I'm A Materialist, Change My Mind

[Jim Cross]

dana.. thanks for your explanation. I'm not trying to be argumentative here but trying to understand the part about direct experience in what you quoted and how it seems some contradictory to some other arguments that have been made.

BK's use of Markov's blankets in explaining alters seems contradictory to the idea of "direct experience". A Markov blanket, as I understand it, is system contained by a boundary with an internal representation of the external world. Across the boundary inputs come from sensory perceptions and outputs are generated in actuators that can affect the external world. Our experience isn't directly of the external world but our internal representation of it. This is how I view consciousness or at least "alter" consciousness.


I can agree with this: "all we can know is the experience of the phenomenal representation of the noumenal thing". This would correspond to the internal representation, but that representation is already an abstraction from what exists in the external world. Perhaps, this experience is most direct experience we can have but it is far and away anything but direct. It might be the best we can do it seems mistaking the representation for the real world would be like mistaking the painting of the pipe or the real pipe.



https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Treachery_of_Images

The problem is there isn't any escaping the dilemma.

[Eugene I]

I can agree with this: "all we can know is the experience of the phenomenal representation of the noumenal thing". This would correspond to the internal representation, but that representation is already an abstraction from what exists in the external world. Perhaps, this experience is most direct experience we can have but it is far and away anything but direct. It might be the best we can do it seems mistaking the representation for the real world would be like mistaking the painting of the pipe or the real pipe.

In the BK' scheme both MAL ideations and the phenomenal representations are direct because both of them are phenomena of conscious experience. MAL directly experiences its ideations, the alters directly experience their phenomena that are caused by the MAL ideations through the the Markov blanket causal mechanism. There is no "external world" and nothing "exists" there independent or beyond of consciousness and its direct phenomenal experiences, so our phenomena are not abstractions of any "existing" tings. There are no "things" anywhere in consciousness, there are only phenomena of (direct) conscious experience. It's a very consistent explanatory model.

Now, to comment on materialism vs idealism explanatory gaps. Both of them have explanatory issues, but of a very different kind. The "hard problem" faced by materialism is a "brutal emergence" explanatory gap. There is currently not even a slightest clue among materialists how to even approach to explain the emergence of conscious experience from non-conscious matter even in principle. The "New Mysterianism" approach is the only resort left to materialism. In addition to that, there are problems with finding consistent interpretations of QM, but those are arguably less severe compared to the "hard problem".

In idealism the situation is the opposite: there are too many explanatory models for the monistic consciousness: BK's DID model, Hoffman's "network of conscious agents" model, a-la-Advaitic "dreaming Consciousness" model, Berkley's model, Shani's model, and so on. All of them are more-or-less rationally consistent, but the problem is that there are too many of them and we do not have sufficient empirical data to prove one vs the others. But that situation is not much different from a huge variety of different formulations of string theory in modern physics with no way to verify/falsify them and prove one vs the others. This now seems to be the the realty of the modern state of science where our ability to produce consistent models of reality exceeds our capability to verify them based on the available empirical data.

[Jim Cross]

Eugene,

The comparison to string theory might be more apt than you realize. Somebody wrote a book Not Even Wrong about it which argued string theory was unfalsifiable and unprovable.

ideations and the phenomenal representations are direct because both of them are phenomena of conscious experience

Yes they are direct experience but are they direct experience of external reality? I don't think so. They are direct experience of internal reality. We can tell that to be so because we routinely make misidentifications of things which are later corrected. The garden hose we may temporarily experience as a snake before we look at it more closely. So this direct experience isn't necessarily closer to "reality".

[Eugene I]

Yes they are direct experience but are they direct experience of external reality? I don't think so. They are direct experience of internal reality. We can tell that to be so because we routinely make misidentifications of things which are later corrected. The garden hose we may temporarily experience as a snake before we look at it more closely. So this direct experience isn't necessarily closer to "reality".

That statement would be correct under the materialistic paradigm, but not under idealistic one. In idealistic one there is no independently existing "external reality" whatsoever, and so our direct conscious experiences are all there is to the reality, there is no other reality other than consciousness and the phenomenal content of its direct experiences. But even in BK's idealism we still speak about the "world", but with a very different meaning. The "world" is a specific part and specific content of the direct conscious experiences of the MAL and alters that is originated in the "imagination" of the world in the MAL and is experienced as phenomenal sense perceptions by the alters. Essentially, it's a MAL's fantasy that we alters experience through Markov's blankets as sense perceptions. And that is exactly why they are so well correlated, because they originate from the same MAL's ideations.

We can still speak about misrepresentations in idealism. Using the same example, when we look at a hose, our sense perceptions are still correlated with the ideation of the hose image in the MAL's mind, but we may mistakenly identify it as a snake. This is an error in our image recognition process, which means that in addition to the proper sense perceptions, we also have an improper thought falsely identifying these perceptions with a wrong image. So, when we correct the recognition and correctly identify the perceptions with a "hose", it becomes closer to the "reality" of the MAL's fantasy. But even in the MAL's fantasy the "hose" is nothing more than its conscious direct experiences. So, in idealism these are direct experiences all across the space of consciousness, there is no other "external reality" to it.

