Nietzsche and Christianity - Metaphysical Idealist Critique

[JustinG]

Precisely. He was most concerned with debasing of the material world, but there is also debasing of the spiritual world, i.e. materialism, Marxism (which Nietzche took to task in "tarantulas" passage of Zarathustra), etc. Even certain forms of religious fundamentalism debase the spiritual world. This is why I am careful to point out the metaphysical split itself is the problem, rather than any particular worldview downstream of it - its an equal opportunity debaser of realms we exist in.

Why then the focus on individual salvation, rather than changing the 'material' realities which are the source of these debasements?

Re Nietzsche and Marxism, I think indications of the reconciliation of the concerns of both Nietzsche, Marx and of theology can be found is some of the writings of Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks. He writes:

"As a philosophy, historical materialism asserts theoretically that every "truth" thought to be eternal and absolute has practical origins and has represented or represents a provisonal value. But the difficulty lies in making people understand what it means "in practice" to interpret historical materialism itself in this light. Such an interpretation is foreshadowed by Engels when he talks about a transition from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. Absolute idealism, or at least certain aspects of it, would be a philosophical utopia in the realm of necessity but could become "truth" after the transition from one realm to the other."

[AshvinP]

Precisely. He was most concerned with debasing of the material world, but there is also debasing of the spiritual world, i.e. materialism, Marxism (which Nietzche took to task in "tarantulas" passage of Zarathustra), etc. Even certain forms of religious fundamentalism debase the spiritual world. This is why I am careful to point out the metaphysical split itself is the problem, rather than any particular worldview downstream of it - its an equal opportunity debaser of realms we exist in.

Why then the focus on individual salvation, rather than changing the 'material' realities which are the source of these debasements?

The 'material' realities are not the source of the split from polarity into duality and debasements in both directions, rather it is a metaphysical-spiritual source. That is precisely why the 'solutions' must be found at the level of individual soul-spirit, i.e. collective policies aimed at changing the material realities are simply band-aids for gunshot wounds until the hard individual work has been done. I love this profound quote from Jung which captures the essence of the Nietzschean critique of Christian theology:

Perhaps this sounds very simple, but simple things are always the most difficult. In actual life it requires the greatest art to be simple, and so acceptance of oneself is the essence of the moral problem and the acid test of one’s whole outlook on life. That I feed the beggar, that I forgive an insult, that I love my enemy in the name of Christ—all these are undoubtedly great virtues. What I do unto the least of my brethren, that I do unto Christ.

But what if I should discover that the least amongst them all, the poorest of all beggars, the most impudent of all offenders, yea the very fiend himself—that these are within me, and that I myself stand in need of the alms of my own kindness, that I myself am the enemy who must be loved—what then?

Then, as a rule, the whole truth of Christianity is reversed: there is then no more talk of love and long-suffering; we say to the brother within us “Raca,” and condemn and rage against ourselves. We hide him from the world, we deny ever having met this least among the lowly in ourselves, and had it been God himself who drew near to us in this despicable form, we should have denied him a thousand times before a single cock had crowed.

Re Nietzsche and Marxism, I think indications of the reconciliation of the concerns of both Nietzsche, Marx and of theology can be found is some of the writings of Gramsci in his Prison Notebooks. He writes:

"As a philosophy, historical materialism asserts theoretically that every "truth" thought to be eternal and absolute has practical origins and has represented or represents a provisonal value. But the difficulty lies in making people understand what it means "in practice" to interpret historical materialism itself in this light. Such an interpretation is foreshadowed by Engels when he talks about a transition from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. Absolute idealism, or at least certain aspects of it, would be a philosophical utopia in the realm of necessity but could become "truth" after the transition from one realm to the other."

