Hegel cannot be translated into English which is almost the foundation stone of German idealistic philosophy: “Sein und Nicht-Sein vereinigen sich zur höheren Einheit im Werden” (Being and Not-Being coalesce in Becoming as a higher unity). Impossible to translate to English. Of course, one can translate everything, but the translation cannot reproduce what is experienced in such a sentence.
The German language has the special peculiarity that it allows a certain fluidity. Think how infinitely easy it is to say, when something is translated into English or French: “This is wrong! One does not say such a thing.”—We Germans must not develop the bad habit of saying that something is wrong, but we must keep our language fluid—this is spoken radically, of course. But if you go through our lecture cycles, there you will see how I always struggled to form new words, also forms which formulate the words from within. This comes, for example, from the fact that the archangel of the German people stopped being so sharply defined. He has only made an attempt, as it were, to sharply coin the national character during almost one century, and then let the people free again.
That means a lot. But this must be that way, because the German people have a vocation to transform their idealism to lively spiritual knowledge. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, who are attacked today, created a thinking which is, it is true, not spiritualism, nor spiritual science, but, it is the seed which guides you to spiritual science, if you meditate it thoroughly.

[Güney27]

Well, hopefully the discussion lingers within him for a bit. In any case it was a good exchange and helpful for me as well.

Thank you, Ashvin, for your meaningful contributions here. Your observations above have positively inspired my thoughts and have given me a lot to consider and reflect on. I am thankful for your contributions.

Hey Ashvin.

I don’t see any meaning in Felipe’s type of thinking.
This type of thinking is extracted from any kind of meaningful purposive being-in-the-World (heideggers term). Of course you can’t prove the existence of other minds, but the question only arises when we take out a “mind” from its „meaningful context“ (worldhood of the world) and contemplate it in isolation.
„What if other minds aren’t real?“. These sort of questions only sitting on a philosophers chair, and forgetting about the real context of meaning which is present and makes possible our living experience and even the question. In our everyday life we know the existence of other minds (I don’t mean a Cartesian subject) trough their meaning, their significance. The question becomes „how can I have this knowledge prior to reflection?“ what is the structure that makes this possible? Of course we can disregard our everyday experience of the world as a mere illusion. But then we only can speculate about the world. The questions become abstract and we contemplate isolated from the real world (the world prior to philosophical reflection, which is the real world we live in, which make it possible to even ask these type of questions). The question should become „what constitutes the possibility of my everyday life prior to philosophical reflection, which is fully intelligible and meaningful (structured), what is it that makes this possible?“ Of course this question should be asked and answered from an individual phenomenological perspective. Then we can try to search for the phenomenological structures that make our state of consciousness possible. Thinking really changes here, because we try to uncover the concealed structures that are part of our being, and try to focus them in clear reflective concepts. Our thinking probes the deeper currents so to say. In short, we begin to move towards intuitive thinking.

It is true that we can never know about the world „outside of consciousness“, but in our everyday life we don’t think about the nature of the visible world, but we live in it and it constraints our activity. It is the context in which we live, which we try to navigate trough in a purposeful manner. Only when we think about the perceived world, and reflect about it’s essence, we say that it exist outside of us. But pre-philosophical living is embedded and possible trough an pre-propositional understanding and questioning on the philosophers chair is only possible trough that context.

In short, I don’t see much meaning in that type of discussion and questions, because in the abstract ways they arise, they forget the real questions about the phenomenological context which makes them possible. Of course we can abstract other humans outside the everyday meaningful context, and question their existence as conscious beings in an isolated hypothetical manner, and then come to the conclusion that we can’t know if they exist. Then we leave our chair and live in the real world full of humans with intentional activity which constrains our own without ever becoming aware of the depth structure which make this living possible.

[Güney27]

Ps: this type of thinking treats knowledge as correspondence. We form propositions about the representations. But we are beings in a world that grasp the appearing world prior to reflection. Knowledge isn’t something we bring forth, but the world in which we live, brings it trough us so to say. This knowledge prior to reflection can than be focused into propositions.

[AshvinP]

Well, hopefully the discussion lingers within him for a bit. In any case it was a good exchange and helpful for me as well.

Thank you, Ashvin, for your meaningful contributions here. Your observations above have positively inspired my thoughts and have given me a lot to consider and reflect on. I am thankful for your contributions.

Hey Ashvin.

I don’t see any meaning in Felipe’s type of thinking.
This type of thinking is extracted from any kind of meaningful purposive being-in-the-World (heideggers term). Of course you can’t prove the existence of other minds, but the question only arises when we take out a “mind” from its „meaningful context“ (worldhood of the world) and contemplate it in isolation.
„What if other minds aren’t real?“. These sort of questions only sitting on a philosophers chair, and forgetting about the real context of meaning which is present and makes possible our living experience and even the question. In our everyday life we know the existence of other minds (I don’t mean a Cartesian subject) trough their meaning, their significance. The question becomes „how can I have this knowledge prior to reflection?“ what is the structure that makes this possible? Of course we can disregard our everyday experience of the world as a mere illusion. But then we only can speculate about the world. The questions become abstract and we contemplate isolated from the real world (the world prior to philosophical reflection, which is the real world we live in, which make it possible to even ask these type of questions). The question should become „what constitutes the possibility of my everyday life prior to philosophical reflection, which is fully intelligible and meaningful (structured), what is it that makes this possible?“ Of course this question should be asked and answered from an individual phenomenological perspective. Then we can try to search for the phenomenological structures that make our state of consciousness possible. Thinking really changes here, because we try to uncover the concealed structures that are part of our being, and try to focus them in clear reflective concepts. Our thinking probes the deeper currents so to say. In short, we begin to move towards intuitive thinking.

It is true that we can never know about the world „outside of consciousness“, but in our everyday life we don’t think about the nature of the visible world, but we live in it and it constraints our activity. It is the context in which we live, which we try to navigate trough in a purposeful manner. Only when we think about the perceived world, and reflect about it’s essence, we say that it exist outside of us. But pre-philosophical living is embedded and possible trough an pre-propositional understanding and questioning on the philosophers chair is only possible trough that context.

In short, I don’t see much meaning in that type of discussion and questions, because in the abstract ways they arise, they forget the real questions about the phenomenological context which makes them possible. Of course we can abstract other humans outside the everyday meaningful context, and question their existence as conscious beings in an isolated hypothetical manner, and then come to the conclusion that we can’t know if they exist. Then we leave our chair and live in the real world full of humans with intentional activity which constrains our own without ever becoming aware of the depth structure which make this living possible.

Guney,

Thanks for these reflections. I would say the meaning in these sorts of discussions comes precisely from us becoming more intimate with how our thinking habitually finds ways of isolating itself from its meaningful context. In fact, this sort of solipsism is the only logically sound continuation of critical philosophy (which JW also adopts), so exploring its thought-movements brings us into more intimate contact with modern philosophy in general. The 'transcendental solipsist' simply work out those critical thought-movements more thoroughly than those who stop short of its logical implications at their varying levels of comfort, for example BK or JW. They both adopt the thinking of critical philosophy up to a point, but then resort to dogmatic metaphysics to keep the possibility of 'other minds' open and 'explain' our experience of such minds. Yet this is no less nihilistic than taking it further to solipsism, since resorting to metaphysical explanations of 'other minds' does nothing to break down the 'dissociative' (antipathy-fueled) boundaries and lead our cognition into the wider etheric-astral spectrum where we experience the overlap between the World Thoughts and our own thoughts.

