Understanding Steiner's Philosophy

[Güney27]

Accordingly, his Philosophy of Freedom is problematic in that it thinks too exclusively from the direction of the subject. While this is necessary, it misses the dimension of the object, which is treated merely as material to be processed by the mental act. This one-sidedness can then lead to insights—or consequences—that manifest on other levels.

Kaje already hit most of the essential points, so let me only add a few thoughts. We should be clear that, in PoF, the question of Being is not ignored, but it is concealed within the question of thinking. We can only recognize this, however, when we work with 'pure thinking', which PoF leads us into through its introspective method (it is very much like a Tombergian arcanic exercise, in that sense), that is, thinking turned away from sensory content and back towards its immanent imaginative flow of activity, and we discover the givenness of Being from the 'other direction' of the sensory aggregate. Because, in pure thinking, unlike sensory observation, both the imaginative content and the inner activity that generates (or focuses) the content are united. The subject discovers the content of the objectively given within its cognitive flow, where the poles of reality can be experienced as phase-locked. It's inputting stream is correlated perfectly with the output flow. Here, thinking creates the conditions for the possibility of appearance in its imaginative flow. This is where Being in its openness first presents itself in full intuitive clarity.

All these philosophers you mention recognize that Being as it presents itself through sensory content is mere shadow play, a projection of Being as it exists in its native intuitive essence. Or we could say the former is the latter when 'chopped up' into elements (or beings) that we experience as unfolding their existence spatially and temporally. This decoherence of Being strips its sensory appearances of intuitive clarity, such that thinking is given the practical task (not theoretical inquiry) of restoring coherence to the flow. Thus it only makes sense that the question of Being will be illuminated when we retrace the play of shadows into the intuitive essences which cast them. (This isn't to deny the reality of the shadows, but to expand orientation to their relation with the deeper intuitive beams that project them and provide their meaningful context). I also remind of Cleric's NP-SP imagination here. We should really feel how there is simply no other way to lucidly encounter Being, except within the same cognitive flow that we are always using to do philosophy, religion, and science, and build our models of reality.

So Steiner does not avoid the question of Being, even in the early epsitemic works, but shifts the inner direction along which the answer to this question is to be sought and found (continuously, in an ever-expanding way). He stands at the culmination of Western metaphysics and shows the path forward to the intuitive realities that previous thinkers could only model indirectly with their mental pictures (except perhaps the initiates at the very dawn of philosophy). To truly grasp this fact, however, requires a proper orientation to the higher cognitive spectrum from which all mysticism, of all ages, has drawn its content. All the misunderstandings in this area arise when this spectrum isn't sufficiently explored, but is either ignored or caricatured or imagined 'too remote' to even attempt understanding it. We must acquire a taste for how what lives in our intuitive life as cognitive weaving, also lives in the wider World phenomenal flow which seems disconnected from our inputs (intents).

"To the eyes of the man of imagination, nature is imagination itself." (Blake)

Only then it becomes clear exactly why Steiner sought the question of Being through the portal of pure thinking, in which the former finally awakens to itself on Earth in the flow of philosophical-scientific thoughts and can continue expanding its wakefulness into all other World content which feels objectively given.

"For everyone, however, who has the ability to observe thinking—and with good will every normal man has this ability—this observation is the most important one he can possibly make. For he observes something of which he himself is the creator; he finds himself confronted, not by an apparently foreign object, but by his own activity. He knows how the thing he is observing comes into being. He sees into its connections and relationships. A firm point has now been reached from which one can, with some hope of success, seek an explanation of all other phenomena of the world." (GA 4)

Hi Ashvin,

Of course, the question of Being is implicitly present in Steiner’s Philosophy of Freedom, but it is approached from the perspective of the subject in its act of thinking, in the constitution of mental images. Being is measured through thinking. Thinking brings its object into Being, which, as a product of our activity, bears intuitive transparency. The subject cognizes what is objectively given, immanent within its own activity. Nevertheless, this approach fails to address the question that was posed: why there is something at all, and why it shows itself. This should perhaps not be regarded too much as a criticism, but rather as a path which, like any path, has its limitations.

Steiner’s greatest philosophical influence seems to be Fichte (although I am not entirely certain of this; Goethe is often mentioned, yet I find Fichte’s thinking more closely aligned with Steiner’s texts). This influence is grounded in the activity of the I, in the movement of thinking, and attempts to proceed from there along a path which, in Steiner’s case, culminates in a spiritual worldview. However, the opposite direction—that of the foreign, the Other (Levinas), that which does not show itself through the activity of the I—remains unaddressed, at least in the Philosophy of Freedom. The emphasis lies far more on elevating thinking to a form of thinking that recognizes its own spiritual condition.

Yet one could also do this while remaining a solipsist—an idealist who, like Felipe, erases everything that is not knowable from thinking through skepticism. The Other is then found only within one’s own activity, as an influence, but still measured solely in relation to the subject. The dimension of the Other—which must not be the appearance of the subject, must not be constituted within it if the Thou is to retain its own dimension—disappears. Here, then, lies a fundamental distinction in the understanding of thinking: for one, it is a productive, cognitive, constitutive activity; for the other, it is a listening to what shows itself, to what has been revealed.

This is not about simply saying that Steiner was wrong in this or that respect. Rather, it is about acknowledging a limitation—recognizing that there is indeed another direction one can take. It appears as an archetypal antinomy between subject and object, or more precisely, between idealism and realism, without devaluing or elevating either.