I would need a lot more context to evaluate the 'reconciliation' which is being attempted here. As far as I can tell, individual freedom at the expense of market inequality cannot be tolerated by Marxism but is exactly what Nietzsche would advocate for. He recognized we as humans cannot even perceive or think without first developing a hierarchy of values-priorities which necessarily entails inequality. Furthermore, ancient pre-Christian mythology, for ex. Zarathustra, Homer's plays, Aeschylus' Prometheus, etc. remains extremely relevant and useful in Nietzsche's thought, while it becomes just another "opiate for the masses" in Marx.

[JustinG]

If all truths are provisonal, as Gramsci and Nietzsche tell us, then this includes 'truths' such as those that claim that material/spiritual debasement has a metaphysical-spiritual source and that individual freedom is premised on market inequality. From a Gramscian point of view, these 'truths' have their origins in the social relations of the market and the competitive, alienated individualism which arises from it.

Of course, to be consistent, Gramsci must also recognise that the 'truth' that competive individualism is a product of market social relations is also a provisional truth determined by social relations. However, I think that Gramsci has an advantage over something like Jungian individualism with its timeless archetypes, in that Gramsci does indeed recognise the provisional nature of his own truth claims (hence, Gramsci acknowledges that absolute idealism may be the philosophy of the future). Any Nietzshean based critique which does not acknowledge the provisional nature of its own 'truths' cannot ground itself and cuts itself off at the feet.

[AshvinP]

If all truths are provisonal, as Gramsci and Nietzsche tell us, then this includes 'truths' such as those that claim that material/spiritual debasement has a metaphysical-spiritual source and that individual freedom is premised on market inequality. From a Gramscian point of view, these 'truths' have their origins in the social relations of the market and the competitive, alienated individualism which arises from it.

Of course, to be consistent, Gramsci must also recognise that the 'truth' that competive individualism is a product of market social relations is also a provisional truth determined by social relations. However, I think that Gramsci has an advantage over something like Jungian individualism with its timeless archetypes, in that Gramsci does indeed recognise the provisional nature of his own truth claims (hence, Gramsci acknowledges that absolute idealism may be the philosophy of the future). Any Nietzshean based critique which does not acknowledge the provisional nature of its own 'truths' cannot ground itself and cuts itself off at the feet.

That is not accurate from my assessment of Nietzsche. We had a similar debate on "the nosedive of philosophy" thread over whether Nietzsche was a moral and/or epistemic relativist. He was not because he wants to affirm everything that is unique, artistic, empowering and noble about human existence. There is reasonable room for debate on exactly what qualities of humans fit within those categories, but they still serve as a solid plane of reference by which he judges all 'truth' claims. Indeed he wants to reimagine traditional notions of "truth" and "morality" as ends-in-themselves into tools which may be used to promote life and ever-increasing human capacity for imagination and spiritual freedom, i.e. "you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free".

Adherence to 'external' authorities and dictates will never be life-affirming in that way, according to Nietzsche. It doesn't matter if it's the Church or the State or a Commune defining the 'acceptable' conduct, controlling the resources and making demands of its members - if it involves undermining of individual sovereignty through compulsion then it has very little to zero truth value for him, full stop. It's remarkably similar to the American pragmatic view in that regard as well as corresponding Continental philosophy. There is nothing 'provisional' about the natural course of life and our experiences within that natural course, rather it is the only real standard against which concepts of truth, morality, justice, etc. can be measured.

[JustinG]

Well there are many readings of Nietzsche I suppose, but his perspectivism is not the same as relativism, and the truth of living is not the same as life being eternally unchanging. Section 24 of essay three of the Genealogy of morals on the "will to truth" and the ascetic ideal is apposite here: http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Clas ... alogy3.htm

[AshvinP]

If all truths are provisonal, as Gramsci and Nietzsche tell us, then this includes 'truths' such as those that claim that material/spiritual debasement has a metaphysical-spiritual source and that individual freedom is premised on market inequality. From a Gramscian point of view, these 'truths' have their origins in the social relations of the market and the competitive, alienated individualism which arises from it.