Actually I have continued discussing this issue of solipsism with Felipe, here are some of the recent comments. It is certainly a mental exercise to find ways of pointing to the core flaws in reasoning and move the discussion forward! I would say it's even a highly artistic skill that we can develop (which is not to say I am proficient at this skill yet). The main flaw with Felipe's reasoning, as I currently see it, is actually that he is avoiding the true implications of solipsism and keeping a 'remainder' (what he calls the 'problematic concept' of things-themselves such as 'other subjects'), which is functionally similar to BK, JW, et al., i.e. dogmatic metaphysics (except in the opposite direction - instead of using transcendent realities to establish the foundation of other minds he is using them to avoid establishing such a foundation).

***

Thanks Felipe, I am glad we have again found common ground on these topics. Perhaps we can make some progress on the chief issue as well.

What I fundamentally suggest is that, if the reality of *ourselves* as subjects is not without an answer, then neither can the reality of other subjects qua subjects remain without an answer. We can take a concrete example here to see if and where there is a misalignment in our understanding.

Let's imagine we come across a still body on the street covered in blood. Now we have immanent representations of its colors, shapes, sizes, etc., which convey the meaning "possibly dead body". But let's imagine the body starts moving and then we hear whimpers and groans. At the same time, through these representations, we dimly empathize with the painful experience. Now the meaning of our immanent representations transforms to, "alive and ensouled body that is experiencing great pain".

At this point, you would say our knowledge of "ensouled body experiencing pain" is merely an inference from the representations and this inference, while an empirical reality (since it is your representation), may or may not correspond with a subject qua subject, i.e. a subject who experiences pain just like *you* are experiencing some pain through the empathic representations? Or rather our empathic representation is a direct perception of the other perspective's experience of pain (even though that experience is also experienced from our unique perspective)?


The fundamental insight of transcendental solipsism—and even of my Ouroboric Idealism system more broadly—and which is essentially grounded in the Fichtean principle that the self is only for itself and through itself, is that the self (as self-determining activity/agency) can in principle extend only as far as itself (only as far as its own activity), and even the thought of a “beyond” its activity amounts to an expression of its own immanent activity (a thought, an idea).

Concerning the moving bloodied body I may come across—and, in fact, concerning anything whatsoever I come across—it is all, one and all, a component within the general framework of my experience. My essential contention is that subjects (not as substances behind and having experience, but as the spiritual activity *constitutive* of the framework of experience) *cannot* in principle have access to anything beyond their own activity. This means that, whether there is—by some sort of pre-established harmony—another subject (qua spiritual activity) beyond myself corresponding to the bloodied body I perceive or whether there is no such correspondence, I cannot in principle come to know it, because what I know is always and inevitably my own activity (whether that activity is perceiving bloodied bodies, feelings of empathy, or thinking about independently existing subjects or objects beyond my own activity/experience).

1. All knowledge is necessarily an expression of my own activity.

2.The very thought of something beyond my activity is itself my activity.

3. Therefore, I can never transcend my own sphere of activity to verify any correspondence (such that objectivity *must* be sought in the context of the framework of my experience because I cannot in principle possibly establish correspondence between neither the generality nor peculiarities of my experience and some alleged transcendental reality, whether involving things-in-themselves or other subjects with their own corresponding experience framework).

The key thing to remember here is the *essence* of subjectivity: subjectivity is the activity of self-knowledge by way of instantiating as a framework of experience. This means that, in principle, any actual subject (according to the *essence* of subjectivity aforementioned) *by definition* can in principle access nothing more than itself (can go no further, that is, than its own activity [which activity manifests necessarily as an experience framework through and as the self]).

In other words, I *cannot* in principle appeal to any aspect whatsoever of my own activity (whether that involves perceiving, empathizing, or reasoning) to address the “chief problem” for the same reason that I cannot appeal to, for example, painting x to verify what the contents of painting y are or are not.

Summa summarum, if I am to have knowledge of the reality of other minds, I must have knowledge of other minds a priori or a posteriori. However, I cannot have knowledge of the reality of other minds a priori because it is not logically necessary that other minds exist beyond myself—because, that is, metaphysical solipsism is a logical possibility (it is logically possible that the sole reality is myself as a mind entertaining itself with its own activity). I cannot have knowledge of other minds a posteriori, in turn, because my experience is simply my own activity (as notes Kant, “All bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts”). The a posteriori route cannot suffice, that is, because—as Hume rightly observed—“That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct, or independent, and external, is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination. When the mind looks farther than what immediately appears to it, its conclusions can never be put to the account of the senses; and it certainly looks farther, when from a single perception it infers a double existence, and supposes the relations of resemblance and causation betwixt them”.


I think we simply need to take transcendental solipsism (TS) more seriously, to its logical conclusion, to resolve the 'chief problem'. It seems that even those who hold to TS still carve out a 'remainder', like a wild card, that holds open the possibility for letting the 'problematic concept' of things-themselves influence their thinking through the fundamental issues. We saw that before with the issue of whether we can establish freedom and I think a similar thing happens with the problem of 'other subjects'.

If we take TS to its logical conclusion, then the meaning of anything that we can imagine, anything we can immanently represent, must necessarily be *implicit* in our spiritual activity (which I agree is the essence of subjectivity) which manifests as an experience framework. If we can imagine other unique perspectives on that framework of experience, i.e. other forms of spiritual activity which feel relatively independent of our own at any given time, then such activity must be implicit in our own.

And such a conclusion has the benefit of thoroughly making sense of our living experience. Although both the meaning of 'triangle form' and 'living bloodied body whimpering and groaning' are immanent representations, there is no denying that the former is completely dependent on our spiritual activity for its existence while the latter does not *feel* to be. We can decide not to picture a triangle form, but no matter how much we wish for the body to stop groaning in pain, it probably won't respond. So it is evident that there are aspects of our immanent representations which move relatively independently of our momentary intents.

Or we could consider how, implicit in your spiritual activity when articulating TS to others, is the spiritual activity of Kant and Fichte. According to TS, if taken to its logical conclusion, ALL 'past' spiritual activity of humanity (and any other conceivable being) is still immanently present in our current spiritual activity. We wouldn't have the ideas, the language, the vocabulary, the larynx, the other organs and body parts, etc. that we do without such implicit spiritual activity being immanently present. When we survey our memory life, indeed we find our entire sense of 'me' is shaped by our interactions with parents, teachers, peers, leading thinkers, etc. over the years.

So what is more reasonable - to stick with the logical necessities of TS and recognize our living experience of relatively independent spiritual activity is always implicit in what we conceive of as 'our' present spiritual activity, our subjectivity? Or to carve out a remainder from TS of 'subjects qua subjects' and wonder whether we can ever 'prove' they exist? If we take TS with utmost seriousness, we see that we have strayed from its logic when we think of the chief problem as a correspondence between our immanent representations of other experiential perspectives and the 'true reality' of such perspectives. It would be the same as wondering if our representation of the Moon corresponded to some other being behind it. If the phases of the Moon are the manifestation of spiritual activity, then our representation of the Moon IS and must be the direct perception of that activity (albeit in incomplete form).