Both paths can be symbolically designated as the Aristotelian path and the Platonic path, which laid the foundations of Western thinking. It would be absurd to ask which of the two is the right or the true one. This antinomy also manifests itself in the differing approaches of Steiner and Tomberg. As already stated, this is not meant to diminish Steiner, who stands as a remarkable thinker within the lineage of German philosophy. My intention is rather to shed light on the other direction, which otherwise tends to remain in the dark.

The other direction mentioned does not begin with the subject making itself, through reflection, the point of investigation. Instead, it begins with listening to what shows itself—something that appears to a subject, yet as a revelation toward which the subject turns, and through which it only then becomes a self-conscious subject, not as a constitution or object of cognitive capacity. Both attitudes lead to different forms of spirituality, and I believe this is precisely where the difference between Tomberg and Steiner lies, as representatives of their respective paths.

I will pose the question again: why did Tomberg construct a framework based on Kant’s critiques and weave it into his work, and why does he not mention Steiner’s Philosophy of Freedom even once, while referring countless times to Kant and Bergson? Do you think this occurred arbitrarily or intentionally? For if Steiner were Tomberg’s greatest influence, would his work not look different? Would he not attempt, philosophically, to articulate a path toward scientific spiritual experience, rather than treating philosophy as a member within a broader gnoseological organism?

[AshvinP]

Hi Ashvin,

Of course, the question of Being is implicitly present in Steiner’s Philosophy of Freedom, but it is approached from the perspective of the subject in its act of thinking, in the constitution of mental images. Being is measured through thinking. Thinking brings its object into Being, which, as a product of our activity, bears intuitive transparency. The subject cognizes what is objectively given, immanent within its own activity. Nevertheless, this approach fails to address the question that was posed: why there is something at all, and why it shows itself. This should perhaps not be regarded too much as a criticism, but rather as a path which, like any path, has its limitations.

Steiner’s greatest philosophical influence seems to be Fichte (although I am not entirely certain of this; Goethe is often mentioned, yet I find Fichte’s thinking more closely aligned with Steiner’s texts). This influence is grounded in the activity of the I, in the movement of thinking, and attempts to proceed from there along a path which, in Steiner’s case, culminates in a spiritual worldview. However, the opposite direction—that of the foreign, the Other (Levinas), that which does not show itself through the activity of the I—remains unaddressed, at least in the Philosophy of Freedom. The emphasis lies far more on elevating thinking to a form of thinking that recognizes its own spiritual condition.

Yet one could also do this while remaining a solipsist—an idealist who, like Felipe, erases everything that is not knowable from thinking through skepticism. The Other is then found only within one’s own activity, as an influence, but still measured solely in relation to the subject. The dimension of the Other—which must not be the appearance of the subject, must not be constituted within it if the Thou is to retain its own dimension—disappears. Here, then, lies a fundamental distinction in the understanding of thinking: for one, it is a productive, cognitive, constitutive activity; for the other, it is a listening to what shows itself, to what has been revealed.

This is not about simply saying that Steiner was wrong in this or that respect. Rather, it is about acknowledging a limitation—recognizing that there is indeed another direction one can take. It appears as an archetypal antinomy between subject and object, or more precisely, between idealism and realism, without devaluing or elevating either.

Both paths can be symbolically designated as the Aristotelian path and the Platonic path, which laid the foundations of Western thinking. It would be absurd to ask which of the two is the right or the true one. This antinomy also manifests itself in the differing approaches of Steiner and Tomberg. As already stated, this is not meant to diminish Steiner, who stands as a remarkable thinker within the lineage of German philosophy. My intention is rather to shed light on the other direction, which otherwise tends to remain in the dark.

The other direction mentioned does not begin with the subject making itself, through reflection, the point of investigation. Instead, it begins with listening to what shows itself—something that appears to a subject, yet as a revelation toward which the subject turns, and through which it only then becomes a self-conscious subject, not as a constitution or object of cognitive capacity. Both attitudes lead to different forms of spirituality, and I believe this is precisely where the difference between Tomberg and Steiner lies, as representatives of their respective paths.

I will pose the question again: why did Tomberg construct a framework based on Kant’s critiques and weave it into his work, and why does he not mention Steiner’s Philosophy of Freedom even once, while referring countless times to Kant and Bergson? Do you think this occurred arbitrarily or intentionally? For if Steiner were Tomberg’s greatest influence, would his work not look different? Would he not attempt, philosophically, to articulate a path toward scientific spiritual experience, rather than treating philosophy as a member within a broader gnoseological organism?

Guney,

These are good points you are highlighting and are very useful to contemplate, but there is something that is missing, and this missing element is leading to characterizations of Steiner's method that are simply not applicable to it. What PoF helps us realize is that the question, "why there is something at all, and why it shows itself?", can only be answered, not by attempting the impossible (to move in the opposite direction of thinking, or to 'listen' without thinking), or by endless philosophizing, but by observing our thinking such that it attains a point of equilibrium within the ordinary hysteresis and thereby becomes simultaneously active and receptive within the cognitive flow of Being. Our thinking should become capable of speaking and listening at the same time. This may sound paradoxical, but it is nevertheless a literal reality that can be experienced. Yes, Steiner had previous philosophical influences, but we should be clear that this element of unleashing what the self-conscious "I" is capable of attaining in our age, is completely new. Neither Kant, Fichte, nor Goethe could suspect this deeper capacity of the "I" in their time.

And this is where we find the overlap between Steiner and Tomberg. Notice how VT's affinity with Kant's transcendental method is when the latter is understood as a spiritual exercise (not a metaphysical system) that brings thinking into greater self-consciousness, i.e., 'thinking about thinking'.

"The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (a soul of childlike purity, endowed with a remarkable honesty and diligence) made Descartes' spontaneous experience a new method of inner effort aspiring to knowledge, namely the transcendental method.