Of course, to be consistent, Gramsci must also recognise that the 'truth' that competive individualism is a product of market social relations is also a provisional truth determined by social relations. However, I think that Gramsci has an advantage over something like Jungian individualism with its timeless archetypes, in that Gramsci does indeed recognise the provisional nature of his own truth claims (hence, Gramsci acknowledges that absolute idealism may be the philosophy of the future). Any Nietzshean based critique which does not acknowledge the provisional nature of its own 'truths' cannot ground itself and cuts itself off at the feet.

That is not accurate from my assessment of Nietzsche. We had a similar debate on "the nosedive of philosophy" thread over whether Nietzsche was a moral and/or epistemic relativist. He was not because he wants to affirm everything that is unique, artistic, empowering and noble about human existence. There is reasonable room for debate on exactly what qualities of humans fit within those categories, but they still serve as a solid plane of reference by which he judges all 'truth' claims. Indeed he wants to reimagine traditional notions of "truth" and "morality" as ends-in-themselves into tools which may be used to promote life and ever-increasing human capacity for imagination and spiritual freedom, i.e. "you shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free".

Adherence to 'external' authorities and dictates will never be life-affirming in that way, according to Nietzsche. It doesn't matter if it's the Church or the State or a Commune defining the 'acceptable' conduct, controlling the resources and making demands of its members - if it involves undermining of individual sovereignty through compulsion then it has very little to zero truth value for him, full stop. It's remarkably similar to the American pragmatic view in that regard as well as corresponding Continental philosophy. There is nothing 'provisional' about the natural course of life and our experiences within that natural course, rather it is the only real standard against which concepts of truth, morality, justice, etc. can be measured.

Additional thoughts - for myself, and for Nietzsche from what I can tell from his writings and various commentary, the spiritual freedom of primary concern is not necessarily a question of how we act or respond to external authority in any given situation. Clearly we are going to live by some normative standards of conduct in most communities, at least for the foreseeable future. It is more of a question of how we perceive-think about ourselves and what kind of narratives we put out into the world, religious, secular or otherwise, through that self-image. And that couldn't possibly be more relevant than it is today.

Nietzsche famously remarked, "morality is cowardice". Meaning, we need to take a hard look at ourselves, a deep inventory, and see whether we are being polite, helpful, considerate, charitable, compassionate, unobtrusive, etc. because we genuinely want to or, rather, because we are deeply afraid of the legal and social consequences of not acting in that way. We have evolved to be more acutely sensitive to negative emotion than positive emotion, which makes sense in a landscape dominated by all manner of things which may eat you alive, and those things still exist today in varied forms, but now we have the capacity to reflect on that inner process and discern when it is much less warranted than we may imagine.

Are we simply thinking and behaving in a certain manner to avoid the negative emotion associated with guilt and shame and/or to get the positive emotion from the affirmation of our [digital] peers, or do we genuinely want to look under the hood and dig deep into our inner workings, to test our soul and spirit in the face of its free expression. It is a process which is simultaneously liberating and daunting as it reminds us that our individual mode of being is truly what makes the difference in the world, yet with great freedom comes great responsibility. There are no more excuses in the face of that freedom; no socioeconomic inequalities, no political parties, no ancestors and no God(s) to blame.

[AshvinP]

Well there are many readings of Nietzsche I suppose, but his perspectivism is not the same as relativism, and the truth of living is not the same as life being eternally unchanging. Section 24 of essay three of the Genealogy of morals on the "will to truth" and the ascetic ideal is apposite here: http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Clas ... alogy3.htm

Yes the 'will to truth' manifests in totalizing rational frameworks which seek to reduce the world into a series of propositions and 'objective facts', which Nietsche recognizes as an unconscious 'will to power'. Marxism fits pretty squarely into that category. The ascetic ideals also manifest across the board, a privileging of "truth", "justice", "equality", etc. over life, as ideals to be sought for their own sake rather than as a means to the realization of the free human spirit. They only become conceptualized as such in light of deep metaphysical division between human-God, natural-supernatural, matter-mind, etc. Eventually one pole gets privileged over the other to such a degree that the other one no longer exists in any important way. In Marxism, the psycho-spiritual becomes an "opiate for the masses". In theistic fundamentalism, the material/natural realm becomes so tainted by sin that any values connected to it must be shunned and it must be escaped from in one manner or another.