Thank you, Ashvin, for your latest contribution.

It is true that the transcendental solipsist acknowledges the problematic status of a transcendental reality (whether thing-in-it-self or other minds), because the transcendental solipsist acknowledges that it would be dogmatic to either outright affirm or deny the existence of a transcendental reality: the transcendental solipsist is *not* a metaphysical solipsist (the metaphysical solipsist insists that “I, as a mind entertaining itself with and as its own representations [viz., with and as its own constitutions/expressions], am the sole reality, there being no transcendental reality of any kind beyond my own activity”); another name for transcendental solipsism is “critical” solipsism, therefore. This does create unnecessary problems for understanding both freedom and other subjects, sure, but only *if* the transcendental solipsist adopts a transcendental realist criterion of truth—which he need not, because he can dispense with the transcendental realist criterion altogether and adopt the empirical realist criterion instead. This means that the transcendental solipsist acknowledges the problematic status of things-in-themselves and other minds (viz., he does not attribute to these either an assertoric or apodeictic status).

You also reference how, if transcendental solipsism is true, then all possible constitutions/expressions must be at least immanent in me, which the transcendental solipsist acknowledges—for example, if you refer to my account of transcendental solipsism, I point out that, even though I may be convinced that I am a man, I may suddenly awaken to discover that I am actually a butterfly who was only dreaming of being a man (further, a butterfly that lives in a world where mankind never even came into existence)—this does not mean, however, that other subjects are implicit in my own subjectivity, it only means that I (as subject) can constitute/express myself differently while still being the same fundamental constituting/expressing mind.

Furthermore, your reference to the seeming independence of the groaning body does not show *genuine* independence anymore than a groaning body I may encounter in a dream shows genuine independence; however *seeming* the independence of the groaning body, its *genuine* independence does *not* follow from that seeming.

Concerning your reference to present spiritual activity containing “past” spiritual activity—the transcendental solipsist can agree with you here because the transcendental solipsist can hold that time (like space) has empirical reality though not necessarily transcendental reality.
Ashvin, what you claim is a “logical conclusion” of transcendental solipsism—namely, that other subjects are implicit in my own activity—is ironically not only what the transcendental solipsist expressly denies but what the transcendental solipsist points out to be a contradiction in terms: the transcendental solipsist explicitly argues that no one subject can extend beyond itself by definition (because it implies a contradiction in terms to suggest my activity can constitute/express itself as not my activity).

As I have said, the “chief issue” *in principle* cannot possibly be resolved by appealing to any aspect of my own activity, because what is in question here is whether I can know that there is anything that is specifically *not* my own activity.

Furthermore, the transcendental solipsist can agree with your observation, Ashvin, that “If I can imagine other unique perspectives ... i.e., other forms of spiritual activity which feel relatively independent of my own at any given time, then such activity must be implicit in my own”—but he will qualify this by specifying that “If I can imagine other unique perspectives ... i.e., other forms of spiritual activity which feel relatively independent of my own at any given time, then such activity must be implicit in my own [as my own activity, for even imagining and feeling x to be relatively independent is already my own activity, just like all my imagining and all my feeling is constitutive/expressive of my own activity]”.

Transcendental solipsism must be apodeictic: the very concept of mind transcending its sphere of immanent representations is self-contradictory, and even any conception or judgment of such transcendence would itself be an immanent representation in mind; in fact, any perception, idea, judgment, belief, conviction [e.g., the conviction that a body is independent because of apparent groans], feeling, sensation, and literally everything that constitutes one’s mental life is an immanent representation, such that transcendental (or critical) solipsism is inescapably apodeictic.
*All* possible attempts to escape transcendental solipsism fail: they must use mental content (thoughts, arguments, beliefs, convictions, appearances, feelings, etc.) to attempt the escape; but all mental content is representational/immanent; therefore any escape attempt remains within the system it tries to transcend.


Yes, it seems this TS remainder (problematic status) is the source of the issues, and actually renders TS internally inconsistent. The consistent position would be to not even distinguish between transcendent and empirical reality, but to recognize the former can only be an empty concept under TS and 'truth' can only be the harmonious relationship of immanent representations. Otherwise, we are no different than a person who claims to be upholding TS but, when investigating the issues of freedom, immortality, other minds, etc., invokes the possibility that an Infinite Mind guarantees all of these realities. We could easily spot this inconsistent reasoning if it was working in the opposite direction, i.e. toward the conclusion that other minds exist and can be known, but it seems more difficult to point out when it is working toward the conclusion that we can never know the reality of other minds.

TS necessitates that there is only One Mind, and that any meaning we can imagine through our immanent representations must be implicit in those representations. It should reveal that there are no 'subjects' as entities conducting spiritual activity, possibly in relation to other subjects, but rather lead toward the idea that the feeling of subjectivity IS overlapping streams of spiritual activity existing in an 'interference pattern'. Those streams which 'constructively interfere' lead to a coherent stream of experience while those that 'destructively interfere' are experienced as belonging to the 'unknown', the not-yet-discovered aspects of spiritual activity. All streams are overlapping and superimposed within the *present* state.

We can imagine there is only One World Flow potentially decomposable in infinite ways. However, only those decompositions can be experienced as 'subjects' which unfold in such a way that the transformations from moment to moment of the World Flow are grasped from the decomposed perspective as imploding into an appropriate memory representation which alone allows for the sense of *continuity of existence*, and thus 'subjectivity'. So the 'subjects' are not some distinct entities that are attached as observers to certain angles of the One World Flow, but they are simply specific decomposed experiences of the World flow. There are no predefined number of decompositions. Those that are not experienceable as integrating memory flow simply provide no basis for the continuity of existence and therefore the consciousness of subjectivity.

It should go without saying none of this is a metaphysical theory of subjects, but is simply a way for us to get an intuitive feel for our living inner experience. Such an idea provides a basis to comprehend how the One Mind, which is identical to our immanent subjectivity, exists as a constellation of 'relative perspectives' which are presupposed (implicit) in everything we perceive, think, feel, and do. There is no need to speculate about scenarios in which we awaken as a butterfly dreaming of being a man, and so forth. We can stick with our daily human experience, as it is given to us, and see whether such an idea harmonizes the experiential facts or not. I submit that the idea will harmonize those facts and it remains entirely consistent with the logic of TS.


Thank you, Ashvin, for sharing your critique of transcendental solipsism. However, if I may say so, the maintenance of the problematic status of a transcendental reality does not render transcendental solipsism inconsistent but is actually *necessary* in the context of transcendental solipsism: insofar as the transcendental solipsist *affirms* a transcendental reality (that is, granting to it an assertoric status [as opposed to a problematic status, that is]), then he would be violating the critical strictures upon knowledge that are essential to transcendental solipsism, and he’d thereby be lapsing into a dogmatic transcendental realism; insofar as, in turn, he *denies* a transcendental reality, then he’d be by definition lapsing into dogmatic solipsism. In other words, the transcendental solipsist cannot either affirm or deny a transcendental reality without thereby eo ipso ceasing to be a transcendental solipsist (hence, why the maintenance of the problematic status of the transcendent actually is *necessary* in the context of transcendental/critical solipsism).