This method amounts to the effort to transcend the thinking in which the thinker is ordinarily immersed, by going out from it and elevating himself above it in order to observe thought or to think about thought from a point of observation taken above discursive thought. Kant's Copernican discovery consists above all in detaching the thinker from naïve thought, i.e. from the state where the thinker is lost in the process of thought, being immersed in it, so as to occupy a point situated above thought, from where the thinker can examine what is thought in an entirely detached way and with implacable and incorruptible truthfulness - this is the "transcendental criticism" of Kant." (Tomberg, MoT)

I think you would agree that the description of this method sounds almost like a direct reference to Steiner and PoF as well. It is only when Kant's method is reduced to a metaphysical system that we arrive at solipsism (re: Felipe). We have discussed many of the reasons for VT's deviation from the Anthroposophical path on the other thread, but that doesn't mean we should ignore the explicit overlaps. In these overlaps, we find the everlasting kernel of initiation. When it comes to encountering the revelation of Being through the portal of thinking, they were completely aligned, because it couldn't possibly be any other way. When thinking takes a stance 'above' its ordinary flow of discursive thought, it realizes its complete continuity with the revelatory flow of Being. The antimonies of reality, however they are conceived and categorized (activity vs. receptivity, "I" vs. Other, Aristotle vs. Plato, etc.), are reconciled to one another within its self-conscious flow.

The problem is that this idea of reconciliation remains an unconvincing abstraction until we endeavor to live out the reconciliation in our thinking. We will never see it at work in Steiner's method if we try to philosophically 'prove' it to exist there beforehand. We know that Steiner described PoF as a means of purification/catharsis, which provides an imaginative foundation for the further aims of illumination (inspired cognition) and union (intuitive cognition), just as Tomberg described the task of Christian Hermeticism. We know that spiritual science derives its content from investigating what the soul experiences after physical death. We need to come to terms with how such a possibility is completely new on the horizon of human thinking and being, which are increasingly experienced as united across the threshold. The stages after death could be experienced before, but only now can the individual retain full lucid consciousness along the gradient of Being and communicate such experiences in scientifically accessible concepts.

"Christian Hermeticism, being a synthesis of mysticism, gnosis and sacred magic, offers humanity three methods of experience, beyond the "philosophical method" outlined above [Kant], for arriving at the certainty of immortality.

There is in the first place the traditional mystical way of purification, illumination and union, which is the voluntary and conscious experience of the three stages of the way of the human soul after death - through purgatory to heaven, and from heaven to God. You will find this not only with the great Christian mystics such as Dionysius the Areopagite, Bonaventura, Teresa of Avila, and John of the Cross...not only in the pre-Christian teachings of the Hermetic treatises attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, such as The Divine Pymander, but also in the great mysteries of pagans, Egyptians, and others, where the three stages of catharsis (purification), photismos (illumination) and henosis (union, or identification with the Divine) give consciousness of the post-mortem states and certainty of immortality."

[Güney27]

Hi Ashvin,

Of course, the question of Being is implicitly present in Steiner’s Philosophy of Freedom, but it is approached from the perspective of the subject in its act of thinking, in the constitution of mental images. Being is measured through thinking. Thinking brings its object into Being, which, as a product of our activity, bears intuitive transparency. The subject cognizes what is objectively given, immanent within its own activity. Nevertheless, this approach fails to address the question that was posed: why there is something at all, and why it shows itself. This should perhaps not be regarded too much as a criticism, but rather as a path which, like any path, has its limitations.

Steiner’s greatest philosophical influence seems to be Fichte (although I am not entirely certain of this; Goethe is often mentioned, yet I find Fichte’s thinking more closely aligned with Steiner’s texts). This influence is grounded in the activity of the I, in the movement of thinking, and attempts to proceed from there along a path which, in Steiner’s case, culminates in a spiritual worldview. However, the opposite direction—that of the foreign, the Other (Levinas), that which does not show itself through the activity of the I—remains unaddressed, at least in the Philosophy of Freedom. The emphasis lies far more on elevating thinking to a form of thinking that recognizes its own spiritual condition.

Yet one could also do this while remaining a solipsist—an idealist who, like Felipe, erases everything that is not knowable from thinking through skepticism. The Other is then found only within one’s own activity, as an influence, but still measured solely in relation to the subject. The dimension of the Other—which must not be the appearance of the subject, must not be constituted within it if the Thou is to retain its own dimension—disappears. Here, then, lies a fundamental distinction in the understanding of thinking: for one, it is a productive, cognitive, constitutive activity; for the other, it is a listening to what shows itself, to what has been revealed.

This is not about simply saying that Steiner was wrong in this or that respect. Rather, it is about acknowledging a limitation—recognizing that there is indeed another direction one can take. It appears as an archetypal antinomy between subject and object, or more precisely, between idealism and realism, without devaluing or elevating either.

Both paths can be symbolically designated as the Aristotelian path and the Platonic path, which laid the foundations of Western thinking. It would be absurd to ask which of the two is the right or the true one. This antinomy also manifests itself in the differing approaches of Steiner and Tomberg. As already stated, this is not meant to diminish Steiner, who stands as a remarkable thinker within the lineage of German philosophy. My intention is rather to shed light on the other direction, which otherwise tends to remain in the dark.

The other direction mentioned does not begin with the subject making itself, through reflection, the point of investigation. Instead, it begins with listening to what shows itself—something that appears to a subject, yet as a revelation toward which the subject turns, and through which it only then becomes a self-conscious subject, not as a constitution or object of cognitive capacity. Both attitudes lead to different forms of spirituality, and I believe this is precisely where the difference between Tomberg and Steiner lies, as representatives of their respective paths.