Beyond that, I really don't think Nietszche's disdain for the Marxist framework could get any more clear than it does in Zarathustra:

Behold, this is the hole of the tarantula. Do you want to see the tarantula itself? Here hangs its web; touch it, that it tremble!

There it comes willingly: welcome, tarantula! Your triangle and symbol sits black on your back; and I also know what sits in your soul. Revenge sits in your soul: wherever you bite, black scabs grow; your poison makes the soul whirl with revenge.

Thus I speak to you in a parable—you who make souls whirl, you preachers of equality. To me you are tarantulas, and secretly vengeful. But I shall bring your secrets to light; therefore I laugh in your faces with my laughter of the heights. Therefore I tear at your webs, that your rage may lure you out of your lie-holes and your revenge may leap out from behind your word justice. For that man be delivered from revenge, that is for me the bridge to the highest hope, and a rainbow after long storms.

The tarantulas, of course, would have it otherwise. “What justice means to us is precisely that the world be filled with the storms of our revenge”—thus they speak to each other. “We shall wreak vengeance and abuse on all whose equals we are not”—thus do the tarantula-hearts vow. “And ‘will to equality’ shall henceforth be the name for virtue; and against all that has power we want to raise our clamor!”

You preachers of equality, the tyrannomania of impotence clamors thus out of you for equality: your most secret ambitions to be tyrants thus shroud themselves in words of virtue. Aggrieved conceit, repressed envy—perhaps the conceit and envy of your fathers—erupt from you as a flame and as the frenzy of revenge.

And it only gets more forceful from there. Perhaps you are referring to a Marxism which does not envision compulsion in redirecting wealth or a complete equalization of material circumstances, but that would be a very unusual form of Marxism.

[Lou Gold]

In theistic fundamentalism, the material/natural realm becomes so tainted by sin that any values connected to it must be shunned and it must be escaped from in one manner or another.

Makes me feel, "Perhaps you are offering a sinless (forgiving because there is nothing to forgive) Christianity, "but that would be a very unusual form of Christianity."

[AshvinP]

In theistic fundamentalism, the material/natural realm becomes so tainted by sin that any values connected to it must be shunned and it must be escaped from in one manner or another.

Makes me feel, "Perhaps you are offering a sinless (forgiving because there is nothing to forgive) Christianity, "but that would be a very unusual form of Christianity."

Not at all, the sinful nature of humanity is undeniable. I am suggesting the sinner is not other than the redeemer of sin. What naturally evolved into humanity will also be naturally redeemed by humanity, as opposed to some supernatural force which we can never really relate to or comprehend.

[Lou Gold]

In theistic fundamentalism, the material/natural realm becomes so tainted by sin that any values connected to it must be shunned and it must be escaped from in one manner or another.

Makes me feel, "Perhaps you are offering a sinless (forgiving because there is nothing to forgive) Christianity, "but that would be a very unusual form of Christianity."

Not at all, the sinful nature of humanity is undeniable. I am suggesting the sinner is not other than the redeemer of sin. What naturally evolved into humanity will also be naturally redeemed by humanity, as opposed to some supernatural force which we can never really relate to or comprehend.

Redeemed by a natural (not supernatural) force of which humanity is part but not top dog. Nature bats last! It's very relatable if one is willing to relate rather than be diverted by notions of Nirvana or Heaven. However, I agree that when viewed through an ecological lens, "the sinful nature of humanity is undeniable."