Ironically, Ashvin, what you suggest the “consistent [transcendental solipsist] position would be”—viz., recognizing that the concept of the transcendent “can only be an empty concept under transcendental solipsism and ‘truth’ can only be the harmonious relationship of immanent representations”—is precisely the position of the transcendental solipsist proper, who affirms the empirical realist criterion of truth and repudiates the transcendental realist criterion. To acknowledge the problematic status—that is, *not* the assertoric status and *not* the apodeictic status—of the transcendent is in effect to say that the transcendent functions as an “empty concept” such that eo ipso truth “can [and must] only be [sought in] the harmonious relationship of immanent representations”.

“That is to say”, writes Kant (concerning the significance of the term ‘problematic’ in this context), “we have an understanding which *problematically* extends further, but we have no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside the field of sensibility can be given, and through which the understanding can be employed assertorically beyond that field. The concept of a noumenon [the concept, that is, of a transcendent] is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of *negative* employment” (B 311).

If you’ll allow me, just to give further context, I’d like to share the following passage from Beiser’s *German Idealism* book:

“Kant [in the Opus postumum] again attempts to explain the source of the objectivity of our experience. He is again saying—as he already had in 1781—that to explain the objectivity of our experience the thing-in-itself is best interpreted as the transcendental object. It is for this reason—and this alone—that Kant insists in these [Opus postumum] passages that the thing-in-itself is an ens rationis. He is not denying or doubting the existence of things-in-themselves, but only *arguing against transcendental realism* that they can have *no useful role* as an explanation of the possibility of experience.

“It is in the same context that we should read other passages of the seventh fascicle [in the Opus postumum] where Kant seems to make the thing-in-itself a mere idea. He writes, for example, that ‘the thing-in-itself is not an object existing for itself but only an idea’, where this idea is that of a completely determined experience, one in which every property of a perception is made determinate according to some concept of the understanding. When Kant describes the thing-in-itself as a Gedankending this means, at least in some contexts, that it is not a mere fiction or illusion but an ideal for the complete knowledge of appearances. Again, Kant is not necessarily doubting or denying the reality of things-in-themselves understood as transcendent entities—their status remains simply problematic—but only explaining how the concept should be used in an *immanent* sense” (Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 212).

The inconsistency you attribute to transcendental solipsism, Ashvin, seems to not only arise from a misunderstanding of transcendental solipsism proper but also from failing to acknowledge the distinction between thinking and knowing an object according to the categories.
Additionally, it should be noted that transcendental solipsism specifically does *not* necessitate “that there is only One Mind”—essential to transcendental solipsism (that is, to *critical* solipsism) is the maintenance of the problematic status of a plurality of minds (remember, transcendental solipsism is not to be confused with dogmatic metaphysical solipsism). Though the transcendental solipsist says that any one given mind is inescapably limited only to itself, he does not say that only one mind *must* have existence (the transcendental reality of a plurality of minds is perfectly consistent with the principles of transcendental solipsism).

The transcendental solipsist, furthermore, need not disagree with your suggestion that the understanding of other perspectives is possible precisely because they are aspects of the One Mind’s (oneself’s) self-articulation—as this would be consistent with how the transcendental solipsist acknowledges the concept of other minds “should be used in an *immanent* sense”.


Thanks for these elaborations, Felipe.

Can you elaborate on this passage:

"the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of *negative* employment"

Like Kant, I am trying to focus attention, not only on the content of our concepts/thoughts, but on how those concepts are functioning. What specifically are the 'pretensions of sensibility' that we are trying to curb through this problematic concept? I am not sure, but this could be at tension with what I have been saying, which is that, we don't need to curb the senses, but expand our cognition to more consciously utilize the *inner senses*, by which we perceive transpersonal inner states, just as we utilize outer senses to perceive transpersonal objective states. Again, with 'transpersonal' I am not affirming any metaphysical plurality of subjects, but simply recognizing the fact that my immanent representations allow me to communicate and empathize with others.

[Güney27]

Well, hopefully the discussion lingers within him for a bit. In any case it was a good exchange and helpful for me as well.

Thank you, Ashvin, for your meaningful contributions here. Your observations above have positively inspired my thoughts and have given me a lot to consider and reflect on. I am thankful for your contributions.

Hey Ashvin.

I don’t see any meaning in Felipe’s type of thinking.
This type of thinking is extracted from any kind of meaningful purposive being-in-the-World (heideggers term). Of course you can’t prove the existence of other minds, but the question only arises when we take out a “mind” from its „meaningful context“ (worldhood of the world) and contemplate it in isolation.
„What if other minds aren’t real?“. These sort of questions only sitting on a philosophers chair, and forgetting about the real context of meaning which is present and makes possible our living experience and even the question. In our everyday life we know the existence of other minds (I don’t mean a Cartesian subject) trough their meaning, their significance. The question becomes „how can I have this knowledge prior to reflection?“ what is the structure that makes this possible? Of course we can disregard our everyday experience of the world as a mere illusion. But then we only can speculate about the world. The questions become abstract and we contemplate isolated from the real world (the world prior to philosophical reflection, which is the real world we live in, which make it possible to even ask these type of questions). The question should become „what constitutes the possibility of my everyday life prior to philosophical reflection, which is fully intelligible and meaningful (structured), what is it that makes this possible?“ Of course this question should be asked and answered from an individual phenomenological perspective. Then we can try to search for the phenomenological structures that make our state of consciousness possible. Thinking really changes here, because we try to uncover the concealed structures that are part of our being, and try to focus them in clear reflective concepts. Our thinking probes the deeper currents so to say. In short, we begin to move towards intuitive thinking.

It is true that we can never know about the world „outside of consciousness“, but in our everyday life we don’t think about the nature of the visible world, but we live in it and it constraints our activity. It is the context in which we live, which we try to navigate trough in a purposeful manner. Only when we think about the perceived world, and reflect about it’s essence, we say that it exist outside of us. But pre-philosophical living is embedded and possible trough an pre-propositional understanding and questioning on the philosophers chair is only possible trough that context.

In short, I don’t see much meaning in that type of discussion and questions, because in the abstract ways they arise, they forget the real questions about the phenomenological context which makes them possible. Of course we can abstract other humans outside the everyday meaningful context, and question their existence as conscious beings in an isolated hypothetical manner, and then come to the conclusion that we can’t know if they exist. Then we leave our chair and live in the real world full of humans with intentional activity which constrains our own without ever becoming aware of the depth structure which make this living possible.