I will pose the question again: why did Tomberg construct a framework based on Kant’s critiques and weave it into his work, and why does he not mention Steiner’s Philosophy of Freedom even once, while referring countless times to Kant and Bergson? Do you think this occurred arbitrarily or intentionally? For if Steiner were Tomberg’s greatest influence, would his work not look different? Would he not attempt, philosophically, to articulate a path toward scientific spiritual experience, rather than treating philosophy as a member within a broader gnoseological organism?

Guney,

These are good points you are highlighting and are very useful to contemplate, but there is something that is missing, and this missing element is leading to characterizations of Steiner's method that are simply not applicable to it. What PoF helps us realize is that the question, "why there is something at all, and why it shows itself?", can only be answered, not by attempting the impossible (to move in the opposite direction of thinking, or to 'listen' without thinking), or by endless philosophizing, but by observing our thinking such that it attains a point of equilibrium within the ordinary hysteresis and thereby becomes simultaneously active and receptive within the cognitive flow of Being. Our thinking should become capable of speaking and listening at the same time. This may sound paradoxical, but it is nevertheless a literal reality that can be experienced. Yes, Steiner had previous philosophical influences, but we should be clear that this element of unleashing what the self-conscious "I" is capable of attaining in our age, is completely new. Neither Kant, Fichte, nor Goethe could suspect this deeper capacity of the "I" in their time.

And this is where we find the overlap between Steiner and Tomberg. Notice how VT's affinity with Kant's transcendental method is when the latter is understood as a spiritual exercise (not a metaphysical system) that brings thinking into greater self-consciousness, i.e., 'thinking about thinking'.

"The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (a soul of childlike purity, endowed with a remarkable honesty and diligence) made Descartes' spontaneous experience a new method of inner effort aspiring to knowledge, namely the transcendental method.

This method amounts to the effort to transcend the thinking in which the thinker is ordinarily immersed, by going out from it and elevating himself above it in order to observe thought or to think about thought from a point of observation taken above discursive thought. Kant's Copernican discovery consists above all in detaching the thinker from naïve thought, i.e. from the state where the thinker is lost in the process of thought, being immersed in it, so as to occupy a point situated above thought, from where the thinker can examine what is thought in an entirely detached way and with implacable and incorruptible truthfulness - this is the "transcendental criticism" of Kant." (Tomberg, MoT)

I think you would agree that the description of this method sounds almost like a direct reference to Steiner and PoF as well. It is only when Kant's method is reduced to a metaphysical system that we arrive at solipsism (re: Felipe). We have discussed many of the reasons for VT's deviation from the Anthroposophical path on the other thread, but that doesn't mean we should ignore the explicit overlaps. In these overlaps, we find the everlasting kernel of initiation. When it comes to encountering the revelation of Being through the portal of thinking, they were completely aligned, because it couldn't possibly be any other way. When thinking takes a stance 'above' its ordinary flow of discursive thought, it realizes its complete continuity with the revelatory flow of Being. The antimonies of reality, however they are conceived and categorized (activity vs. receptivity, "I" vs. Other, Aristotle vs. Plato, etc.), are reconciled to one another within its self-conscious flow.

The problem is that this idea of reconciliation remains an unconvincing abstraction until we endeavor to live out the reconciliation in our thinking. We will never see it at work in Steiner's method if we try to philosophically 'prove' it to exist there beforehand. We know that Steiner described PoF as a means of purification/catharsis, which provides an imaginative foundation for the further aims of illumination (inspired cognition) and union (intuitive cognition), just as Tomberg described the task of Christian Hermeticism. We know that spiritual science derives its content from investigating what the soul experiences after physical death. We need to come to terms with how such a possibility is completely new on the horizon of human thinking and being, which are increasingly experienced as united across the threshold. The stages after death could be experienced before, but only now can the individual retain full lucid consciousness along the gradient of Being and communicate such experiences in scientifically accessible concepts.

"Christian Hermeticism, being a synthesis of mysticism, gnosis and sacred magic, offers humanity three methods of experience, beyond the "philosophical method" outlined above [Kant], for arriving at the certainty of immortality.

There is in the first place the traditional mystical way of purification, illumination and union, which is the voluntary and conscious experience of the three stages of the way of the human soul after death - through purgatory to heaven, and from heaven to God. You will find this not only with the great Christian mystics such as Dionysius the Areopagite, Bonaventura, Teresa of Avila, and John of the Cross...not only in the pre-Christian teachings of the Hermetic treatises attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, such as The Divine Pymander, but also in the great mysteries of pagans, Egyptians, and others, where the three stages of catharsis (purification), photismos (illumination) and henosis (union, or identification with the Divine) give consciousness of the post-mortem states and certainty of immortality."

Thanks Ashvin,

It is true that Tomberg reads Kant in a way that comes somewhat close to Steiner, although this proximity can still be interpreted differently. Steiner is deeply shaped by Fichte, who frees the I from any concept of substance (Descartes’ cogito) as well as from any merely formal function (Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception), and instead understands it as pure activity, as pure doing, without first being something. Moreover, Fichte repeatedly emphasizes that the activity of the I must be experienced through inner immersion in it, and not merely abstractly postulated. In his Wissenschaftslehre (which I am currently reading), this constitutes the first fundamental principle: an experienced activity in which product and production coincide. This is strongly reminiscent of Steiner.

In addition, Fichte distinguishes between representations that appear to us as produced by ourselves and those that appear to confront us as something opposed. The activity of the I is limited by the not-I, which offers resistance to the I, and it is precisely through this resistance that the I attains self-consciousness. I find an extraordinary number of motifs in Steiner that he clearly adopted from Fichte, although I am still relatively new to Fichte’s world of thought.

