SanteriSatama wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 6:32 pm
AshvinP wrote: ↑Sat Jul 24, 2021 5:56 pm
That is the mystical/animist approach.
I don't think you are sharing a communicative meaning for either of those words. Nagarjuna was not a "mystic", as BK said, he was the Gödel of his age who deconstructed rationalistic logicism and logicism case for substance metaphysics with tools of logic. The two basic levels of animism, 1) intersubjective relations and 2) asubjective multiperspectivism are not beyond language, hence not "mystical".
I said BK and Schopenhauer - I am leaving Nagarjuna out because way too many confusions come in when dealing with non-Western philosophies 2,000 years ago. I try to stick within the ambit of the culture/language I have inherited and thinkers in the modern age, because we are most familiar with their mode of consciousness, since it also our own. I do not want to project my own mode of consciousness back onto Nagarjuna or any other ancient thinker. Related to that, I have not read anything he wrote. Animism seems to me like a very broad category and more like a cultural ethos than formal philosophy, so I am fine leaving that out of the naïve realism criticism for now.
But the BK-Schopenhauer view is definitely mystical, a sort of secular mysticism which is pretty popular these days, and within the naïve realist methodology. As usual, it does not matter one bit what labels we use, only if we are understanding the approach correctly. Schopenhauer perceives willing activity in his bodily actions and he takes that to be the
sole objective and universal Reality. Percepts of our personal willing activity have no superior noumenal value than percepts of a tree in our backyard simply because they appear to come from within instead of from without. So I call that also a form of naïve realism that he was engaged in.
SS wrote:Ashvin wrote:
meaning/qualia is fundamental.
Why would such basic phenomenological observation require monistic substance reduction, and how is that supposed to be criticism of Nagarjuna?
I am wondering if you have a position on the underlying criricism that there is naive realism when relational QM is transposed onto Reality?
I have plenty of criticism of details and mathematical foundation of RQM (etc. physicalist theories) and in general reductionism to any form of abstract spatial thinking, which I've stated in previous threads. However, those are not relevant to arguing in favour of substance metaphysics and against relational process ontology. Or relevant only in favour of relational process ontology, on which also scientific method rests, when correctly understood.
I am not criticizing Nagarjuna for the reasons stated above. I am not arguing for substance metaphysics, as I have also stated in many previous threads. There is nothing in process philosophy that requires an anti-essential position. Bergson was quintessential process philosopher and he still held to fundamental essences, as reflected in his last published book. Rovelli is not simply adopting process philosophy in
Helgoland, he is commenting on fundamental ontology. At least that seems evident to me from the quotes which have been posted here, and BK seems to think so as well. I doubt BK got that wrong. The anti-essentialist ontological position stems from a failure to see that, what is not accessible to mere abstract intellect, can still fundamentally and
objectively exist for all relational perspectives. That is 100% naïve realism - mistaking his own perceptive-cognitive limitations for the very essence (or "non-essence") of Reality.