Guney,

Thanks for these reflections. I would say the meaning in these sorts of discussions comes precisely from us becoming more intimate with how our thinking habitually finds ways of isolating itself from its meaningful context. In fact, this sort of solipsism is the only logically sound continuation of critical philosophy (which JW also adopts), so exploring its thought-movements brings us into more intimate contact with modern philosophy in general. The 'transcendental solipsist' simply work out those critical thought-movements more thoroughly than those who stop short of its logical implications at their varying levels of comfort, for example BK or JW. They both adopt the thinking of critical philosophy up to a point, but then resort to dogmatic metaphysics to keep the possibility of 'other minds' open and 'explain' our experience of such minds. Yet this is no less nihilistic than taking it further to solipsism, since resorting to metaphysical explanations of 'other minds' does nothing to break down the 'dissociative' (antipathy-fueled) boundaries and lead our cognition into the wider etheric-astral spectrum where we experience the overlap between the World Thoughts and our own thoughts.

Actually I have continued discussing this issue of solipsism with Felipe, here are some of the recent comments. It is certainly a mental exercise to find ways of pointing to the core flaws in reasoning and move the discussion forward! I would say it's even a highly artistic skill that we can develop (which is not to say I am proficient at this skill yet). The main flaw with Felipe's reasoning, as I currently see it, is actually that he is avoiding the true implications of solipsism and keeping a 'remainder' (what he calls the 'problematic concept' of things-themselves such as 'other subjects'), which is functionally similar to BK, JW, et al., i.e. dogmatic metaphysics (except in the opposite direction - instead of using transcendent realities to establish the foundation of other minds he is using them to avoid establishing such a foundation).

***

Thanks Felipe, I am glad we have again found common ground on these topics. Perhaps we can make some progress on the chief issue as well.

What I fundamentally suggest is that, if the reality of *ourselves* as subjects is not without an answer, then neither can the reality of other subjects qua subjects remain without an answer. We can take a concrete example here to see if and where there is a misalignment in our understanding.

Let's imagine we come across a still body on the street covered in blood. Now we have immanent representations of its colors, shapes, sizes, etc., which convey the meaning "possibly dead body". But let's imagine the body starts moving and then we hear whimpers and groans. At the same time, through these representations, we dimly empathize with the painful experience. Now the meaning of our immanent representations transforms to, "alive and ensouled body that is experiencing great pain".

At this point, you would say our knowledge of "ensouled body experiencing pain" is merely an inference from the representations and this inference, while an empirical reality (since it is your representation), may or may not correspond with a subject qua subject, i.e. a subject who experiences pain just like *you* are experiencing some pain through the empathic representations? Or rather our empathic representation is a direct perception of the other perspective's experience of pain (even though that experience is also experienced from our unique perspective)?


The fundamental insight of transcendental solipsism—and even of my Ouroboric Idealism system more broadly—and which is essentially grounded in the Fichtean principle that the self is only for itself and through itself, is that the self (as self-determining activity/agency) can in principle extend only as far as itself (only as far as its own activity), and even the thought of a “beyond” its activity amounts to an expression of its own immanent activity (a thought, an idea).

Concerning the moving bloodied body I may come across—and, in fact, concerning anything whatsoever I come across—it is all, one and all, a component within the general framework of my experience. My essential contention is that subjects (not as substances behind and having experience, but as the spiritual activity *constitutive* of the framework of experience) *cannot* in principle have access to anything beyond their own activity. This means that, whether there is—by some sort of pre-established harmony—another subject (qua spiritual activity) beyond myself corresponding to the bloodied body I perceive or whether there is no such correspondence, I cannot in principle come to know it, because what I know is always and inevitably my own activity (whether that activity is perceiving bloodied bodies, feelings of empathy, or thinking about independently existing subjects or objects beyond my own activity/experience).

1. All knowledge is necessarily an expression of my own activity.

2.The very thought of something beyond my activity is itself my activity.

3. Therefore, I can never transcend my own sphere of activity to verify any correspondence (such that objectivity *must* be sought in the context of the framework of my experience because I cannot in principle possibly establish correspondence between neither the generality nor peculiarities of my experience and some alleged transcendental reality, whether involving things-in-themselves or other subjects with their own corresponding experience framework).

The key thing to remember here is the *essence* of subjectivity: subjectivity is the activity of self-knowledge by way of instantiating as a framework of experience. This means that, in principle, any actual subject (according to the *essence* of subjectivity aforementioned) *by definition* can in principle access nothing more than itself (can go no further, that is, than its own activity [which activity manifests necessarily as an experience framework through and as the self]).

In other words, I *cannot* in principle appeal to any aspect whatsoever of my own activity (whether that involves perceiving, empathizing, or reasoning) to address the “chief problem” for the same reason that I cannot appeal to, for example, painting x to verify what the contents of painting y are or are not.

Summa summarum, if I am to have knowledge of the reality of other minds, I must have knowledge of other minds a priori or a posteriori. However, I cannot have knowledge of the reality of other minds a priori because it is not logically necessary that other minds exist beyond myself—because, that is, metaphysical solipsism is a logical possibility (it is logically possible that the sole reality is myself as a mind entertaining itself with its own activity). I cannot have knowledge of other minds a posteriori, in turn, because my experience is simply my own activity (as notes Kant, “All bodies, together with the space in which they are, must be considered nothing but mere representations in us, and exist nowhere but in our thoughts”). The a posteriori route cannot suffice, that is, because—as Hume rightly observed—“That our senses offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct, or independent, and external, is evident; because they convey to us nothing but a single perception, and never give us the least intimation of any thing beyond. A single perception can never produce the idea of a double existence, but by some inference either of the reason or imagination. When the mind looks farther than what immediately appears to it, its conclusions can never be put to the account of the senses; and it certainly looks farther, when from a single perception it infers a double existence, and supposes the relations of resemblance and causation betwixt them”.


I think we simply need to take transcendental solipsism (TS) more seriously, to its logical conclusion, to resolve the 'chief problem'. It seems that even those who hold to TS still carve out a 'remainder', like a wild card, that holds open the possibility for letting the 'problematic concept' of things-themselves influence their thinking through the fundamental issues. We saw that before with the issue of whether we can establish freedom and I think a similar thing happens with the problem of 'other subjects'.

If we take TS to its logical conclusion, then the meaning of anything that we can imagine, anything we can immanently represent, must necessarily be *implicit* in our spiritual activity (which I agree is the essence of subjectivity) which manifests as an experience framework. If we can imagine other unique perspectives on that framework of experience, i.e. other forms of spiritual activity which feel relatively independent of our own at any given time, then such activity must be implicit in our own.

And such a conclusion has the benefit of thoroughly making sense of our living experience. Although both the meaning of 'triangle form' and 'living bloodied body whimpering and groaning' are immanent representations, there is no denying that the former is completely dependent on our spiritual activity for its existence while the latter does not *feel* to be. We can decide not to picture a triangle form, but no matter how much we wish for the body to stop groaning in pain, it probably won't respond. So it is evident that there are aspects of our immanent representations which move relatively independently of our momentary intents.

Or we could consider how, implicit in your spiritual activity when articulating TS to others, is the spiritual activity of Kant and Fichte. According to TS, if taken to its logical conclusion, ALL 'past' spiritual activity of humanity (and any other conceivable being) is still immanently present in our current spiritual activity. We wouldn't have the ideas, the language, the vocabulary, the larynx, the other organs and body parts, etc. that we do without such implicit spiritual activity being immanently present. When we survey our memory life, indeed we find our entire sense of 'me' is shaped by our interactions with parents, teachers, peers, leading thinkers, etc. over the years.