Furthermore, I think that Fichte’s The Way toward the Blessed Life (Anweisung zum seligen Leben) would interest you, since in this work Fichte attempts to give guidance as to how human beings may attain blessedness. It is, in a sense, a spiritual training text by Fichte, in which esoteric elements can be discerned. This is a work that the young Steiner read and which likely influenced him. This does not mean that Steiner’s texts are mere copies, but rather that they are strongly inspired by contemplation of Fichte’s world of thought. As you know, Steiner engaged intensely with the ideas of Schelling, Hegel, and Fichte in his youth.

Tomberg seems to incorporate The Philosophy of Freedom into his work at some point, especially in his emphasis that once philosophy loses contact with the “deep dimension” (mysticism, gnosis, magic), it becomes a system that automates and chains thinking. For this reason, there can be no final philosophy that satisfies everyone and answers all philosophical questions once and for all, because that would effectively kill thinking itself. Thinking can adopt infinitely many perspectives and traverse finite paths.

Moreover, what would a philosophical answer look like that would address the questions that concern human beings in a way that is universally valid—that is, valid at all times and for everyone? How could such an answer appear? Philosophy is thinking itself, and one cannot remove the person and their personality from philosophy. Would Kant have written the Critique of Pure Reason if he had not been confronted with skepticism and had not possessed a strong inclination toward the natural sciences, which he sought to defend? No—or at least it would be highly unlikely. For every philosophy always arises within a field of problems left behind by previous generations of philosophers, which delineates the domain within which thinking takes place. In the same way, the personality of a thinker determines which paths of thought are taken.

I do not mean to say that philosophy is a product of the psyche, but rather to suggest that the personality of a thinker co-determines the context within which thinking moves. One must first have the disposition to befriend philosophy at all, to contemplate difficult texts over many years, and then to write oneself, etc. A certain orientation of the soul must be present, one that cannot simply be acquired at will. For this reason, it seems problematic to me to want to sterilize thinking, or even to assume that this would be possible.

In our epoch there is a strong dichotomy between the personal, ethical, lived life and the theoretical, cognitive life. Consider how a philosopher is portrayed in Plato’s dialogues and how philosophers exist today. Today, a philosopher belongs to an academy and operates in the realm of editing, criticizing, and producing philosophical texts, and then has a private life in which hobbies, beliefs, and relationships are pursued. Of course, being a philosopher will influence the form these private interests and necessities take, yet they remain separated—in contrast to the deeply religious individual, in whom knowledge and action form a unity (Plato, Augustine, Aquinas…).

What are the conditions of possibility for this differentiation? I believe the answer can be found in Tomberg’s work, for his entire oeuvre is also a religious or spiritual epistemology—or, to use another term, a gnoseology. For he answers the question of how human beings can attain inner certainty with regard to those questions whose answers are necessary because they decide human destiny. Here Tomberg provides an answer that, although different from Steiner’s in appearance, has the same origin in essence and is adapted to the modern world.

The central question, then, is: How can the human being, in full consciousness, recognize what their destiny is? This question occupies both Tomberg and Steiner. Both also attempt to recognize and combat the dangers and delusions of modernity—such as materialism, or the confinement of thinking within rigid systems—that is, the consequences of an intensified spiritual awakening.

And here you are absolutely right: the beginning lies precisely in becoming conscious of
“to transcend the thinking in which the thinker is ordinarily immersed, by going out from it and elevating himself above it in order to observe thought or to think about thought from a point of observation taken above discursive thought.”

[AshvinP]

I do not mean to say that philosophy is a product of the psyche, but rather to suggest that the personality of a thinker co-determines the context within which thinking moves. One must first have the disposition to befriend philosophy at all, to contemplate difficult texts over many years, and then to write oneself, etc. A certain orientation of the soul must be present, one that cannot simply be acquired at will. For this reason, it seems problematic to me to want to sterilize thinking, or even to assume that this would be possible.

In our epoch there is a strong dichotomy between the personal, ethical, lived life and the theoretical, cognitive life. Consider how a philosopher is portrayed in Plato’s dialogues and how philosophers exist today. Today, a philosopher belongs to an academy and operates in the realm of editing, criticizing, and producing philosophical texts, and then has a private life in which hobbies, beliefs, and relationships are pursued. Of course, being a philosopher will influence the form these private interests and necessities take, yet they remain separated—in contrast to the deeply religious individual, in whom knowledge and action form a unity (Plato, Augustine, Aquinas…).

What are the conditions of possibility for this differentiation? I believe the answer can be found in Tomberg’s work, for his entire oeuvre is also a religious or spiritual epistemology—or, to use another term, a gnoseology. For he answers the question of how human beings can attain inner certainty with regard to those questions whose answers are necessary because they decide human destiny. Here Tomberg provides an answer that, although different from Steiner’s in appearance, has the same origin in essence and is adapted to the modern world.

The central question, then, is: How can the human being, in full consciousness, recognize what their destiny is? This question occupies both Tomberg and Steiner. Both also attempt to recognize and combat the dangers and delusions of modernity—such as materialism, or the confinement of thinking within rigid systems—that is, the consequences of an intensified spiritual awakening.

And here you are absolutely right: the beginning lies precisely in becoming conscious of
“to transcend the thinking in which the thinker is ordinarily immersed, by going out from it and elevating himself above it in order to observe thought or to think about thought from a point of observation taken above discursive thought.”

Well stated again, Guney. There is something very interesting to notice here. The ideal of taking the personality out of thinking through reality is that of the scientific method.