[Starbuck]

Eugene,

The comparison to string theory might be more apt than you realize. Somebody wrote a book Not Even Wrong about it which argued string theory was unfalsifiable and unprovable.

ideations and the phenomenal representations are direct because both of them are phenomena of conscious experience

Yes they are direct experience but are they direct experience of external reality? I don't think so. They are direct experience of internal reality. We can tell that to be so because we routinely make misidentifications of things which are later corrected. The garden hose we may temporarily experience as a snake before we look at it more closely. So this direct experience isn't necessarily closer to "reality".

You are making the assumption that there is a ‘thing’ out there rather than a flow of experiences that our mind boundaries as a permanent or lasting object or entity. This is just the relative/ultimate confusion that runs down the centuries. We can say that on a relative level we saw one thing then on inspection realise it’s illusion and claim to be seeing the real appearance of that same thing. But ultimately, like a dream, every moment is a fresh manifestation of the dreaming mind. We never step into the same river twice. Continuity is an illusion of similarity. In BkS model, similarity is accounted for by the metaphor of vibration/resonance/waves/ripples etc which are ultimately all happening right now in one mind.

[Jim Cross]

. In idealistic one there is no independently existing "external reality" whatsoever, and so our direct conscious experiences are all there is to the reality, there is no other reality other than consciousness and the phenomenal content of its direct experiences.

So the garden hose really is a snake. That's absurd.

You are making the assumption that there is a ‘thing’ out there...But ultimately, like a dream, every moment is a fresh manifestation of the dreaming mind. We never step into the same river twice. Continuity is an illusion of similarity. In BkS model, similarity is accounted for by the metaphor of vibration/resonance/waves/ripples etc which are ultimately all happening right now in one mind.

Actually I think Bernardo and Hoffman both make that assumption too. That is what alters are all about. What's out there is the mind at large.

And there is a great deal of permanence in it which is why the rock in my garden is still essentially the same rock for days, weeks, and years. Even rivers have eddies that form with some degree of permanence. It is especially ironic that some idealists want to argue for some sort of "immortal soul" while the stuff of consciousness and world itself as you seem to envision it seems to be forming afresh moment to moment.

I think the world has forms which can arise and maintain a consistent structure for varying periods of time. An eddy in a river, the rock in my garden, and my mortal self are all good examples. If dreams are a model for how the world is, then the rock might one moment be granite and the next sandstone. But that doesn't match how my world seems to work.

[Starbuck]

Actually I think Bernardo and Hoffman both make that assumption too. That is what alters are all about. What's out there is the mind at large.

And there is a great deal of permanence in it which is why the rock in my garden is still essentially the same rock for days, weeks, and years. Even rivers have eddies that form with some degree of permanence. It is especially ironic that some idealists want to argue for some sort of "immortal soul" while the stuff of consciousness and world itself as you seem to envision it seems to be forming afresh moment to moment

Just sticking with Bernardo whom I respect greatly. When he says ‘out there’ he is obviously speaking figuratively. In terms of immortal souls, I would be amazed to find him condoning that view in any interviews.

[Eugene I]

Actually I think Bernardo and Hoffman both make that assumption too. That is what alters are all about. What's out there is the mind at large.

And there is a great deal of permanence in it which is why the rock in my garden is still essentially the same rock for days, weeks, and years. Even rivers have eddies that form with some degree of permanence. It is especially ironic that some idealists want to argue for some sort of "immortal soul" while the stuff of consciousness and world itself as you seem to envision it seems to be forming afresh moment to moment.

I think the world has forms which can arise and maintain a consistent structure for varying periods of time. An eddy in a river, the rock in my garden, and my mortal self are all good examples. If dreams are a model for how the world is, then the rock might one moment be granite and the next sandstone. But that doesn't match how my world seems to work.

Yes, "What's out there is the mind at large" is the idealism's premise. However, what we experience as perceptions of the world is not the MAL itself, but its "ideations", the "stuff" the MAL is doing in its mind. This "world" may look objective to us, but essentially it is subjective by nature and is a result of a subjective activity of the MAL. And, in spite of MAL being a flexible mind, there is nothing stopping it from producing consistent and lasting structures in its imagination and from projecting those imaginary structures to us alters through our "blankets". So, the structured "world" that we perceive is simply the structured ideations of the MAL projected on us. We humans are also capable of producing structured and lasting ideations, this is what mathematicians or engineers do in their professions, so why can't MAL do the same, being much more powerful in its abilities?

Materialism emphasizes the structural consistency of our perceptions of the world a a rationale for the non-conscious nature of reality, but that is a weak argument. The structural consistency is also entirely compatible with the idealistic framework.

[Jim Cross]

In terms of immortal souls, I would be amazed to find him condoning that view in any interviews.

I was speaking more about other people in the forum than Bernardo. I don't know his views on the matter.

Materialism emphasizes the structural consistency of our perceptions of the world a a rationale for the non-conscious nature of reality, but that is a weak argument.

I was using structural consistency to support the idea that there is something beyond our consciousness. You correctly identify that must be MAL in idealism and, as you note, MAL can do everything the physical world can do in materialism. They are hardly distinguishable in their characteristics as they must be if we are explain how the world is and make sense of it.

[Eugene I]

I was using structural consistency to support the idea that there is something beyond our consciousness. You correctly identify that must be MAL in idealism and, as you note, MAL can do everything the physical world can do in materialism. They are hardly distinguishable in their characteristics as they must be if we are explain how the world is and make sense of it.

Agreed