So what is more reasonable - to stick with the logical necessities of TS and recognize our living experience of relatively independent spiritual activity is always implicit in what we conceive of as 'our' present spiritual activity, our subjectivity? Or to carve out a remainder from TS of 'subjects qua subjects' and wonder whether we can ever 'prove' they exist? If we take TS with utmost seriousness, we see that we have strayed from its logic when we think of the chief problem as a correspondence between our immanent representations of other experiential perspectives and the 'true reality' of such perspectives. It would be the same as wondering if our representation of the Moon corresponded to some other being behind it. If the phases of the Moon are the manifestation of spiritual activity, then our representation of the Moon IS and must be the direct perception of that activity (albeit in incomplete form).


Thank you, Ashvin, for your latest contribution.

It is true that the transcendental solipsist acknowledges the problematic status of a transcendental reality (whether thing-in-it-self or other minds), because the transcendental solipsist acknowledges that it would be dogmatic to either outright affirm or deny the existence of a transcendental reality: the transcendental solipsist is *not* a metaphysical solipsist (the metaphysical solipsist insists that “I, as a mind entertaining itself with and as its own representations [viz., with and as its own constitutions/expressions], am the sole reality, there being no transcendental reality of any kind beyond my own activity”); another name for transcendental solipsism is “critical” solipsism, therefore. This does create unnecessary problems for understanding both freedom and other subjects, sure, but only *if* the transcendental solipsist adopts a transcendental realist criterion of truth—which he need not, because he can dispense with the transcendental realist criterion altogether and adopt the empirical realist criterion instead. This means that the transcendental solipsist acknowledges the problematic status of things-in-themselves and other minds (viz., he does not attribute to these either an assertoric or apodeictic status).

You also reference how, if transcendental solipsism is true, then all possible constitutions/expressions must be at least immanent in me, which the transcendental solipsist acknowledges—for example, if you refer to my account of transcendental solipsism, I point out that, even though I may be convinced that I am a man, I may suddenly awaken to discover that I am actually a butterfly who was only dreaming of being a man (further, a butterfly that lives in a world where mankind never even came into existence)—this does not mean, however, that other subjects are implicit in my own subjectivity, it only means that I (as subject) can constitute/express myself differently while still being the same fundamental constituting/expressing mind.

Furthermore, your reference to the seeming independence of the groaning body does not show *genuine* independence anymore than a groaning body I may encounter in a dream shows genuine independence; however *seeming* the independence of the groaning body, its *genuine* independence does *not* follow from that seeming.

Concerning your reference to present spiritual activity containing “past” spiritual activity—the transcendental solipsist can agree with you here because the transcendental solipsist can hold that time (like space) has empirical reality though not necessarily transcendental reality.
Ashvin, what you claim is a “logical conclusion” of transcendental solipsism—namely, that other subjects are implicit in my own activity—is ironically not only what the transcendental solipsist expressly denies but what the transcendental solipsist points out to be a contradiction in terms: the transcendental solipsist explicitly argues that no one subject can extend beyond itself by definition (because it implies a contradiction in terms to suggest my activity can constitute/express itself as not my activity).

As I have said, the “chief issue” *in principle* cannot possibly be resolved by appealing to any aspect of my own activity, because what is in question here is whether I can know that there is anything that is specifically *not* my own activity.

Furthermore, the transcendental solipsist can agree with your observation, Ashvin, that “If I can imagine other unique perspectives ... i.e., other forms of spiritual activity which feel relatively independent of my own at any given time, then such activity must be implicit in my own”—but he will qualify this by specifying that “If I can imagine other unique perspectives ... i.e., other forms of spiritual activity which feel relatively independent of my own at any given time, then such activity must be implicit in my own [as my own activity, for even imagining and feeling x to be relatively independent is already my own activity, just like all my imagining and all my feeling is constitutive/expressive of my own activity]”.

Transcendental solipsism must be apodeictic: the very concept of mind transcending its sphere of immanent representations is self-contradictory, and even any conception or judgment of such transcendence would itself be an immanent representation in mind; in fact, any perception, idea, judgment, belief, conviction [e.g., the conviction that a body is independent because of apparent groans], feeling, sensation, and literally everything that constitutes one’s mental life is an immanent representation, such that transcendental (or critical) solipsism is inescapably apodeictic.
*All* possible attempts to escape transcendental solipsism fail: they must use mental content (thoughts, arguments, beliefs, convictions, appearances, feelings, etc.) to attempt the escape; but all mental content is representational/immanent; therefore any escape attempt remains within the system it tries to transcend.


Yes, it seems this TS remainder (problematic status) is the source of the issues, and actually renders TS internally inconsistent. The consistent position would be to not even distinguish between transcendent and empirical reality, but to recognize the former can only be an empty concept under TS and 'truth' can only be the harmonious relationship of immanent representations. Otherwise, we are no different than a person who claims to be upholding TS but, when investigating the issues of freedom, immortality, other minds, etc., invokes the possibility that an Infinite Mind guarantees all of these realities. We could easily spot this inconsistent reasoning if it was working in the opposite direction, i.e. toward the conclusion that other minds exist and can be known, but it seems more difficult to point out when it is working toward the conclusion that we can never know the reality of other minds.

TS necessitates that there is only One Mind, and that any meaning we can imagine through our immanent representations must be implicit in those representations. It should reveal that there are no 'subjects' as entities conducting spiritual activity, possibly in relation to other subjects, but rather lead toward the idea that the feeling of subjectivity IS overlapping streams of spiritual activity existing in an 'interference pattern'. Those streams which 'constructively interfere' lead to a coherent stream of experience while those that 'destructively interfere' are experienced as belonging to the 'unknown', the not-yet-discovered aspects of spiritual activity. All streams are overlapping and superimposed within the *present* state.

We can imagine there is only One World Flow potentially decomposable in infinite ways. However, only those decompositions can be experienced as 'subjects' which unfold in such a way that the transformations from moment to moment of the World Flow are grasped from the decomposed perspective as imploding into an appropriate memory representation which alone allows for the sense of *continuity of existence*, and thus 'subjectivity'. So the 'subjects' are not some distinct entities that are attached as observers to certain angles of the One World Flow, but they are simply specific decomposed experiences of the World flow. There are no predefined number of decompositions. Those that are not experienceable as integrating memory flow simply provide no basis for the continuity of existence and therefore the consciousness of subjectivity.

It should go without saying none of this is a metaphysical theory of subjects, but is simply a way for us to get an intuitive feel for our living inner experience. Such an idea provides a basis to comprehend how the One Mind, which is identical to our immanent subjectivity, exists as a constellation of 'relative perspectives' which are presupposed (implicit) in everything we perceive, think, feel, and do. There is no need to speculate about scenarios in which we awaken as a butterfly dreaming of being a man, and so forth. We can stick with our daily human experience, as it is given to us, and see whether such an idea harmonizes the experiential facts or not. I submit that the idea will harmonize those facts and it remains entirely consistent with the logic of TS.