In natural science, however, there are levels of indirection between the intuitive pushing toward new insights and the consequential memory pictures that recede and imprint in the World flow. Cleric nicely describes that out-of-phase relationship here:


"The vast majority of today’s scientific intuition concerns such output-to-output relations. When we study history, politics, economics, geology, biology, physics, and so on, in general, we are confronted with and develop intuition primarily about output-to-output patterns. Even when describing the actions of human beings, for example when history depicts the deeds of ancient rulers, we mainly study the output behavior as it ripples through World events, not so much the inner life. There’s a certain convenience in studying relations of phenomena that are comfortably laid out in the output field. This is why, when it comes to our inputs, we feel tempted to cast them down into outputs too. Why deal with two different categories if we can get away with just one? It is simply easier to observe the brain and try to see everything as rippling outputs, then imagine that the illusion of input is merely “what this process feels like.” In our age, it is almost a universal fact that as soon as one tries to point attention to the inwardly experienced real-time input process, we are immediately thrown back into the experience of a mental flow outputting images of neurons, energy, information, souls, and so on. When we philosophize about the input, we are no longer clearly aware of the actual philosophizing flow, but instead, we are immersed in the meaning implied in the outputted mental images. Now, ‘input’ is simply a name for the arrangement of metaphysical mental images in the output, while the true input doing the arrangement remains instinctive and hidden in the blind spot of our cognitive activity. If we indeed try to grasp the input process, if we try to observe how our input activity is reflected in mental images, but at the same time we fight to preserve our habit of seeing all reality as faithfully laid out within the output, we feel like a dog chasing its tail, it is like trying to draw a picture that also includes our hands painting the picture."


It is the 'leeway' within those levels of indirection which allows the personality to habitually insert itself - its desires, preferences, and so on - into the gaps when developing theoretical models about the structure and laws of reality based on output-to-output patterns. As long as the scientist is merely observing sequences of phenomenal output and recording these observations, the thinking process is relatively streamlined and discplined by the output patterns, but as it becomes a question of figuring out what causes what, which element is more fundamental than the others, how the patterns can be extrapolated backward and forward through time, and so on, the personality becomes a driving force in how the thinking process unfolds. It is the same with philosophy, as you and Federica pointed out, and perhaps even more so because the inner process is not as constrained by the strict lawfulness of sensory perceptions (or mathematical intuitions). Now, even when the philosophical topic is centered around the nature of the "I", the nature of thinking and willing, the conditions of Being which make experience possible, etc., the way these intuitions are shaped is highly dependent on the personality. The intuitions we explore in this way may be entirely valid, but they are formatted according to the personality's context of unstable soul tensions and often lead to highly one-sided and misleading models.

The phenomenological method (as initially developed through Steiner-PoF), on the other hand, marks the first time in thinking history when the ideal of the scientific method could be fully realized. That is because the levels of indirection are collapsed between the perfectly correlated or phase-locked spectrums of inner activity and mental picture feedback. In a manner of speaking, there is no room for the personality to insert itself when the inner facts of imaginative experience are truthfully investigated. I think we can all experience this absence of personality quite vividly when working with the essays and their introspective exercises, for example:

"Take something as trivial as moving a finger. We can place our hand palm down on a surface and lift the index finger several times while trying to be very attentive to the way it feels. Then we stop moving the finger physically and only imagine its movement, basically trying to remember what we just did. It’s not so important that the imagined finger movement is visually seen in our imagination – it’s the inner input act that we try to repeat, but without allowing it to manifest as actual movement. Then we try this imaginative movement, but by transforming the intent – we try to feel the movement as a rehearsal for a future physical lifting of the finger. We can repeat these rehearsals a few times, and at some point decide to lift the finger physically. The most important thing to observe here is what changes. What do we do differently in order to allow the input act to reach deeper in the body instead of remaining only an imaginative rehearsal? We’re not looking for some clear-cut intellectual answer to this question, but only trying to feel the difference."

We can contrast this experience with that of working through a standard philosophical treatise, where we may encounter a dozen different assumptions, speculations, and claims that we are unsure about in the course of a few paragraphs. This may also be a reason why many people abandon such a method quite quickly, since it is as if they sense their personality being stripped away from the revelatory flow in a way that simply never happens with standard theoretical inquiries. We finally get a taste of true freedom from the personality's formatting of the cognitive flow, but this tastes like bland veggies rather than the delectable meats and sweets we are accustomed to. You mentioned the strong inclination people may have for philosophy or science, and we should recognize that this inclination can work both ways. It can be an inclination to pursue the truthful flow of experience no matter where it leads, no matter what mental pipelines need to be sacrificed in the process, or it may be an inclination to use the methods of philosophy and science as a vent for the personality. In the latter case, the phenomenological method will be shunned because it does not act as such a vent and fulfill the underlying intent.

This gives us a better appreciation for why the Other, or the objectively revealed World content that stimulates our inner activity, can only be encountered in its true objectivity and openness within the exceptional state, when thinking sacrifices its habit of 'seeing all reality as faithfully laid out within the output' and instead feels the subtle differentiations within its imaginative flow. It is only here that we begin to sense a spectrum of our Being that transcends the ordinary personality and its formatting (which is the true meaning of Kant's 'transcendental method', which should take us beyond the confines of the 'empirical self'). That is also the meaning of catharsis-purification, or what you may have referred to as 'sterilizing thinking'. We should be under no illusion that, by pursuing phenomenology, our personality has suddenly evaporated from the thinking context, or that we are forever free of its formatting. Yet, in the very experience of that pursuit, we can attain intuitive flashes of a personality-free inputting process that investigates reality without prior agendas, so to speak. The only agenda is to continuously expand intuitive orientation within the lawful interleaved IO flows and allow this expanded orientation to flow into practical, ethical deeds as we encounter various life circumstances.