Thank you, Ashvin, for sharing your critique of transcendental solipsism. However, if I may say so, the maintenance of the problematic status of a transcendental reality does not render transcendental solipsism inconsistent but is actually *necessary* in the context of transcendental solipsism: insofar as the transcendental solipsist *affirms* a transcendental reality (that is, granting to it an assertoric status [as opposed to a problematic status, that is]), then he would be violating the critical strictures upon knowledge that are essential to transcendental solipsism, and he’d thereby be lapsing into a dogmatic transcendental realism; insofar as, in turn, he *denies* a transcendental reality, then he’d be by definition lapsing into dogmatic solipsism. In other words, the transcendental solipsist cannot either affirm or deny a transcendental reality without thereby eo ipso ceasing to be a transcendental solipsist (hence, why the maintenance of the problematic status of the transcendent actually is *necessary* in the context of transcendental/critical solipsism).

Ironically, Ashvin, what you suggest the “consistent [transcendental solipsist] position would be”—viz., recognizing that the concept of the transcendent “can only be an empty concept under transcendental solipsism and ‘truth’ can only be the harmonious relationship of immanent representations”—is precisely the position of the transcendental solipsist proper, who affirms the empirical realist criterion of truth and repudiates the transcendental realist criterion. To acknowledge the problematic status—that is, *not* the assertoric status and *not* the apodeictic status—of the transcendent is in effect to say that the transcendent functions as an “empty concept” such that eo ipso truth “can [and must] only be [sought in] the harmonious relationship of immanent representations”.

“That is to say”, writes Kant (concerning the significance of the term ‘problematic’ in this context), “we have an understanding which *problematically* extends further, but we have no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside the field of sensibility can be given, and through which the understanding can be employed assertorically beyond that field. The concept of a noumenon [the concept, that is, of a transcendent] is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of *negative* employment” (B 311).

If you’ll allow me, just to give further context, I’d like to share the following passage from Beiser’s *German Idealism* book:

“Kant [in the Opus postumum] again attempts to explain the source of the objectivity of our experience. He is again saying—as he already had in 1781—that to explain the objectivity of our experience the thing-in-itself is best interpreted as the transcendental object. It is for this reason—and this alone—that Kant insists in these [Opus postumum] passages that the thing-in-itself is an ens rationis. He is not denying or doubting the existence of things-in-themselves, but only *arguing against transcendental realism* that they can have *no useful role* as an explanation of the possibility of experience.

“It is in the same context that we should read other passages of the seventh fascicle [in the Opus postumum] where Kant seems to make the thing-in-itself a mere idea. He writes, for example, that ‘the thing-in-itself is not an object existing for itself but only an idea’, where this idea is that of a completely determined experience, one in which every property of a perception is made determinate according to some concept of the understanding. When Kant describes the thing-in-itself as a Gedankending this means, at least in some contexts, that it is not a mere fiction or illusion but an ideal for the complete knowledge of appearances. Again, Kant is not necessarily doubting or denying the reality of things-in-themselves understood as transcendent entities—their status remains simply problematic—but only explaining how the concept should be used in an *immanent* sense” (Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 212).

The inconsistency you attribute to transcendental solipsism, Ashvin, seems to not only arise from a misunderstanding of transcendental solipsism proper but also from failing to acknowledge the distinction between thinking and knowing an object according to the categories.
Additionally, it should be noted that transcendental solipsism specifically does *not* necessitate “that there is only One Mind”—essential to transcendental solipsism (that is, to *critical* solipsism) is the maintenance of the problematic status of a plurality of minds (remember, transcendental solipsism is not to be confused with dogmatic metaphysical solipsism). Though the transcendental solipsist says that any one given mind is inescapably limited only to itself, he does not say that only one mind *must* have existence (the transcendental reality of a plurality of minds is perfectly consistent with the principles of transcendental solipsism).

The transcendental solipsist, furthermore, need not disagree with your suggestion that the understanding of other perspectives is possible precisely because they are aspects of the One Mind’s (oneself’s) self-articulation—as this would be consistent with how the transcendental solipsist acknowledges the concept of other minds “should be used in an *immanent* sense”.


Thanks for these elaborations, Felipe.

Can you elaborate on this passage:

"the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of *negative* employment"

Like Kant, I am trying to focus attention, not only on the content of our concepts/thoughts, but on how those concepts are functioning. What specifically are the 'pretensions of sensibility' that we are trying to curb through this problematic concept? I am not sure, but this could be at tension with what I have been saying, which is that, we don't need to curb the senses, but expand our cognition to more consciously utilize the *inner senses*, by which we perceive transpersonal inner states, just as we utilize outer senses to perceive transpersonal objective states. Again, with 'transpersonal' I am not affirming any metaphysical plurality of subjects, but simply recognizing the fact that my immanent representations allow me to communicate and empathize with others.

JW‘s thoughts are sometimes quite an enigma for me. He says that he is very much a heideggerian, but I somehow get other meaning out of him. Heidegger tries to eludicate the hidden context we live in, he developed something like meditative intuitive thinking. Of course he hasn’t the answers for all the questions (most questions aren’t really relevant), but his thinking is really different and developed. For example Jw thinks in reductionistic terms sometimes, on other times he seems like an spiritual thinker, who states that truth can only be expressed trough poetic speech (non-reductive). That makes it sometimes hard to follow him. Do you think that it is a philosophers karma to become a philosopher?

Felipe seems like an interesting and very intellectual guy, but the intellect operates in forming mental representations of the world out there, instead of probing the worlds meaning. It’s interesting how evolution seems to metamorphose trough thinkers like Heidegger, who influenced the academic philosophy and even science. For example The ecological approach of perception, which influenced JP, is inspired from merleau Ponty‘s work. Philosophy is really influencing science, which we can clearly see in the new approaches in biology, which tries to leave the reductionistic and mechanistic approaches, into a more holistic and embodied picture.
The more I engaged within philosophy, the more I see so much pointless discussion and amusing. The intellectual domain of building systems of mental pictures seems to be pointless at this stage. Cleric did expressed it very clearly in his Symphony of minds essay. I don’t know but after engaging with cleric or Steiner, I don’t have much fun reading philosophy (except for the new philosophy influenced by Heidegger, which seems to reflect a different kind of thinking). When we leave all philosophical beliefs behind, and focus on our real everyday life, the only big question that appears seems to be concerning meaning.

You are right Ashvin, it is always good to try to understand other thinkers in depth. Did you came across Scott Elliot hicks book „the resurrection of thinking“?

[AshvinP]

JW‘s thoughts are sometimes quite an enigma for me. He says that he is very much a heideggerian, but I somehow get other meaning out of him. Heidegger tries to eludicate the hidden context we live in, he developed something like meditative intuitive thinking. Of course he hasn’t the answers for all the questions (most questions aren’t really relevant), but his thinking is really different and developed. For example Jw thinks in reductionistic terms sometimes, on other times he seems like an spiritual thinker, who states that truth can only be expressed trough poetic speech (non-reductive). That makes it sometimes hard to follow him. Do you think that it is a philosophers karma to become a philosopher?