[Federica]

I want to share here a fitting example of unfree philosophizing, where one allows personal preferences to take arbitrary lead:

When we discuss the evolution of Anthroposophy, we must begin by addressing the one issue that remains unresolved in Steiner’s ideas: his inability to see through the Abrahamic paradigms as fundamentally Ahrimanic and counterproductive to the evolution of the human creative imagination.

It feels rather strange to critique someone who truly was a brilliant mystic and seer. Yet Steiner—although monumentally ahead of his time—could not get past Abrahamic systems of thought.

For one, he centered his entire human cosmology and evolutionary cycles around the Christ event. It is within this event, place, and time that he sees humanity gaining an inner subjectivity that can then permeate outward into its next cycle of growth. What Steiner fails to see are the numerous examples in prehistory that focus on the Ego—its growth, its returns, and its impulse toward divine expression.

In fact, one could even argue that we see a greater shift in consciousness during the Enlightenment than anything that had existed for the two thousand years prior. It takes brutal honesty and the removal of Western Christian bias to see that it is Steiner who ultimately falls on the wrong sword of time, thereby closing off his potential understanding of the broader cosmic backdrop—one that could have catapulted his visions through the gateway of the old gods, or cosmic powers of transformation.

Yet Steiner was an intuitive genius. He was able to see, for instance, that the infancy narratives and genealogies of Jesus were irreconcilable—which I believe he sensed was not accidental but intentional—and thus he still held the text as a living, high spiritual document. As a result, he built a layered cosmology of the two Jesus children, who then become the vehicles for the preparation of the Christ force. It is a beautiful idea, but his methodology of holding onto the stories at face value is a romantic one that collapses under even minimal historical or textual exegesis.

What Steiner failed to see was that human civilization was not developing an “I” for the first time, but rather was entering the dissolution of the “I” during the Age of Pisces. It would not be until the returning currents of the Age of Aquarius that the impulse toward the “I” would be reborn.
...

https://substack.com/home/post/p-182876563

Rick liked "the freedom the author takes". Unfortunately, what the author submits to is the exact opposite of freedom. It's an example of what Ashvin (and Cleric in the quotes) described as using the philosophizing flow (without realizing it) as a vent for the personality. When the exceptional state is disregarded it's easy to get caught in 'philosophizing' or 'reasoning' and confuse freedom with its opposite, convinced that there are many alternative versions of the truth, just as for the materialist, there are many theories that may complement each other, explain each other's hypotheses, and so on.

Here's the exact picture of human unfreedom in science. In philosophy the exact same stance is common as well, leading to just as hopeless prospects:

A scientific theory asks us to grant certain assumptions. If we grant them, the theory promises in return to explain some phenomena of interest. William of Ockham counsels theory builders to keep assumptions to a minimum. That is sage advice. The bare minimum, however, is never zero. Each theory has assumptions. So no theory explains everything in its domain: no theory explains its assumptions.

One may propose a deeper theory, which explains assumptions of a prior theory. But the new theory has its own, unexplained, assumptions. And so on, forever. Thus science can offer no theory of everything, in the sense of a theory that explains its own assumptions. (This is distinct from what physicists term a "theory of everything," which is one that unifies the known four fundamental forces.)

Since no theory can be a theory of everything, it follows that every theory has a scope and limits. A good theory provides mathematically precise tools to explore its scope. A great theory provides tools to discover its own limits.

[AshvinP]

I want to share here a fitting example of unfree philosophizing, where one allows personal preferences to take arbitrary lead:

It's interesting because, just yesterday, I came across a book by Judith von Halle that addresses this exact way of approaching Steiner's ideas, which is, unfortunately, increasingly common in our cynical times. Perhaps she has also come across FB before

"‘Man, Steiner, where does anthroposophy go from here?’ was recently an op-ed in a journal well-known in anthroposophic circles and is a quite ‘typical’ approach. Now, why is the question of where anthroposophy goes from here directed at Rudolf Steiner? Are we not aware of our own responsibility for the future of anthroposophic work and so must blame all that is wrong with anthroposophy in our times on the human being Rudolf Steiner? Such a phrase gives the reader the impression that many a present difficulty related to anthroposophic work today is the result of this talented but also fallible human being having not thought his ideas through. At present this emphasis on the ‘humanity’ of Rudolf Steiner is related less to qualities such as love, self-sacrifice, compassion or generosity, which we would normally associate with the idea of humanity, but more in the sense of ‘human, all too human’, of perceived weaknesses and errors or to some extent problematic developments, which are to be expected of a ‘historic’ Rudolf Steiner, understood in the ‘context of his age’ as a ‘child of his times’.

Thus today we are increasingly presented with an image of Rudolf Steiner which shows a person of great merit but also with flaws; a person like you and me, with perceived weaknesses and failures, which we—as enlightened anthroposophists of the present day—have risen above and from which we know to distance ourselves at the appropriate moments. This is an ideational construction of great arrogance, since we continually help ourselves to the fruits of Rudolf Steiner’s spiritual achievements (insofar as our own imperfections allow) and at the same time we place ourselves above Rudolf Steiner by thinking we can or should ‘correct’ or ‘modernize’ him or his findings on various levels—a sign that we have not in the least understood the enduring timeliness of what anthroposophy was a hundred years ago and will be in the coming centuries. The appropriating of Rudolf Steiner’s spiritual discoveries while simultaneously dismantling the discoverer has become a weird expression of our sickly soul-spiritual condition. Anthroposophy is connected directly and inextricably to its founder, because ultimately it was created through him. And this does not change one bit when on their spiritual path someone becomes able to make their own discoveries independently.
...
Even when many a speech given in celebration of the 150th anniversary of Rudolf Steiner’s birth praises these achievements in the realm of practical life, still we often look in vain for an appreciation of what it was that rendered them possible: a living knowledge of the spiritual world. In hardly any publication at this anniversary did I find a tribute to Rudolf Steiner as a servant of the Christ and we can only marvel at the fact that on this occasion of all times Rudolf Steiner’s great contribution to the renewal of esoteric Christianity is not at the forefront. It is from precisely this truly Christian-Trinitarian source that all the impulses, for example in the educational institutions or the development of the concept of social threefolding, the ‘Christ-appropriate gestalt’ of the social order, flow! Also the first advances in the field of anthroposophic medicine or biodynamic agriculture that we are now taking would not exist without the foundations of a ‘Pauline’ spiritual knowledge. Rudolf Steiner lived in constant interchange with the spiritual hierarchies; he experienced the spiritual world. And it is only this direct experiencing of the spiritual world, in contrast to ‘intellectualizing’, which can lead to spiritual knowledge."

von Halle, Judith (2025-09-24T23:58:59.000). Rudolf Steiner, Master of the White Lodge: On his Occult Biography . Temple Lodge Publishing. Kindle Edition.

[Federica]

It's interesting because, just yesterday, I came across a book by Judith von Halle that addresses this exact way of approaching Steiner's ideas, which is, unfortunately, increasingly common in our cynical times. Perhaps she has also come across FB before

...

So well expressed, thanks for sharing. The Christ in particular is a typical catalyzer for many of such stances that put Steiner in question as a 'professional' - a philosopher, a genius seer, an educator, or whatever - without having gained any real grasp of what he is and did.

Rick, for example, commented the post I quoted above by Pleromaunderground: "The place Christ takes in Steiner’s work has always been difficult to “accept” for me. This may be due to my catholic upbringing and my distancing from the church after that. That does not mean that going along with Steiner’s ideas about Christ has not resulted in fruitful insights. I guess Christ just did not come to me yet (as they say: you don’t come to Christ, Christ comes to you). Below an alternative view."

People prefer to pick and choose this or that piece, as long as 'it works for them', and leave the Christ aside. Too heavy, and unnecessary. People want a Steiner à-la-carte. I know this will be controversial, but in many cases, in a strange way, Valentin Tomberg is taken hostage to achieve this self-pleasing, customizable, complementary, boxed Anthroposophy.


BTW, has anyone listened to any of the speeches at the recent 100 years RS conference at Harvard Divinity School?

[AshvinP]

I know this will be controversial, but in many cases, in a strange way, Valentin Tomberg is taken hostage to achieve this self-pleasing, customizable, complementary, boxed Anthroposophy.

Yes, it is certainly possible that people utilize VT in that way, like Steiner himself is taken hostage in these Anthroposophical examples. On the other hand, VT is often accused of being too Christ-oriented (even in his Anthroposophical days). Everything he illustrates in this domain is always referenced back to the spiritual foundations of Christianity. If someone is turned away by such references, they won't make it past a few pages of VT's work.

BTW, has anyone listened to any of the speeches at the recent 100 years RS conference at Harvard Divinity School?

I listened to Segall's presentation, which was decent enough. It seems Steiner's 'racial views' were a main theme of some other presentations. What was your impression?

[Federica]

I know this will be controversial, but in many cases, in a strange way, Valentin Tomberg is taken hostage to achieve this self-pleasing, customizable, complementary, boxed Anthroposophy.

Yes, it is certainly possible that people utilize VT in that way, like Steiner himself is taken hostage in these Anthroposophical examples. On the other hand, VT is often accused of being too Christ-oriented (even in his Anthroposophical days). Everything he illustrates in this domain is always referenced back to the spiritual foundations of Christianity. If someone is turned away by such references, they won't make it past a few pages of VT's work.

BTW, has anyone listened to any of the speeches at the recent 100 years RS conference at Harvard Divinity School?

I listened to Segall's presentation, which was decent enough. It seems Steiner's 'racial views' were a main theme of some other presentations. What was your impression?

Yes, I meant that many of those who have such à la carte approach to Anthroposophy use VT to criticize RS.

I haven't seen any of those presentations, I was curious of your opinion.

[AshvinP]

I know this will be controversial, but in many cases, in a strange way, Valentin Tomberg is taken hostage to achieve this self-pleasing, customizable, complementary, boxed Anthroposophy.

Yes, it is certainly possible that people utilize VT in that way, like Steiner himself is taken hostage in these Anthroposophical examples. On the other hand, VT is often accused of being too Christ-oriented (even in his Anthroposophical days). Everything he illustrates in this domain is always referenced back to the spiritual foundations of Christianity. If someone is turned away by such references, they won't make it past a few pages of VT's work.

BTW, has anyone listened to any of the speeches at the recent 100 years RS conference at Harvard Divinity School?

I listened to Segall's presentation, which was decent enough. It seems Steiner's 'racial views' were a main theme of some other presentations. What was your impression?

Yes, I meant that many of those who have such à la carte approach to Anthroposophy use VT to criticize RS.

I haven't seen any of those presentations, I was curious of your opinion.

I only listened to Segall's. It was heavy on philosophical correspondences with Whitehead, as usual. Phenomenological prompts were generally absent. I think some of the other presentations leaned pretty strongly into what JvH discussed above, criticizing Steiner for being a 'child of his times', which they imagine influenced his spiritual scientific claims about racial differentiations.