Felipe seems like an interesting and very intellectual guy, but the intellect operates in forming mental representations of the world out there, instead of probing the worlds meaning. It’s interesting how evolution seems to metamorphose trough thinkers like Heidegger, who influenced the academic philosophy and even science. For example The ecological approach of perception, which influenced JP, is inspired from merleau Ponty‘s work. Philosophy is really influencing science, which we can clearly see in the new approaches in biology, which tries to leave the reductionistic and mechanistic approaches, into a more holistic and embodied picture.
The more I engaged within philosophy, the more I see so much pointless discussion and amusing. The intellectual domain of building systems of mental pictures seems to be pointless at this stage. Cleric did expressed it very clearly in his Symphony of minds essay. I don’t know but after engaging with cleric or Steiner, I don’t have much fun reading philosophy (except for the new philosophy influenced by Heidegger, which seems to reflect a different kind of thinking). When we leave all philosophical beliefs behind, and focus on our real everyday life, the only big question that appears seems to be concerning meaning.

You are right Ashvin, it is always good to try to understand other thinkers in depth. Did you came across Scott Elliot hicks book „the resurrection of thinking“?

Right, these kind of philosophical thoughts will stop being so enigmatic when we focus more on the underlying thought-movements, the common habits, expectations, assumptions, and so on that shape and steer the thoughts. Some people make it more difficult than others to sense these underlying movements because they draw concepts from many different places and combine them in unique ways. I think JW does some of that. Felipe, on the other hand, makes it relatively easy because he remains firmly with the conceptual framework of critical philosophy. In general, the movements are all given their primary direction from insensitivity to their own existence. From there, they rely on common modern assumptions and preferences to fashion their mental pictures in one constellation or another that purports to 'explain' reality, cognition, the limits of cognition, etc.

Certainly it is in the karma of many souls to rigorously develop the intellectual faculty and the forces of logical thinking, but whether it was specifically to become a philosopher, I am sure that depends on many more factors including on whether a particular philosophical impulse is helpful at a certain time for furthering spiritual evolution. As you say, these impulses are not limited to academic discussions but truly influence the course of science and technology, economic and political trends, etc.

I don't personally seek out abstract philosophical systems to study, but I do appreciate engaging in discussion with particular personalities who channel those systems into their thinking, especially if they can present those systems in a somewhat unique and accessible way. I think JW and Felipe are good examples of that. We should remember, the intellectual process of weaving mental pictures together will be quite necessary for some time to come, it's only that we need to become more conscious of what we are doing in that process, to gain a more intimate sense of why it helps anchor and refine our intuition of the meaningful kernels around which collective evolution unfolds. Philosophical, theological, and scientific mental pictures can all be very helpful in this pursuit of self-knowledge, in elucidating the inner rhythms of everyday life.

We will start to see how they all hang together and complement one another to provide a more complete picture of our living experience. Just like exploring a sensory object with vision, hearing, touch, etc. can give a more complete sense of its living 'texture' and function, exploring the ideal curvatures with these varied mental pictures provides unique vantage points on their existence and functions in the spiritual evolutionary process.

[AshvinP]

Did you came across Scott Elliot hicks book „the resurrection of thinking“?

I hadn't before but thanks for bringing my attention to it - I will surely check it out! I am always interested in getting a more concrete orientation to the 'post-structural' philosophical systems. Ben-Aharon also drew some interesting connections between Derrida, Deleuze, etc. and the impulse toward self-conscious thinking.

The first full-length text to wrestle with the conceptual relationship between the spiritual science of Rudolf Steiner and the French Post-structuralist thinking of Jacques Derrida, Alain Badiou, Gilles Deleuze and Guattari, and Emmanuel Levinas. Furthermore, the book is a living investigation of new ways of deactualizing and taking the first steps in spiritualizing thinking, perception, sensation, language, warmth, and willing. It is a direct demonstration of original spiritual research and creation, inscribed and readable by Intuitive Thinking and Moral Imagination in a vibrant, breathing experiment of the weaving together and opening up of living concepts. It is a sensible and supersensible cognitive-chemical experiment carried out and followed moment by moment one step beyond subjective, transcendental, and phenomenological research. The text operates in a neutral field, which does not try to interpret or critique, but rather opens up the direct perception of the concept plane and its new moral intensive fields, and the activities and events engendered there. This text brings Anthroposophy into direct contact with the most current elements of the evolution of world-thinking, using its life and light to illuminate the fresh notions in the most up-to-date philosophical thinking.

[AshvinP]

The passage from Kant—viz., where he suggests that the *function* of the noumenon concept “is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of *negative* employment”—is highly relevant to your concern with focusing “attention, not only on the content of our concepts/thoughts, but on how those concepts are functioning”. Interestingly, an answer to the question of the *functioning* (as opposed to the content) of the concept/idea of the thing-in-it-self is already expressed above in the Beiser passage I cited: “Kant is not necessarily doubting or denying the reality of things-in-themselves understood as transcendent entities—their status remains simply problematic—but only explaining how the concept should be used in an *immanent* sense’”; “He [Kant] is not denying or doubting the existence of things-in-themselves, but only *arguing against transcendental realism* that they can have *no useful role* as an explanation of the possibility of experience”.

What specifically are the ‘pretensions of sensibility’ that we are trying to curb through this problematic concept? An answer to this question is given by Kant himself: “Even if we could bring our intuition to the highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby come any nearer to the constitution of objects in themselves. We should still know only our mode of intuition, that is, our sensibility. We should, indeed, know it completely, but always only under the conditions of space and time — conditions which are originally inherent in the subject. What the objects may be in themselves would never become known to us even through the most enlightened knowledge of that which is alone given us, namely, their appearance” (KrV, A 43, B 60). And, elsewhere, “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (KrV, A 51, B 75).

Concerning your suggestion, Ashvin, that “we don’t need to curb the senses, but expand our cognition to more consciously utilize the *inner senses*, by which we perceive transpersonal inner states, just as we utilize outer senses to perceive transpersonal objective states”—it is important to note that, for Kant, *inner sense* is itself a form of sensible intuition, such that “to more consciously use inner sense” would not necessarily be in conflict with what Kant is saying when he speaks of curbing the pretensions of sensibility, because you are respecting the senses insofar as you *cultivate and engage more deeply with* inner sense (cf. Kant, KrV, A 43, B 60). For Kant, it is necessary to curb the senses in order to prevent our attempts to go beyond them, whereas you suggest more consciously *engaging with them* (which is perfectly in accord with Kant’s program).


So we all agree things-themselves can have no useful role as an explanation of the possibility of experience, but can they have any useful role whatsoever? If such things-themselves existed, they are by definition beyond any capacity to experience or know. They could not overlap with the domain of intuition/sensibility in any way, because in that case we would know their existence.

Yet in these questions concerning freedom, other experiential perspectives, etc., the possibility of things-themselves is constantly being referred to. How can we make such references but simultaneously say they have *no useful role* in explaining the possibilities of experience? This is what I have a hard time grappling with in your TS argument. The idea of other experiential perspectives is an immanent given - such perspectives may not exist, but we cannot doubt the *feeling* that they do. It is presupposed in everything we think, feel, and do, including engaging in this discussion. How can we investigate this question by appealing to the possibility of things-themselves [e.g. subjects qua subjects], which we have already agreed play *no useful role* in explaining possibilities of experience?